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THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY OF
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CONTRACTS
Oren Bar-Gillt
Almost three million subprime loans were originated in 2006, bringing
the total value of outstanding subprime loans over a trillion dollars. A few
months later the subprime crisis began, with soaring foreclosure rates and
hundreds of billions, perhaps trillions, of dollars in losses to borrowers, lend-
ers, neighborhoods, and cities, not to mention broader effects on the U.S. and
world economies. In this Article, I focus on the subprime mortgage contract
and its central design features. I argue that these contractual design features
can be explained as a rational market response to the imperfect rationality of
borrowers. Accordingly, for many subprime borrowers, loan contracts were
not welfare maximizing. And to the extent that the design of subprime mort-
gage contracts contributed to the subprime crisis, the welfare loss to borrow-
ers-substantial in itself-is compounded by much broader social costs.
Finally, I argue that a better understanding of the market failure that pro-
duced these inefficient contracts should inform the ongoing efforts to reform
the regulations governing the subprime market.
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INTRODUCTION
Almost three million subprime loans were originated in 2006,
bringing the total value of outstanding subprime loans over a trillion
dollars.' A few months later the subprime crisis began, with soaring
1 See Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
22 REv. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 6 & n.6, 7 tbl.1, on file with authors)
(analyzing data covering approximately 85 percent of securitized subprime loans. In 2006,
75 percent of subprime loans were securitized, and the authors' data set included
1,772,000 subprime loans originated in 2006, implying a total of 1,772,000 / (0.85 * 0.75) =
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CONTRACTS
foreclosure rates and hundreds of billions-perhaps trillions-of dol-
lars in losses to borrowers, lenders, neighborhoods, and cities, not to
mention broader effects on the U.S. and world economies. 2 In this
Article, I focus on the subprime mortgage contract and its central de-
sign features. I argue that for many borrowers these contractual de-
sign features were not welfare maximizing. And to the extent that the
design of subprime mortgage contracts contributed to the subprime
crisis, the welfare loss to borrowers-substantial in itself-is com-
pounded by much broader social costs. Finally, I argue that a better
understanding of the market failure that produced these inefficient
contracts should inform the ongoing efforts to reform the regulations
governing the subprime market.
During the five years preceding the crisis, the subprime market
experienced staggering growth as riskier loans were made to riskier
borrowers." Not surprisingly, these riskier loans came at the price of
higher interest rates that compensated lenders for the increased risk
that they undertook.4 But high prices themselves are not the central
problem; the problem is that lenders hid these high prices and bor-
rowers underappreciated them. In the prime market, the traditional
loan is a standardized thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage (FRM). Lenders
could have accounted for the increased risk of subprime loans by sim-
ply raising the interest rate on the traditional FRM. Yet the typical
subprime loan is a far cry from an FRM. The subprime market
2,779,608); see also State of the U.S. Economy and Implications for the Federal Budget: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong. 10 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (prepared
statement of Peter Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office) ("By the end of 2006,
the outstanding value of subprime mortgages totaled more than $1 trillion and accounted
for about 13 percent of all home mortgages."). The Center for Responsible Lending esti-
mates that as of November 27, 2007, there were 7.2 million outstanding subprime loans
with an estimated total value of $1.3 trillion. A Snapshot of the Subprime Market, Center
for Responsible Lending, http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgage/quick-ref-
erences/a-snapshot-of-the-subprime.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) [hereinafter CRL
Snapshot].
2 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS
2008 TO 2018, 23 (2008) [hereinafter CBO OUTLOOK], available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdoc.cfm?index=8917&type=l (noting estimates of between $200 billion and $500 billion
for total subprime-related losses and noting the additional-and potentially substantial-
indirect adverse effects of the subprime crisis on the economy); see also Henry M. Paulson,
Jr., U.S. Sec'y of the Treasury, Remarks on Current Housing and Mortgage Market Devel-
opments at the Georgetown University Law Center (Oct. 16, 2007), available at http://
www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp612.htm (noting that foreclosures on subprime loans
increased more than 200 percent between 2000 and 2006 and discussing the broad impact
of these foreclosures on the economy).
3 See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5, 7 tbl.1); Center for
Responsible Lending, Mortgage Lending Overview, http://www.responsiblelending.org/
issues/mortgage/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
4 See Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Preda-
tory Lending: Price, 65 Mn. L. REV. 707, 720-21 (2006) (describing the development of risk-
based pricing in the mortgage market).
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boasted a broad variety of complex loans with multidimensional pric-
ing structures. Hybrid loans, combining fixed and variable rates, in-
terest-only loans, and option-payment adjustable-rate mortgages
(ARMs)-each product type with its own multidimensional design-
were all common in the expanding subprime market. Many of these
contractual designs were not new; they were known in the prime mar-
ket since the early 1980s. But it was in the subprime market where
they first took center stage.5
Common subprime mortgage contracts share two suspect fea-
tures. The first is cost deferral. (Of course, any loan contract involves
deferred costs; I am referring to deferral of costs beyond that which is
necessarily implied by the very nature of a loan.) The traditional
prime mortgage required a 20 percent down payment, which implies
a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of no more than 80 percent. In the sub-
prime market, in 2006, over 40 percent of loans had LTVs exceeding
90 percent. Focusing on purchase-money loans in 2005, 2006, and the
first half of 2007, the median subprime borrower put no money down,
borrowing 100 percent of the purchase price of the house. The
schedule of payments on the loan itself exhibits the same deferred-
cost characteristic. Under the standard prime FRM, the borrower
pays the same dollar amount each month-a flat payment schedule.
Under a conventional ARM, where the monthly payment is calculated
by adding a fixed number of percentage points to a fluctuating index,
the dollar amount paid varies from month to month but without any
systemic trajectory. The majority of subprime loans, on the other
hand, exhibited an increasing payment schedule: they set a low inter-
est rate for an introductory period-commonly two years-and a
higher interest rate for the remaining term of the loan. Other sub-
prime loans exhibited an even steeper payment schedule. Interest-
only loans and payment-option ARMs allowed for zero or negative
amortization during the introductory period, further increasing the
step-up in the monthly payment after the introductory period ended.
A direct implication of an escalating-payments contract is the "pay-
ment shock," which occurs when a rate reset leads to a significant, up
to 100 percent, increase in the monthly payment.
The second suspect feature of subprime contracts is their level of
complexity. While the traditional FRM sets a single, constant interest
rate, the typical subprime mortgage includes multiple interest rates,
some of which are implicitly defined by nontrivial formulas that adjust
5 A note on terminology: The residential mortgage market is divided into the prime
segment and the nonprime segment. The nonprime segment is further divided into sub-
prime (higher risk) and Alt-A (lower risk), although the line between subprime and Alt-A
is not always clear. See infra Part I.A. Many of the contractual design features studied in
this Article were common in both the subprime and Alt-A segments. For expositional con-
venience, I will sometimes refer to these two segments together as "subprime."
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rates from one period to the next. The typical subprime loan also
features a host of fees-some applicable at different time periods dur-
ing the loan term, some contingent on various exogenous changes or
on borrower behavior. The numerous fees associated with a subprime
loan fall under two categories: (1) origination fees, including a credit
check fee, an appraisal fee, a flood certification fee, a tax certification
fee, an escrow analysis fee, an underwriting analysis fee, a document
preparation fee, and separate fees for sending emails, faxes, and cou-
rier mail; and (2) post-origination fees, including late fees, foreclo-
sure fees, prepayment penalties, and dispute-resolution or arbitration
fees. These fees can add up to thousands of dollars, or up to 20 per-
cent of the loan amount. The prepayment option, of special impor-
tance in the subprime market, further complicates the valuation of
these contracts. So does the (implicit) default option. Finally, since a
borrower must choose among many different, complex products, each
with a different set of multidimensional prices and features, the com-
plexity of the borrower's decision is exponentially greater than the
already high level of complexity of a single contract.6
What explains these contractual design features?7 I begin by ex-
ploring possible rational-choice explanations. Consider the cost-
deferral feature. A common explanation for deferred-cost contracts is
based on the affordability argument. Many subprime borrowers, at
the time they took out their loans, were liquidity constrained: they
could afford only a small down payment and a small monthly pay-
ment. The catch, of course, is that a small down payment and a small
initial monthly payment imply higher monthly payments in the future,
after the initial rate resets to the post-introductory level. Accordingly,
the rationality of the affordability argument depends on the ability of
the borrower to either make the high future payment or to avoid it.
And so the argument splits into two sub-arguments: the "make" argu-
ment and the "avoid" argument. The "make" argument is that the
borrower will anticipate being able to make the higher payment if she
expects her income to increase substantially by the end of the intro-
ductory period. Some subprime borrowers rationally expected such a
substantial increase in income; many others did not.
Next, the "avoid" argument: the borrower will be able to avoid
the higher payment if she expects to prepay the mortgage before the
6 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,524-25 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226) ("[P]roducts in the subprime market tend to be complex, both relative
to the prime market and in absolute terms ....").
7 As noted above, these contractual design features appeared in the prime market
well before the subprime expansion. The explanations considered below apply to prime
mortgages that share the deferred-cost and high-complexity features. These explanations
also reveal why these existing design features rose to prominence in the subprime market
and, as argued below, even facilitated the subprime expansion.
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introductory period ends. The prepayment option depends on the
expected ability to sell the house, on the expected availability of refi-
nance loans with attractive terms, and on the expected ability to sell
the house at an attractive price. Attractive refinancing and sale op-
tions will be available if (1) the borrower's credit score improves; (2)
market interest rates fall; or (3) house prices increase. Some borrow-
ers rationally expected that such positive realizations would enable
them to refinance their deferred-cost mortgage and avoid the high
long-term costs. For many other borrowers, these expectations were
overly optimistic.
An alternative, rational-choice explanation portrays the deferred-
cost mortgage as an investment vehicle designed to facilitate specula-
tion on real estate prices. If house prices rise, the speculator will sell
the house (or refinance) and pocket the difference between the lower
buy price and the higher sell price, without ever paying the high long-
term cost of the deferred-cost loan. If house prices fall, the speculator
will default on the mortgage, again avoiding the high long-term cost.
Of course, default is not a cost-free proposition, but as long as the
probability of a price increase is high enough, the upside benefit will
offset the downside risk. Some subprime borrowers were surely specu-
lators. Many others, however, were not.
I now turn to the second identified design feature: complexity
and multidimensionality. First consider the multiple, indirectly de-
fined interest rates.8 The index-driven rate adjustments of an ARM-
further complicated by maximum adjustment caps-can be explained
as a means to efficiently allocate the risk of fluctuating interest rates
between lenders and borrowers. This explanation, however, was more
powerful when interest-rate risk was shared by the lender and bor-
rower. During the subprime expansion, when securitization was prev-
alent, this risk could have been-and sometimes was-passed on to
diversified investors. Next consider the proliferation of fees common
in subprime mortgage contracts. A rational-choice model can explain
at least some of these fees. Charging separate fees for separate ser-
vices allows each borrower to pick and choose between the offered
services according to her individual preferences. But this efficiency
story applies only to optional services; it does not apply to the numer-
ous non-optional, yet separately priced, services such as the credit
check and document preparation. Another explanation views the
proliferation of fees as reflecting efficient risk-based pricing. For ex-
ample, delinquency imposes a cost on lenders. Late fees and foreclo-
sure fees allocate this cost to the delinquent borrowers. Absent such
fees, nondelinquent borrowers would bear a large share of the costs
8 To the extent that interest-rate complexity is an artifact of the deferred-cost fea-
tures, the preceding discussion applies here as well.
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imposed by delinquent borrowers, as lenders would raise interest rates
to compensate for the forgone fees. Again, this explanation is plausi-
ble for certain fees but not for others.
The rational-choice theories explain some of the observed con-
tractual designs in some contexts. They do not, however, provide a
complete account: a rational-choice model does not fully explain the
prevalence of cost deferral and the exceedingly high level of complex-
ity. To fill this explanatory gap, I develop a behavioral-economics the-
ory of the subprime mortgage contract. I argue that the design of
these contracts can be explained as a rational market response to the
imperfect rationality of borrowers. Myopic borrowers unduly focus on
the short-term dimensions of the loan contract and pay insufficient
attention to the long-term dimensions. Optimistic borrowers underes-
timate the future cost of the deferred-cost contract. They overesti-
mate their future income. They expect to have unrealistically
attractive refinance options. Or, they overestimate the expected value
of a bet placed on the real estate market, perhaps because they irra-
tionally expect that a 10 percent price increase last year will be repli-
cated next year.9 If myopic and optimistic borrowers focus on the
short term and discount the long term, then lenders will offer de-
ferred-cost contracts with low short-term prices and high long-term
prices.
A similar argument explains the complexity of subprime mort-
gage contracts. Imperfectly rational borrowers will not be able to ef-
fectively aggregate multiple price and nonprice dimensions and
discern from them the true total cost of the mortgage product. Inevi-
tably, these borrowers will focus on a few salient dimensions. If bor-
rowers cannot process complex, multidimensional contracts and thus
ignore less salient price dimensions, then lenders will offer complex,
multidimensional contracts, shifting much of the loan's cost to the
less salient dimensions.10
While focusing on only one part of the subprime picture-the
design of subprime loan contracts-this Article develops an alterna-
tive account of the dynamics that led to the subprime crisis. One com-
mon account focuses on unscrupulous lenders who pushed risky
9 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech
at the Women in Housing and Finance and Exchequer Club Joint Luncheon, Washington,
D.C.: Financial Markets, the Economic Outlook, and Monetary Policy (Jan. 10, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080110a.htm [here-
inafter Bernanke January 2008 Speech] (suggesting that the ARM design responds to
optimism about house prices).
10 See Edmund L. Andrews, Fed and Regulators Shrugged as the Subprime Crisis Spread:
Analysis Finds Trail of Warnings on Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at Al (quoting Edward
M. Gramlich, the former Federal Reserve governor, asking "Why are the most risky loan
products sold to the least sophisticated borrowers? .. .The question answers itself-the
least sophisticated borrowers are probably duped into taking these products.").
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credit onto borrowers who were incapable of repaying." Another
common account focuses on irresponsible borrowers who took out
loans they could not repay. 12 Both accounts capture some of what was
going on during the subprime boom, but both accounts are incom-
plete. In many cases borrowers were not reckless; they were imper-
fectly rational. And in many cases lenders were not evil; they were
simply responding to a demand for financing that was driven by bor-
rowers' imperfect rationality.
This Article highlights a demand-side market failure: imperfectly
rational borrowers "demanded" complex deferred-cost loan contracts
and lenders met this demand. But the failures in the subprime mort-
gage market were not limited to the demand side. In fact, a supply-
side market failure explains why lenders willingly catered to borrow-
ers' imperfectly rational demand even when the demanded product
designs increased the default risk borne by lenders.1-3 The main cul-
11 There are numerous accounts of abusive practices falling under the general head-
ing of predatory lending, many of them predating the recent subprime crisis. See U.S.
DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME & RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUB-
PRIME LENDING IN AMERICA 1 (2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/
pdf/unequal-full.pdf (documenting "the rapid growth of subprime lending during the
1990's" and calling for increased scrutiny of subprime loans due to "growing evidence of
widespread predatory practices in the subprime market"). While there is surely some over-
lap between the contractual design features studied in this Article and the problem of
predatory lending, the extent of the overlap is unclear, largely because there is no agreed-
upon definition of predatory lending. See U.S. DEP'T OF HoUs. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 17 (2000), available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfin/curbing.html [hereinafter HUD-TREASURY
REPORT]. Yet, two observations can be made: First, the more severe instances of predatory
lending go far beyond manipulation of contractual design. Second, the identified contrac-
tual design features are more ubiquitous than at least the more severe manifestations of
predatory lending. Cf. Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of
Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO, L. REv. 1, 11-20 (2009) (discussing the relationship between
predatory lending and subprime lending).
12 In some cases, borrowers engaged in outright fraud. SeeJennifer E. Bethel, Allen
Ferrell & Gang Hu, Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from the 2007-2008 Credit
Crisis 17 (Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 212; Harvard Law Sch. Program on
Risk Regulation Research Paper No. 08-5, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/ab-
stract=1096582 (citing evidence of widespread fraud in the application and appraisal
processes among early payment default loans).
13 An immediate response is that lenders priced the increased risk. And there is some
evidence of such pricing. See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5).
But this response is misleading. The evidence shows that subprime risks were not accu-
rately priced. See U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE
COMMISSION STAFF'S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 34-35 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexaminationO70808.pdf [hereinafter
SEC RATING AGENCIES REPORT] (finding that rating agencies underestimated risks associ-
ated with subprime mortgage-backed securities); Bethel et al., supra note 12. Bethel, Fer-
rell, and Hu argue that even sophisticated market participants had limited experience with
and understanding of the assets (subprime residential mortgages) underlying the securi-
ties (RMBSs and CDOs), and what risks these assets generate when pooled and securitized.
In addition, credit-rating models underestimate the correlation of defaults and thus under-
state risk. Moreover, major investment banks are under investigation by the SEC, the FBI,
1080
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prit is securitization-the process of issuing securities backed by large
pools of mortgage obligations. Securitization created a host of agency
problems, as a series of agents-intermediaries tasked with originat-
ing loans, pooling and packaging them into mortgage-backed securi-
ties, and assessing the risk associated with the different securities-
stood between the principals, the investors who ultimately funded the
mortgage loans, and the borrowers. The compensation of these
agents-intermediaries was not designed to align their interests with
those of the principals-investors: their fees were based on the quantity,
not quality, of processed loans. As a result, the agents-intermediaries
had strong incentives to increase the volume of originations, even at
the expense of originating low-quality, high-risk loans, by promoting
mortgage products that, with high levels of complexity and cost defer-
ral, created the appearance of affordability.1 4 Moreover, it is likely
and state attorneys general with respect to pricing of RMBSs and CDOs, suggesting that
mispricing may be the result of malice, not only incompetence. See Bethel et al., supra note
12, at 2; see also SEC RATING AGENCIES REPORT, supra, at 12 (citing an analyst from one
rating agency who wrote in an e-mail that "her firm's model did not capture 'half of the
deal's risk"); Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Behind AIG's Fall, Risk Models Failed to Pass Real-
World Test, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2008, at Al (discussing the failure of AIG's risk models and
quoting Warren Buffett: "All I can say is, beware of geeks ... bearing formulas.").
14 See Scott Woll, The Buildup to a Fall, MORTGAGE BANKING, Nov. 2007, at 50, 53-54
(describing how lenders and securitizers profiting from increased loan volume "started
looking at new ideas [to increase loan volume] .... What followed was the largest intro-
duction of new products to the mortgage market in decades."); see also Zywicki & Adamson,
supra note 11, at 51-53 (discussing agency costs in the subprime market); Frederic S.
Mishkin, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the U.S. Monetary
Policy Forum, New York, New York: Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage
Meltdown (Feb. 29, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
mishkin2008O229a.htm (arguing that rating agencies, underwriters, and CDO mangers
were driven by fees). But see Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime Panic 27-31 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14398, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w14398 (arguing that agency costs were not that large, as many agents along the
securitization chain retained substantial risks on their balance sheets). On the compensa-
tion structure and incentives of loan originators, see Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Testimony Before the Committee on Financial Services,
U.S. House of Representatives: Subprime Mortgage Lending and Mitigating Foreclosures
(Sept. 20, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/
bernanke20070920a.htm (noting that since originators profited from fees and yield-spread
premiums, they were more interested in increasing loan volume than in increasing loan
quality). On the compensation structure and incentives of the rating agencies charged
with assessing the risk associated with mortgage-backed securities, see SEC RATING AcEN-
CES REPORT, supra note 13 (finding inadequate rating procedures and conflicts of interest,
which led to underestimation of risk, which in turn contributed to the failure of investors
and investment banks to press originators for safer loans);Jan A. Kregel, Changes in the U.S.
Financial System and the Subprime Crisis 16 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper
No. 530, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=123937 (noting how rating agencies
that provided more lax assessment of subprime risks got more business-and more fees-
from securitizers). These interinstitutional agency costs come on top of the intrainstitu-
tional agency costs stemming from the imperfect alignment of incentives between each
one of the financial intermediaries and its employees. See, e.g., Martin Wolf, Why Regulators
Should Intervene in Bankers'Pay, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at 13 (discussing the conflicts of
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that even sophisticated investors and financial intermediaries were
caught up in the frenzy of the real estate boom and underestimated
the risks associated with the mortgage products that they were ped-
dling.'5 The multibillion dollar losses incurred by these sophisticated
players provide (at least suggestive) evidence that imperfect rationality
was not confined to the demand side of the subprime market.' 6
The proposed behavioral-economics theory offers a more com-
plete account of the dynamics in the subprime market and of how
these dynamics shaped the design of subprime loan contracts. These
contractual design features have substantial welfare implications, espe-
cially when understood as a market response to the imperfect rational-
interest that exist within lending institutions). Beyond these more subtle-albeit finan-
cially substantial-agency costs, there is evidence that some agents-intermediaries withheld
information from principals-investors. See Bethel et al., supra note 12, at 2 (noting that
investment banks are under investigation by the SEC, the FBI, and state attorneys general
for withholding information affecting credit risk from rating agencies and investors).
15 See Bethel et al., supra note 12, at 27 ("The market appears to have not fully antici-
pated the probability or effect of correlated market events or the very small probability of
an extremely negative outcome."); Martin S. Feldstein, Housing, Credit Markets and the Busi-
ness Cycle 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13471, 2007), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w3471 (arguing that investors underestimated and mis-
priced risks); Gorton, supra note 14, at 26 (arguing that the complexity of the securitiza-
tion process led to a loss of information along the securitization chain); Joseph R. Mason &
Joshua Rosner, Where Did The Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed
Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Disruptions 35-36 (SSRN Working Paper,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027475 (arguing that investors and invest-
ment banks falsely believed that pooling mortgages diversifies risk). Much of this underes-
timation of risk harkens back to optimism about house prices. See, e.g., Thomas L.
Friedman, Op-Ed., All Fall Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, at A33 (citing Michael Lewis,
The End of Wall Street's Boom, PORTFOLIO.COM, Dec. 2008, http://www.portfolio.com/news-
markets/ national-news/ portfolio/ 2008/11 /11 /The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom (reporting,
based on a telephone conversation between hedge fund investor Steve Eisman and a Stan-
dard & Poor's employee, that S&P's models assumed that home prices would keep going
up)); Kristopher S. Gerardi et al., Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis I (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Boston, Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 09-1, 2008), available at http://www.bos.frb.
org/economic/ppdp/2009/ppdpO9Ol.htm (finding that analysts in 2005 understood the
risks of a steep decline in house prices but believed that the probability of such a decline
was very low); see also, e.g.,JuLIO ROTEMBERG, SUBPRIME MELTDOWN: AMERICAN HOUSING AND
GLOBAL FINANCIAL TURMOIL 1 (2008) (quoting a letter that Fannie Mae CEO Franklin
Raines sent to shareholders in 2001: "Housing is a safe, leveraged investment-the only
leveraged investment available to most families-and it is one of the best returning invest-
ments to make .... Homes will continue to appreciate in value. Home values are expected
to rise even faster in this decade than in the 1990's.").
16 See Bethel et al., supra note 12, at 21, 81 tbl.2 (summarizing the tens of billions of
dollars worth of subprime-related write-offs by banks; citing an estimate of $150 billion in
writedowns as of February 2008 and a forecast that this amount will more than double);
Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Subprime Write-Downs Could Reach $285 Billion, But
Are Likely Past The Halfway Mark (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www2.standardand
poors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/4,5,5,1,1204834027864.html (discussing
Standard & Poor's increased estimate of writedowns at $285 billion, up from $265 billion
earlier in the year). These losses do not provide conclusive evidence that sophisticated
players made mistakes; they could be the realization of the large (!) down-side risk in an
(ex ante) rational bet.
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ity of borrowers. First, excessive complexity prevents effective
comparison shopping and thus hinders competition in the subprime
mortgage market. Second, deferred-cost features are correlated with
increased levels of delinquency and foreclosure, which impose signifi-
cant costs not only on borrowers but also on surrounding communi-
ties, lenders, loan purchasers, and the economy at large. Third,
excessively complex deferred-cost contracts have adverse distributive
consequences, disproportionally burdening financially weaker-often
minority-borrowers. Finally, concentrating a loan's cost in less sali-
ent or underappreciated price dimensions artificially inflates the de-
mand for mortgage financing and, indirectly, for residential real
estate. The proposed theory thus establishes a causal link between
contractual design, on the one hand, and the subprime expansion
and the real estate boom, on the other. Accordingly, the subprime
meltdown that followed this expansion can also be attributed, at least
in part, to the identified contractual design features. 17
Importantly, the identified contractual design features and the
welfare costs associated with them are not the result of the less-than-
vigorous competition in the subprime market. In fact, enhanced com-
petition would likely make these design features even more pervasive.
If borrowers focus on the short term and discount the long term, then
competition will force lenders to offer deferred-cost contracts. And if
17 See Andrey Pavlov & Susan Wachter, Subprme Lending and House Price Volatility 2
(Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 08-33, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1316891 (establishing a link between the use of aggressive mort-
gage lending instruments and house price volatility). While contractual design contrib-
uted to the subprime expansion, there are other factors that likely played a more central
role in generating the subprime expansion. One such factor is the advent of new technol-
ogy that enabled efficient risk-based pricing. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO
THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, SPECIAL COMMITITEE ON AGING, U.S. SEN-
ATE, GAO-04-280, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES
IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 21 (2004) [hereinafter GAO CONSUMER PROTECTION
REPORT], available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf. Another factor is the increase
in the supply (or availability) of funds brought about by securitization and the global sav-
ing glut. See generally Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion:
Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Pa-
per No. 13936, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1072304 (arguing that the ex-
pansion in mortgage credit to subprime zip codes and its dissociation from income growth
is closely correlated with the increase in securitization of subprime mortgages); Ben S.
Bernanke, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Sandridge
Lecture, Virginia Association of Economics, Richmond, Virginia: The Global Saving Glut
and the U.S. Current Account Deficit (Mar. 10, 2005), available at http://www.feder-
alreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200503102/ (discussing how the global saving
glut reversed the flow of credit to developing and emerging-market economies). A third
factor is the increase in supply of funds for risky investments caused by investors' underesti-
mation of risk. See Feldstein, supra note 15. It is important to emphasize that the main
purpose of this Article is to explain the contractual design features common in subprime
mortgages-not the subprime expansion itself-although, as argued above, contractual
design did contribute to the subprime expansion.
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borrowers faced with complex, multidimensional contracts ignore less
salient price dimensions, then competition will force lenders to offer
complex, multidimensional contracts and to shift much of the loan's
cost to the less salient price dimensions. Thus, ensuring robust com-
petition in the subprime mortgage market would not solve the
problem. 8
The subprime crisis has spurred a plethora of reform proposals.' 9
One of these proposals has recently matured into law, as the Federal
Reserve Board (FRB), in July 2008, issued a new set of regulations
governing mortgage lending.20 The behavioral-economics theory de-
veloped in this Article can be used to evaluate the existing and pro-
posed regulatory solutions and to devise potentially superior
solutions. In this Article, I focus on disclosure regulation. I argue
that the centerpiece of the current disclosure regime, the Annual Per-
centage Rate (APR) disclosure, has the potential to undo the adverse
effects of imperfect rationality, including the identified contractual
design features and the welfare costs they impose.
The APR disclosure was the most important innovation of the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) of 1968.21 A normalized total-cost-of-
credit measure, the APR was designed to assist borrowers in compar-
ing among different loan products. In theory, the APR should solve-
or at least mitigate-both the complexity problem and the cost-defer-
ral problem. Complexity and multidimensionality pose a problem if
they hide the true cost of the loan. The APR responds to this concern
by folding the multiple price dimensions into a single measure. The
APR should similarly help short-sighted borrowers grasp the full cost
of deferred-cost loans, as the APR calculation assigns proper weight to
Is Cf Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REv.
749, 751 (2008) [hereinafter Bar-Gill, Consumer Contracts] (explaining that competition will
not always alleviate mistakes in the consumer-contracts market); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by
Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1373, 1388 (2004) [hereinafter Bar-Gill, Seduction] (arguing that
consumers' underestimation of their future borrowing leads to inefficiencies "that cannot
be cured even by perfect competition"); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit
Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 69 (2008) (noting that competition in the credit markets creates
valuable products and features while also creating an "array of risky products and unsafe
features").
19 Mortgage reform bills recently proposed in Congress include Emergency Home
Ownership and Mortgage Equity Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3609, 110th Cong. (2007);
Home Owners' Mortgage and Equity Savings Act, S. 2133, 110th Cong. (2007); Helping
Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2007, S. 2136, 110th Cong. (2007); Home
Owners Mortgage and Equity Savings Act, H.R. 3778, 110th Cong. (2007).
20 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,524-25 (July 30, 2008) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226); see also Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-289, § 2502(a), 122 Stat. 2654, 2855-57 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2)).
21 Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 107, 82 Stat. 146, 149 (1968) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (2006)) (defining the APR); Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-321, §§ 121-31, 82 Stat. 146, 152-57 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1631-49 (2006)) (requiring disclosure of the APR).
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the long-term price dimensions. Moreover, since the APR-in the-
ory-strips away any competitive advantage of excessive complexity
and cost deferral, lenders will have no reason to offer loan contracts
with these design features.
The APR can solve these problems, but only if it lives up to the
expectations of the Congress that enacted it, namely, if it provides a
timely, true measure of the total cost of credit and borrowers rely on it
in choosing among different loan products. The current APR disclo-
sure does not live up to these expectations. First, the APR disclosure
often comes too late to be useful for comparison shopping. Second,
the APR does not measure the total cost of credit. Numerous fees
paid by mortgage borrowers are excluded from the regulatory defini-
tion of a "finance charge" and are thus ignored in the APR calcula-
tion. Moreover, the current APR calculation assumes that the
borrower will hold the loan for the nominal loan period, commonly
thirty years. The actual duration of a mortgage loan is, however,
much shorter than thirty years: closer to five years on average in the
subprime market. Most borrowers refinance and prepay (or default)
long before the thirty-year mark. By ignoring the possibility of prepay-
ment (and default) the current APR disclosure fails to reflect the true
total cost of the loan. The distortion was especially large during the
recent subprime expansion, when for many loans the prepayment op-
tion constituted a substantial value component. When a borrower ex-
pects to prepay a deferred-cost loan by the end of the low-rate
introductory period, it makes little sense for this borrower to rely on
an APR that presumes continued payments at the high post-introduc-
tory rate.
Since the APR disclosure often came too late and did not reflect
the true cost of credit, borrowers stopped relying on the APR as the
main tool for comparison shopping among loan products. As the
APR lost the trust of borrowers, it also lost the ability to serve as an
effective antidote to imperfect rationality. Recent reforms and ex-
isting reform proposals address some of the shortcomings of the APR
disclosure. The timing-of-disclosure problem was addressed and par-
tially solved by the FRB's new mortgage regulations2 2 and by the re-
cently enacted Housing and Economic Recovery Act. 23 I commend
these reforms but argue that more should be done. Elizabeth Renuart
and Diane Thompson recently addressed the problem of an insuffi-
ciently inclusive APR. They advocate-in the most recent and most
22 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,524 ("The final rule requires creditors to
provide transaction-specific mortgage loan disclosures such as the APR and payment sched-
ule for all home-secured, closed-end loans no later than three business days after applica-
tion, and before the consumer pays any fee except a reasonable fee for the review of the
consumer's credit history.").
23 See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 § 2502(a).
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comprehensive proposal to create a more inclusive APR-a broader
definition of a "finance charge," one that that would cover all, or
most, of the costs paid by borrowers.2 4 The analysis in this Article
supports the spirit of the Renuart-Thompson proposal while simulta-
neously recognizing that a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis may
justify keeping certain price dimensions outside the scope of the "fi-
nance charge" definition.
Recent reforms and existing reform proposals do not address the
exclusion of the prepayment option (nor the default option) from the
APR definition. I explain how the APR calculation would have to be
adjusted to incorporate the prepayment option. I acknowledge the
costs of making these adjustments, and I urge policymakers to care-
fully weigh these costs against the potentially substantial benefits of an
APR that accounts for the prepayment option. If borrowers ignored
the traditional APR figure because it excluded the prepayment op-
tion, they should embrace an APR that incorporates that option. And,
as the APR reclaims its rightful position at the forefront of the mort-
gage disclosure regime, borrowers, and society, will again benefit from
the APR's unique ability to undo the adverse effects of imperfect
rationality.
While this Article focuses on the subprime mortgage market,
much of the analysis applies with equal force to the other segments of
the residential mortgage market-the Alt-A segment and even to the
prime segment. There, too, highly complex, deferred-cost contracts
began to appear in increasing numbers, alongside the traditional
FRM. In fact, the most extreme forms of cost deferral-the interest-
only and payment-option mortgages-were more common in the Alt-
A and prime segments. Moreover, it was in the Alt-A and prime seg-
ments where introductory rates were substantially below the fully-in-
dexed market rate. 25 While the crisis began with subprime, it did not
end there. Defaults and foreclosures are also already appearing in
substantial numbers in the Alt-A and even prime markets.26
24 See Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, The Whole Truth, and Noth-
ing but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181 (2008).
Renuart and Thompson, however, are not the first to recognize that the APR is not suffi-
ciently inclusive, nor are they the first to propose a more inclusive APR. See HUD-TREASuRy
REPORT, supra note 11, at 69 (proposing that the law be amended "to require that the full
costs of credit be included in the APR"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of
Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics
of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REv. 1083, 1166 (1984) (proposing, over
twenty years ago, a more inclusive APR).
25 See CHRISTOPHER L. CAGAN, FiRsT Am. CORELOGIC, INC., MORTGAGE PAYMENT RESET:
THE ISSUE AND THE IMPACT 2 (2007).
26 See Stan J. Liebowitz, Anatomy of a Train Wreck: Causes of the Mortgage Meltdown, in
INDEP. INST., HOUSING AMERICA: BUILDING OUT OF A CRISIS (Randall G. Holcombe & Benja-
min Powell eds., forthcoming July 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1211822
(explaining that ARM defaults and foreclosures are as prevalent in the prime market as in
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides some back-
ground on the subprime mortgage market. Part II describes the cen-
tral design features of subprime mortgage contracts. Part III evaluates
the rational-choice explanations for the identified contractual design
features, emphasizing the limits of these rational-choice theories. Part
IV develops an alternative, behavioral-economics theory that fills the
explanatory gap left by the rational-choice accounts. Part V describes
the welfare costs of the identified contractual design features. Part VI
considers policy implications.
I
THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET
A. Defining Subprime
What is a subprime mortgage? In theory, subprime loans are sold
to riskier borrowers. 27 While low-risk borrowers get low price-specif-
ically, low-interest-rate prime loans-high-risk borrowers get high
price-specifically, high-interest-rate subprime loans. 28 But this defi-
nition establishes a misleading dichotomy. The risk associated with
different borrowers varies along a continuum, and, accordingly, loan
prices vary along a continuum. Still, it is helpful to focus on a subset
of high-risk, high-price loans, even if the line that divides this category
of loans from the neighboring, lower-risk, lower-price category is both
arbitrary and blurry. The mortgage industry itself follows this rough
categorization. And so do policymakers. The recent credit crisis is
dubbed the subprime mortgage crisis, and legislators and regulators
are working to fix the problems in the subprime market.
While the boundaries of the subprime segment are arbitrary and
blurry, the industry, researchers, and regulators have been using
more- or less-common definitions of subprime. According to one
rough division, borrowers with FICO scores-a common measure of
creditworthiness-below 620 are considered subprime borrowers. 29
the subprime market); Gorton, supra note 14, at 21 ("Problems in the Alt-A market are still
mostly in the future, and it is likely that this market will also shut down.").
27 1 say "in theory" since many low-risk borrowers end up with high-price subprime
loans. See infra Part III.A.
28 An important legal antecedent to the subprime market was the Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 that "preempted state interest caps
and allowed lenders to charge higher interest rates." See Zywicki & Adamson, supra note
11, at 6.
29 See, e.g., Iw L. ZELMAN ET AL., CREDIT SUISSE, MORTGAGE LIQUIDITY DUJOUR: UNDER-
ESTIMATED No MORE 13 (2007) [hereinafter CREDIT SUISSE REPORT] (noting that prime
conforming conventional loans are "typically limited to buyers with [FICO] scores above
620"); Kristopher Gerardi, Adam Hale Shapiro & Paul S. Willen, Subprime Outcomes: Risky
Mortgages, Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures 5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Work-
ing Paper No. 07-15, 2007), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2007/
wp0715.htm ("In the United States, a subprime borrower today typically refers to an indi-
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Of course, a borrower's FICO score is only one of several factors deter-
mining risk level. Thus, industry participants consider additional risk
factors, such as the loan-to-value ratio, when classifying a loan as sub-
prime. 30 Moving from risk factors to price, a common subprime
threshold is a loan APR that is three points (or more) above the trea-
sury rate for a security of the same maturity; the three-point threshold
defines "higher-priced loans" under the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) .3  In its new subprime mortgage regulations the FRB
adopted a slightly different definition of "higher-priced mortgage
loans," setting the threshold APR at 1.5 points above the "average
prime offer rate."32
B. Subprime Mortgage Loans: The Numbers
The subprime mortgage market has grown substantially over the
past few years (an increase ending in 2006). In 2001, about 985,000
first-lien subprime loans were originated, while in 2006 that number
was approximately 2,780,000 and represented over 20 percent of total
loan-origination volume. 33 According to the Congressional Budget
vidual with a FICO score below 620, who has become delinquent on some form of debt
repayment in the previous 12 to 24 months, or who has even filed for bankruptcy in the last
few years.").
30 CREDIT SUISSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 21. In 2006, the average FICO score of a
borrower on a first-lien subprime loan was 618.1. See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note
1 (manuscript at 7 tbl.1). These data reflect the trend of making subprime loans to high-
FICO-score borrowers who exhibit risk factors other than an impaired credit history, such
as borrowers who do not wish to produce a down payment ("zero-down borrowers"), bor-
rowers who do not wish to fully disclose their income and financial wealth ("no-doc" and
"low-doc borrowers"), and borrowers seeking a high LTV loan. See Gerardi et al., supra
note 29, at 6-7.
31 See Michael LaCour-Little, Economic Factors Affecting Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Re-
porting, 29 J. REAL EST. REs. 479, 506 n.3 (2007).
32 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,531-32 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (stating that "[t]he definition of 'higher-priced mortgage loans' appears
in § 226.35(a)" and that the average prime offer rate is derived from the Freddie Mac
Primary Mortgage Market Survey ®).
33 See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 1. The authors' data include 452,000
loans in 2001 and 1,772,000 loans in 2006. Id. (manuscript at 7 tbl.1). These data cover
approximately 85 percent of securitized subprime loans. Id. (manuscript at 6). In 2001, 54
percent of subprime loans were securitized, implying a total of 452,000 / (0.85 * 0.54) =
984,749. See id. (manuscript at 6 n.6). In 2006, 75 percent of subprime loans were securi-
tized, implying a total of 1,772,000 / (0.85 * 0.75) = 2,779,608). See id.; see also CBO OUT-
LOOK, supra note 2, at 23-24 ("The number of subprime mortgages has grown rapidly in
recent years: In 2005 and 2006, such loans made up about one-fifth of all originations of
home mortgages (in dollar terms) ... ."); Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 11, at 20 (noting
that subprime mortgage originations increased from $65 billion in 1995 to $332 billion in
2003); Christopher J. Mayer, Karen M. Pence & Shane M. Sherlund, The Rise in Mortgage
Defaults 3 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Paper
No. 2008-59, 2008) (recording LP data showing a rise in subprime originations from 1.1
million in 2003 to 1.9 million in 2005); CRL Snapshot, supra note 1 (noting that subprime
originations accounted for 28 percent of total loan volume in 2006). Focusing on
purchase loans, subprime originations have also grown substantially. See CREDIT SUISSE RE-
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Office (CBO), subprime mortgages "accounted for about 13 percent
of all home mortgages at the end of [2006]."34 The Alt-A market-
covering "medium risk" loans between subprime and prime-also ex-
perienced significant growth, expanding from 2 percent of total origi-
nations in 2003 to 13 percent of originations in 2006.35
The average size of a subprime loan has also increased. In 2006,
the average size of a first-lien subprime loan was $212,000, up from
$126,000 in 2001.36 In terms of loan purpose, in 2006, 42.4 percent of
first-lien subprime loans were purchase loans, and 57.6 percent were
refinance loans. 3 7 The average subprime borrower had a debt-to-in-
come ratio of approximately 40 percent and a FICO score of 618.1.38
The median subprime borrower had a FICO score of 620.39 The me-
dian Alt-A borrower had a FICO score of 705.40
C. Market Structure
1. Participants
Traditionally, a single entity, commonly the neighborhood bank,
was the only party, other than the borrower, in the mortgage transac-
tion. This bank would originate the loan, provide the funds for the
loan, and service the loan. In the modern mortgage market, the dif-
ferent roles-origination, financing, and servicing-are often per-
PORT, supra note 29, at 4 (noting that the share of subprime purchase loans grew to ap-
proximately 20 percent in 2006); Mayer et al., supra, at 6 (" [P] urchase loans (as opposed to
refinance loans) rose from 30 to 42 percent as a share of subprime originations over the
2003-2006 period ....").
34 CBO OUTLOOK, supra note 2, at 24.
35 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,533; see also Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 3
(explaining that "Alt-A originations grew ... from 304,000 in 2003 to 1.1 million in 2005").
36 See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 1 (manuscript at 7 tbl. 1).
37 See id. Of the 57.6 percent of refinance loans in 2006, 51.4 percent were refinance/
cash-out loans, and 6.2 percent were refinance/no-cash-out loans. Id. At the peak of the
subprime expansion, in 2004, only 35.8 percent of first-lien subprime loans were purchase
loans, and 64.2 percent were refinance loans. See id. (including both cash-out and no-cash-
out loans in the refinance percentage); see also MICHAEL FRATANTONI ET AL., MORTGAGE
BANKERS ASS'N, THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKET AND ITS ECONOMIC CONTEXT IN 2007,
at 24 (MBA Research Monograph Series, 2007) (showing subprime originations by loan
purpose and type); LaCour-Little, supra note 31, at 498 (noting that a little more than half
of the loans in 2004-2005 were refinancing loans). See generally Yan Chang & Frank E.
Nothaft, Demystifying the Refi-Share Mystery, 29 J. REAL EST. REs. 511 (2007). The importance
of this distinction is highlighted by the finding that the average number of mortgages per
borrower, per property is close to three. See Gerardi et al., supra note 29, at 4-5, 14 (em-
phasizing the importance of distinguishing subprime loans made for initial purchase from
subprime refinances of existing mortgages and finding that "the average number of mort-
gages over the life of completed homeownerships is 2.7").
38 See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 1 (manuscript at 7 tbl.1).
39 See Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 6.
40 Id.
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formed by different entities. 4' I focus on the parties involved in
origination and financing since they exert the most influence on the
design of the mortgage contract.42
In the subprime (and Alt-A) market, mortgages were originated
mainly by depository institutions-that is, banks or bank subsidiaries
and affiliates-and by mortgage companies, 43 with the bulk of loan
volume originated by mortgage companies. 44 Another important
group of participants in the mortgage origination process is the bro-
kers: "Mortgage brokers act as intermediaries between lenders and
borrowers, and for a fee, help connect borrowers with various lenders
that may provide a wider selection of mortgage products. '45 In 2006,
brokerages accounted for 58 percent of total origination activity. 46
Traditionally, depository institutions originated loans and funded
them with the deposits they held. During the subprime expansion,
origination volume shifted to mortgage companies with no indepen-
dent means to fund the originated loans. These mortgage companies,
and increasingly also depository institutions, sold the loans that they
originated to Wall Street investment banks that pooled the loans,
41 See Paulson, supra note 2 ("A mortgage loan is likely to be originated, serviced, and
owned by three different entities. Originators often sell mortgages to securitizers who
package them into mortgage-backed securities, which are then divided and sold again to a
global network of investors.").
42 On the role of servicers, see, for example, Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportu-
nism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 753, 755 (2007).
43 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
U.S. SENATE, GAO-06-1021, ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE PRODUCTS: IMPACT ON DEFAULTS RE-
MAINS UNCLEAR, BUT DISCLOSURE OF RISKS TO BORROWERS COULD BE IMPROVED 7 (2006)
[hereinafter GAO AMP REPORT] ("Borrowers arrange residential mortgages through ei-
ther mortgage lenders or brokers. The funding for mortgages can come from federally or
state- chartered banks, mortgage lending subsidiaries of these banks or financial holding
companies, or independent mortgage lenders, which are neither banks nor affiliates of
banks."). Indirect originations also played an important role. See LaCour-Little, supra note
31, at 498 ("A little less than one-third of all loans were originated through indirect, whole-
sale channels, which include mortgage brokers, certain correspondent lending relation-
ships, builder programs and the like.").
44 Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort & Glenn B. Canner, Opportunities and Issues in
Using HMDA Data, 29 J. REAL EST. RES. 351, 353 (2007) ("Depository institutions account
for the bulk of the reporting institutions, but mortgage companies report the majority of
the applications and loans. In 2005, for example, nearly 80% of the 8,850 reporting insti-
tutions were depository institutions but together they reported only 37% of all the lending-
related activity. Mortgage companies accounted for 63% of all the reported lending; 70%
of these institutions were independent and not related in any way to a depository
institution.").
45 GAO AMP REPORT, supra note 43. Brokers also play a more direct role via indirect
originations. See LaCour-Little, supra note 31, at 498.
46 Press Release, Access Mortgage Research & Consulting, Inc., New Broker Research
Published (Aug. 17, 2007), available at http://accessmtgresearch.com/?p=40 ("[T] he aver-
age firm produced $32.4 million (151 loans) .. .conforming loans accounted for 48% of
brokers' production volume; the most used wholesalers were Countrywide (for conven-
tional loans) and New Century (for subprime loans) . . ").
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carved up the expected cash flows, and converted these cash flows
into bonds that were secured by the mortgages. 47 At the peak of the
subprime expansion, most mortgages were financed through this pro-
cess of securitization. 48 As a result, the "owners" of the loans are the
investors who purchased shares in these Mortgage (or Asset) Backed
Securities (MBSs or ABSs).
The loan originators have direct control over the design of the
mortgage contract. The investment banks and their clients also influ-
ence the design of mortgage contracts, as the demand for MBSs-and
thus the price that the investment banks are willing to pay the origina-
tors for the loans-depends on the contractual design.
2. Competition
The degree of competition in a market can affect the design of
the products and contracts sold in this market. The loan origination
market appears, at first blush, to be fairly competitive. In 2006, the
top fifteen subprime lenders divided among themselves 80.5 percent
of the market, with no lender holding more than a 13 percent share. 49
The Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) list of
lenders that specialize in subprime lending named 210 lenders (al-
though not all of these lenders offer loans nationally).50 Barriers to
47 See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2045 (2007).
48 See CREDIT SUISSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 11 (finding 75 percent securitization
rate); Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 1 (manuscript at 6 n.6) (reporting securitiza-
tion rates of 76 percent and 75 percent in 2005 and 2006, respectively). For a good exposi-
tion on securitization, see Engel & McCoy, supra note 47, at 2045-48. See generally Bethel et
al., supra note 12.
49 See CREDIT SUISSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 22 (noting that the market shares of the
top subprime lenders in 2006 were: Wells Fargo 13.0%, HSBC Finance 8.3%, New Century
8.1%, Countrywide Financial 6.3%, CitiMortgage 5.9%, WrMC Mortgage 5.2%, Fremont
Investment 5.0%, Ameriquest 4.6%, Option One 4.5%, First Franklin 4.3%, Washington
Mutual 4.2%, Residential Funding 3.4%, Aegis Mortgage 2.7%, American General 2.4%,
Accredited Lenders 2.3%, and that the top fifteen lenders commanded 80.5% of the mar-
ket). Similar numbers are reported by other sources. See, e.g., 2 MARKET SHARE REPORTER:
AN ANNUAL COMPILATION OF REPORTED MARKET SHARE DATA ON COMPANIES, PRODUCTS, AND
SERVICES: 2008, at 704-05 (Robert S. Lazich, ed., 2008) (reporting that the top ten lenders
commanded less than 58.8 percent of the market with no single lender controlling more
than 8.3 percent of the market, based on a conservative combination of the two sources
cited in Market Share Reporter). The 2005 figures are similar. See 2 MARKET SHARE REPORTER:
AN ANNUAL COMPILATION OF REPORTED MARKET SHARE DATA ON COMPANIES, PRODUCTS, AND
SERVICES: 2007, at 719 (Robert S. Lazich ed., 2007) (reporting that the top ten lenders
commanded less than 51 percent of the market with no single lender controlling more
than 9 percent of the market). These numbers represent the outcome of a consolidation
process.
50 See Randall M. Scheessele, HUD Subprime and Manufactured Home Lender List, HUD
USER, Mar. 16, 2007, http://www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html (describing the 2005
list). Many other lenders, while not specializing in subprime lending, also offer subprime
loans. See Avery et al., supra note 44, at 353 (noting that there were 8,850 Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA) reporting institutions in 2005).
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entry in this industry have been substantially reduced with the growth
in securitization, which enables entry by new, small lenders. 5' The
internet has enhanced competition by reducing shopping costs. 52
The FRB, at least, characterized this market as competitive. 53
Nevertheless, because many consumers engage in limited shop-
ping, several observers have expressed concerns about the level of
competition in the subprime market.54 The increasing complexity of
mortgage products renders comparison shopping more difficult and
limits the efficacy of the shopping that does occur.55 In fact, limited
shopping may be a rational response to its reduced efficacy. The re-
sult is imperfect information and imperfect competition.56 HUD's
proposed amendments to its Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA) regulations are motivated by the need to enhance competi-
tion in the mortgage market.57 And two recent studies-one by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and another by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)-
have expressed concerns about the level of competition in the real
51 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 47, at 2041 ("[S]ecuritization funds small, thinly
capitalized lenders and brokers, thus enabling them to enter the subprime market. These
originators are more prone to commit loan abuses because they are less heavily regulated,
have reduced reputational risk, and operate with low capital, helping to make them judg-
ment-proof.").
52 See, e.g., LendingTree.com, Lender Ratings, http://www.lendingtree.com/stm3/
lenders/scorecard.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) (listing over 250 affiliated lenders). Al-
though clearly not all of these lenders offer subprime loans, and those who do might not
offer loans nationally.
51 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1674 (proposed Jan. 9, 2008) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) ("Underwriting standards loosened in large parts of the mortgage
market in recent years as lenders-particularly nondepository institutions, many of which
have since ceased to exist-competed more aggressively for market share.").
54 See, e.g., MarshaJ. Courchane, Brian J. Surette & Peter M. Zorn, Subprime Borrowers:
Mortgage Transitions and Outcomes, 29 J. RiAL EsT. FIN. & ECON. 365, 371-72 (2004) (find-
ing, based on a survey study, that subprime borrowers search less and are less informed).
55 See Willis, supra note 4, at 726-27. The limits of advertising in the subprime market
further increase the cost of comparison shopping. See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,522, 44,524 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) ("[Plrice information
for the subprime market is not widely and readily available to consumers. A consumer
reading a newspaper, telephoning brokers or lenders, or searching the Internet can easily
obtain current prime interest rate quotes for free. In contrast, subprime rates, which can
vary significantly based on the individual borrower's risk profile, are not broadly advertised
and are usually obtainable only after application and paying a fee.").
56 See Eskridge, supra note 24, passim (stating that imperfect information, largely
driven by limited shopping, has lead to monopolistic competition, rather than perfect
competition); Willis, supra note 4, at 749 (arguing that lack of sufficient disclosure and low
levels of financial literacy among borrowers make shopping extremely difficult).
57 See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA): Rule to Simplify and Improve
the Process of Obtaining Mortgages and Reduce Consumer Settlement Costs, 73 Fed. Reg.
68,204, 68,207 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 203, 3500) (describing
"important changes that should increase consumer understanding and competition in the
mortgage marketplace").
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estate brokerage industry, which, as explained above, plays an impor-
tant role in the loan origination process. 58
As noted above, contractual design is not determined solely by
the loan originator, and thus, competition, or lack thereof, in other
markets may have played an important role. In particular, securitiza-
tion enhanced competition in the loan-origination market but simul-
taneously transferred some control over contractual design away from
the originators and into the hands of securitizers. The securitization
market appears to have been relatively competitive. In 2007, the top
ten securitizers-Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley, JP
Morgan, Credit Suisse, Bank of America Securities, Deutsche Bank,
Royal Bank of Scotland Group, Merrill Lynch, and Goldman Sachs-
controlled 73.4 percent of the market, with no single bank controlling
more than 10.8 percent of the market.59
D. Regulatory Scheme
The regulatory authority over mortgage lending is divided be-
tween the federal and state levels and among several regulators at the
58 See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON Fi-
NANCIAL SERVICES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GAO-05-947, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE: FAC-
TORS THAT MAY AFFECT PRICE COMPETITION (2005); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
COMM'N, COMPETITION IN THE REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY: A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE (2007), available at www.ftc.gov/
reports/realestate/V050015.pdf [Hereinafter DOJ & FTC REPORT]. There are about
98,000 brokerage firms; they employ around 2.5 million real estate licensees. See DOJ &
FTC REPORT, supra, at 31. Of these firms, 60 percent have fewer than five agents and
operate locally, and only about 5 percent have more than fifty agents. See id. Indeed,
competition among brokers is primarily local; on the national level in 2004, the top ten
firms accounted for only 9.1 percent of the market share, while at the local level, top firms
often control much larger market shares. See id. For example, in Des Moines, Iowa, a
single firm accounts for over half of all residential real estate transactions. Id. at 31-32.
The primary barrier to entry in the brokerage market is the licensing process (which is
more stringent for brokers than it is for agents). Id. at 33. Competition is, however, lim-
ited by cooperative participation in multiple listings services (MLS) that are typically oper-
ated by local groups affiliated with the National Association of Realtors. See id. at 10.
Access to the MLS is limited to members, who use the database to list homes for sale on
behalf of sellers and to search for homes on behalf of buyers. Id. While the MLS limits
both access and competition, it also reduces costs for brokers and customers. Id. at 12-14.
Competition is also limited by state law. Ten states ban rebates, which are often a key tool
in price competition. Id. at 49. Several states also have minimum-service laws, which limit
the extent to which brokers can compete by offering a range of service packages. Id. at 53.
Lastly, competition is restricted by licensing requirements on for-sale-by-owner websites.
Id at 62. For further discussion, see Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1148-49; Matthew Magura,
How Rebate Bans, Discriminatory MILS Listing Policies, and Minimum Service Requirements Can
Reduce Price Competition for Real Estate Brokerage Services and Why It Matters (U.S. Dep't of
Justice Econ. Analysis Group, Discussion Paper No. 07-8, 2007), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=997137.
59 See Bethel et al., supra note 12, at 81 tbl. 2.
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federal level. 60 Federal banking agencies-the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Of-
fice of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC), and the National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA)-regulate depository institutions. The Federal Trade Com-
mission Improvements Act of 1980 authorized the Federal Reserve to
identify unfair or deceptive acts or practices by banks and to issue
regulations prohibiting them.61 Moreover, the federal banking agen-
cies can use § 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to prevent unfair
or deceptive acts or practices under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, whether or not there is an FRB regulation defining the par-
ticular act or practice as unfair or deceptive. 62 Focusing on high-
priced mortgage loans-that is, loans with an APR that is three points
(or more) above the treasury rate for a security of the same maturity-
the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) grants the
FRB broad powers to police unfair or deceptive lending practices. 63
The FRB also promulgates disclosure regulations under TILA. 64 Addi-
tional disclosure regulations are promulgated by HUD under RESPA,
which governs the loan-closing process.65
Nondepository institutions-that is, nonbanks, including mort-
gage companies, brokers, and advertisers-fall under the jurisdiction
of the FTC. The FTC described its own authority as follows:
The FTC enforces a number of federal laws governing home equity
lending, including [TILA] and [HOEPA], which amended TILA to
address certain practices for high-cost home equity loans. The
Commission also enforces Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act ("FTC Act"), which more generally prohibits unfair and
deceptive acts and practices in the marketplace. 66
60 William Eskridge ably summarizes the history of mortgage lending regulation in
the U.S. See Eskridge, supra note 24.
61 15 U.S.C. §§ 57b-1 to -4 (2006).
62 See Comptroller of the Currency, Administrator of National Banks, Guidance on
Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, Advisory Letter No. AL 2002-3 (Mar. 22, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2002-3.doc; see also Julie L. Williams &
Michael S. Bylsma, On the Same Page: Federal Banking Agency Enforcement of the FTC Act to
Address Unfair and Deceptive Practices by Banks, 58 Bus. LAw. 1243, 1244 (2003).
63 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,527 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226); Raphael W. Bostic et al., State and Local Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: The
Effect of Legal Enforcement Mechanisms, 60J. EcoN. & Bus. 47, 49 (2008); Willis, supra note 4,
at 744-54.
64 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 21.
65 See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA): Rule to Simplify and Improve
the Process of Obtaining Mortgages and Reduce Consumer Settlement Costs, 73 Fed. Reg.
68,204 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 203, 3500). RESPA applies to all
"federally related mortgage loans," a somewhat broader category than loans originated by
depository institutions. 24 C.F.R. § 3500.5(a) (2008).
66 Letter from Donald S. Clark, Sec'y, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Jennifer L.John-
son, Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 1 (Sept. 14, 2006), available at http://
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At the state level, mini-FTC statutes prohibit unfair and deceptive
acts and practices. Likewise, mini-HOEPA statutes, as well as other
statutes, ban or restrict specific practices, such as prepayment penal-
ties and balloon clauses. 67 There is substantial variation in the scope
and enforcement of state-level laws. 68 Because some states clearly go
further than federal regulators in their attempts to protect borrow-
ers, 69 there have been heated preemption battles, especially with the
OCC and other federal banking agencies. State law is being increas-
ingly preempted by federal law. 70
E. Summary
The subprime mortgage market experienced significant growth
between 2000 and 2006. This rapid growth stopped in 2006, and in
2007, when the subprime crisis erupted, the market basically shut
www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2006/November/20061121/OP-1 253/OP-1 253_53_1.pdf
[hereinafter FTC Comment] (commenting on the FRB's hearing notice, published in the
Federal Register, regarding the Home Equity Lending Market).
67 See Bostic et al., supra note 63 (describing the mini-HOEPA statutes and older
anti-predatory lending laws restricting the use of prepayment penalties and balloon
clauses).
68 See id.; Anthony Pennington-Cross & Giang Ho, The Termination of Subprime Hybrid
and Fixed Rate Mortgages 8-9 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Research Div., Working Paper
No. 2006-042A, 2006), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2006/2006-042.pdf,
Ctr. for Responsible Lending, CRL State Legislative Scorecard: Predatory Mortgage Lend-
ing, http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgage/statelaws.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2009).
69 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 79-83; see also Eggert, supra note 42, at
774-75 (noting that many states have implemented regulations that are more stringent
than the regulations promulgated by HUD under RESPA).
70 SeeJulia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending,
Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 1303 (2006); Christopher L.
Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal
Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 Am. U. L. REv. 515 (2007); see also Bar-
Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 79-83. Despite the increasing federal preemption on the
substantive law dimension, state agencies enforce the state or federal law on lenders and
brokers that fall outside the jurisdiction of the federal banking agencies. See GAO AMP
REPORT, supra note 43, at 9-10.
State regulators oversee independent lenders and mortgage brokers and do
so by generally requiring business licenses that mandate meeting net worth,
funding, and liquidity thresholds. They may also mandate certain experi-
ence, education, and operational requirements to engage in mortgage ac-
tivities. Other common requirements for licensees may include
maintaining records for certain periods, individual prelicensure testing,
posting surety bonds, and participating in continuing education activities.
States may also examine independent lenders and mortgage brokers to en-
sure compliance with licensing requirements, review their lending and bro-
kerage functions for state-specific and federal regulatory compliance, and
look for unfair or unethical business practices. When such practices arise,
or are brought to states' attention through consumer complaints, regula-
tors and State Attorneys General may pursue actions that include licensure
suspension or revocation, monetary fines, and lawsuits.
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down.71 Still, the proposed analysis is more than a historic account of
a market that was. First, while few new subprime loans are being
originated, many subprime loans are still outstanding. The proposed
analysis hopes to contribute to an assessment of the welfare costs that
are and will be generated by this stock of loans. Second, the analysis
suggests policy reforms that can prevent a second subprime crisis,
when subprime lending resumes. Third, the proposed analysis is rele-
vant to the still-operating Alt-A and prime markets, as loan contracts
in these markets share certain design features with subprime con-
tracts. Finally, an analysis of the subprime market holds general les-
sons concerning the interaction between market forces and borrower
psychology-lessons applicable to other consumer credit markets and
even to noncredit markets.
II
THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CONTRACT
The traditional, prime mortgage contract is a relatively simple,
fixed-rate, thirty-year loan for 80 percent, or less, of the home price
(that is, a down payment of at least 20 percent is required). 72 The
typical subprime mortgage contract is very different from this tradi-
tional benchmark. In this Part, I describe the two main design fea-
tures that distinguish the common subprime mortgage contract from
the traditional prime FRM: deferred costs and a high level of
complexity.
A. Deferred Costs
The common subprime loan defers costs via three contractual de-
sign features: small down payments and high LTVs, escalating pay-
ments, and prepayment penalties.
71 See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Testimony Before the Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives: The Eco-
nomic Outlook (Jan. 17, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/tes-
timony/bernanke20080117a.htm (noting the "virtual shutdown of the subprime mortgage
market").
72 See, e.g., FTC Comment, supra note 66, at 5 (describing the traditional mortgage
contract); see also GAO CONSUMER PRomcITION REPORT, supra note 17, at 21 ("Because
subprime loans involve a greater variety and complexity of risks, they are not the uniformly
priced commodities that prime loans generally are."); Willis, supra note 4, at 715-18
(describing the traditional mortgage that dominated the market until the end of the twen-
tieth century); Kristopher Gerardi, Harvey S. Rosen & Paul Willen, Do Households Benefit
from Financial Deregulation and Innovation? The Case of the Mortgage Market 1 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12967, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w12967 ("Gone are the days when most households got a cookie-cutter, 30-year,
fixed-rate, level-payment mortgage ....").
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1. Small Down Payments and High LTVs
The down payment, while not a component of the loan contract,
is a component of the payment stream that home buyers face. This
payment stream consists of a "time zero" payment, the down payment,
and the payment schedule specified in the loan contract. This
broader, payment-stream perspective is helpful: First, because from
the buyer's perspective, it makes little difference if a payment is made
to the seller or to the lender. Second, because in many cases, a close
(formal or informal) relationship between the seller and the lender
allows payment shifting between these two parties. 73
One way to defer the costs associated with a home purchase is to
reduce the down payment. Indeed, the size of the average down pay-
ment declined during the subprime expansion. Traditionally, a home
buyer was required to make a down payment equal to (at least) 20
percent of the purchase price.74 In 2005 and 2006, the median sub-
prime home buyer put no money down, borrowing 100 percent of the
purchase price of the house.75 Down payments were a bit higher in
the Alt-A market, with a median value of 5 percent in 2006.76
The flip side of the down payment is the LTV ratio. In a
purchase loan, a 10 percent down payment is equivalent to a 90 per-
cent LTV. But the LTV measure is more general, and it applies also to
refinance loans. A higher LTV means lower cost (or higher benefit in
the case of a cash-out refinance loan) in the present and higher cost
in the future. While the traditional mortgage has an LTV ratio of (at
most) 80 percent, over 40 percent of subprime loans originated in
73 See Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1124-27.
74 See, e.g., FTC Comment, supra note 66, at 5 (describing the traditional mortgage
contract).
75 See Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 33 tbl.2B; see also FTC Comment, supra note 66, at
10 n.45 (indicating that, in the few years prior to 2005, over 40 percent of first-time home
buyers did not make any down payment at all); Gerardi et al., supra note 29, at 44 tbl.2
(finding-using the HUD-list definition of "subprime" and Massachusetts data-that the
average LTV of an initial-purchase subprime loan rose from 0.76 in 1988 to 0.84 in 2007
and that the median LTV rose from 0.80 in 1988 to 0.90 in 2007); Amy Hoak, 100% More
Difficult: First-Time Home Buyers Struggle to Find Down-Payment Money, MARKETWATCH, Mar. 9,
2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/first-time-home-buyers-struggle-find/
story.aspx?guid=%7B4BF19BC-C4EE-4107-ACFC-F6524E878D5A%7D) (stating that for
the period between July 2006 and June 2007, the National Association of Realtors esti-
mated that 45 percent of first-time home buyers opted for 100 percent financing).
76 Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 33 tbl.2B.
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2006 had combined LTVs exceeding 90 percent.77 LTVs were some-
what lower in the Alt-A market. 78
2. Escalating Payments
The traditional FRM features a constant payment stream
throughout the loan period. In contrast, the typical subprime and Alt-
A loans stipulate monthly payments that increase in magnitude over
the loan period. In 2006, only 19.9 percent of first-lien subprime
loans were FRMs. 79 The vast majority of loans were ARMs or hybrid
mortgages with an initial fixed-rate period followed by an adjustable-
rate period. According to the FRB, approximately three-fourths of
originations in securitized subprime "pools" from 2003 to 2007 were
ARMs or hybrids with two- or three-year "teaser" rates followed by
substantial increases in the rate and payment (so-called "2-28" and
"3-27" mortgages). 80 In 2006, the average initial rate was 8.4 percent,
while the average long-term rate, calculated as the sum of the relevant
index (most commonly the 6 months LIBOR) and the contractually
specified margin, was 11.4 percent.8' The expected increase in the
77 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech
at the Independent Community Bankers of America Annual Convention, Orlando, Flor-
ida: Reducing Preventable Mortgage Foreclosures (Mar. 4, 2008), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke200803O4a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke
March 2008 Speech] (basing this figure on information about loans in securitized pools
from First American LoanPerformance). The relevant measure is the combined LTV, which
includes both the first- and second-lien mortgages. The first-lien mortgage often has an
LTV of 80 percent, but the borrower then takes a second-lien mortgage-a piggyback
loan-that further increases the combined LTV. If the first-lien mortgage has an LTV
above 80 percent, the borrower is generally required to purchase Private Mortgage Insur-
ance (PMI) to protect the lender from default losses. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., PMI Act Information, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/res/respapmi.cfm (last
visited Mar. 13, 2009). The insurance premium for the PMI is often financed through a
second mortgage, further increasing the LTV.
78 Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 33 tbl.2B.
79 See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 1 (manuscript at 7 tbl.1) (counting only
non-I/O, nonballoon FRMs); see also Pennington-Cross & Ho, supra note 68, at 1 (finding
that, between 2003 and 2005, "the ARM market share for securitized subprime loans has
ranged from just approximately 60 percent to over 80 percent").
80 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,540 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226). Many ARMs, including prime ARMs, have a teaser rate in effect until
the first rate adjustment, when the ARM rate jumps to the fully indexed (that is, index plus
margin) level. SeeJoe Peek, A Call to ARMs: Adjustable Rate Mortgages in the 1980s, NEw ENG.
ECON. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 47, 54.
81 See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 1 (manuscript at 7 tbl.1) (reporting the
average initial rate, 8.4 percent, and the average margin, 6.1 percent). The average long-
term rate is the sum of the margin and the index. The average value of the most popular
index, the 6 month LIBOR, was 5.3 percent in 2006. See ARM Index Values-2006 Fannie
Mae LIBOR, https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/refmaterials/libor/index.jsp (last visited
Mar. 13, 2009); see also Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 11 (noting that, between 2003 and
2007, the initial (teaser) rate on subprime hybrids remained relatively constant,
"hover[ing] in the range of 7.5 to 8.5 percentage points"). The fully indexed rate was
lower than the initial rate in 2003 and early 2004 when short-term interest rates were low.
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monthly payment at the end of the low-rate introductory period was
substantial. 82 Monthly payments escalated even more steeply in Alt-A
(and prime) mortgages, where teaser rates were set further below the
market rate.83 These contracts stipulated an increase of up to 100
percent, or $1,500 on average, in the monthly payment at the end of
the introductory period. 84 According to one estimate, rate resets have
increased borrowers' annual mortgage payments by about $42
billion.85
The escalating-payments feature was most pronounced in inter-
est-only (I/O) mortgages and payment-option (or simply, option)
mortgages.8 6 Under an I/O mortgage the borrower pays only interest
during the introductory period, generally one to ten years, and begins
paying the principal only after the introductory period ends.87 The
most popular I/O mortgages are hybrid loans, where the introductory
interest rate is fixed and the postintroductory interest rate is varia-
ble.8 8 In 2006, approximately 20 percent of subprime originations
and over 40 percent of Alt-A originations were I/O mortgages.8 9
Id. In 2005, the fully indexed rate was nearly 350 basis points above the initial rate. Id. In
2006 and early 2007, the fully indexed rate was closer to 300 basis points above the initial
rate. Id.
82 The actual payment shock experienced on 2005 and 2006 2-28 mortgages turned
out to be less severe, thanks to relatively low market interest rates and correspondingly low
index values in 2007 and 2008, when the interest rates on these loans reset. Still, the
average monthly payment increased by more than 10 percent at reset. See Bernanke March
2008 Speech, supra note 77 (stating that even with the currently low LIBOR, a typical reset
would raise the monthly payment by more than 10 percent); Paul Willen, Would More Disclo-
sure of Loan Terms Have Helped? 10 (presentation at FTC Mortgage Conference, May 29,
2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/mortgage/presentations/willen_
paul.pdf (finding that payment shock for a typical subprime borrower in 2007 was 15 per-
cent). Moreover, recent increases in the market interest rate are pushing monthly pay-
ments on these mortgages even higher. In any event, contractual design is determined by
the ex ante expected payment shock at origination, not by the ex post actual payment shock
realized two years later. An industry study assessing, as of December 2006, subprime ARMs
originated between 2004 and 2006 calculated an approximate monthly payment increase
of $400. See CAGAN, supra note 25, at 44.
83 See CAGAN, supra note 25, at 13 tbl.4 (showing "red" nonsubprime loans with less
steep resets than the "orange" subprime loans).
84 See id. at 13 tbl.4 (estimating a 97 percent increase); id. at 44 (estimating payment
increases exceeding $1,500).
85 See id. The $42 billion figure covers the entire residential mortgage market, not
only the subprime and Alt-A segments, but ARMs and resets were common mainly in these
two segments.
86 I/Os are also "option loans" in the sense that the borrower has an option to pay
only interest instead of the fully amortized payment.
87 See FTC Comment, supra note 66, at 6-7 ("I/O loans provide for an initial loan
period during which borrowers pay only the interest that is accruing on the loan balance.
When the initial period expires, the borrower's payments expand to pay both principal
and interest.").
88 See id. at 7 (describing hybrid-rate I/O loans as "[p1articularly popular").
89 See CREDIT SUISSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 28 (showing that I/O loans constituted
$171 billion of the $824 billion in subprime loans); see also Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 7
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An even more extreme escalating-payments contract is the option
ARM. As described by the FTC,
[o]ption ARMs . . . generally offer borrowers four choices about
how much they will pay each month during the loan's introductory
period. Borrowers may pay: (1) a minimum payment amount that is
smaller than the amount of interest accruing on the principal; (2)
the amount of interest accruing on the loan principal; (3) the
amount of principal and interest due to fully amortize the loan on a
15-year payment schedule; or (4) the amount of principal and inter-
est due to fully amortize the loan on a 30-year payment schedule.
Option ARMs vary in the length of the introductory periods
they offer. Some, especially in the subprime market, have introduc-
tory periods of only one year, six months, or even one month.
When the loan's introductory term expires, the loan is recast, amor-
tizing to repay principal and the variable interest rate over the re-
maining term of the loan.90
While I/O mortgages are zero-amortization loans, option ARMs imply
negative amortization by allowing below-interest monthly payments. 91
Accordingly, at the end of the introductory period, or even earlier, a
borrower might end up owing more than the value of the home. 92
This might happen even when home prices are steady or rising, but,
of course, it is more likely to happen when home prices are falling.9 3
Option ARMs were rare in the subprime market but quite popular in
the Alt-A market. By 2006 and 2007, more than 25 percent of Alt-A
loans were option ARMs.94 Overall, in the Alt-A market in 2006, a
large majority of originations were nontraditional mortgage products,
allowing borrowers to defer principal or both principal and interest.9 5
("Forty percent of Alt-A mortgages involved only interest payments without any scheduled
principal repayment (only about 10 percent of subprime mortgages have such an interest-
only feature).").
90 FTC Comment, supra note 66, at 7 (footnotes omitted).
91 See id. at 9 ("Generally, when a consumer has made only the minimum payment
[on an option ARM], the loan 'negatively amortizes,' so that the amount the person owes is
increased by the difference between the interest accruing and the minimum amount
paid.").
92 Id.
93 See CGAAN, supra note 25, at 56 tbl.30 (finding that, as of December 2006, 22.4
percent of subprime ARMs originated between 2004 and 2006 had zero or negative eq-
uity). Another 5 percent drop in house prices, as happened after December 2006, in-
creases the 22.4 percent figure to 36 percent.
94 See Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 13-14; see also CREDrr SUISSE REPORT, supra note
29, at 26, 28 (finding, based on nonagency MBS data, that in 2006, option ARMs com-
prised approximately 0.5 percent of the subprime market and 30 percent of the Alt-A
market).
95 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,541 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R pt. 226) (stating that, according to one estimate, 78 percent of Alt-A originations in
2006 were either I/O or option mortgages). Looking more broadly at the entire residen-
tial mortgage market, the Government Accountability Office found that "[flrom 2003
through 2005, AMP originations grew threefold, from less than 10 percent of residential
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These deferrals led to substantial increases-exceeding 100 percent in
some cases-in the monthly payment at the end of the introductory
period.96
3. Prepayment Penalties
Another deferred-cost component, common in subprime and Alt-
A contracts, is the prepayment penalty-a penalty imposed on a bor-
rower who repays the loan before the maturity date. About 70 percent
of subprime loans and about 40 percent of Alt-A loans included a pre-
payment penalty.97 The penalty amount is usually expressed as a per-
centage of the outstanding balance on the loan, up to 5 percent,98 or
as the sum of a specified number of months, commonly six months,
worth of interest payments. This is a significant amount. For exam-
ple, a 3 percent penalty on a $200,000 balance amounts to $6,000.
The economic importance of prepayment penalties to lenders is un-
deniable. They generate substantial revenues. For example, Country-
wide's revenues from prepayment penalties amounted to $268 million
in 2006.99
Prepayment penalties can be viewed as a necessary supplement to
the escalating-payments feature: if borrowers prepay before the end of
the low-rate introductory period and thus avoid the high post-reset
mortgage originations to about 30 percent. Most of the AMPs originated during this pe-
riod consisted of interest-only and payment-option ARMs." GAO AMP REPORT, supra note
43, at 3. Likewise, the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) noted that "[ilnterest only
(1O) loans, with both adjustable- and fixed-rates, and payment option loans that allow neg-
ative amortization, have become a very important part of the [residential mortgage] mar-
ket." FRATANTONI ET AL., supra note 37, at 3.
96 See GAO AMP REPORT, Supra note 43, at 14 (describing an example with a 128
percent increase in the monthly payment at the end of the 5-year payment option period);
FTC Comment, supra note 66, at 9 (referring to "payment shock"). With an option ARM,
the payment increase might occur before the end of the introductory period. The loan
contracts allow for negative amortization but set a maximum allowable negative amortiza-
tion cap of 110 percent or 115 percent. When this cap is reached-and this can happen
before the end of the introductory period-monthly mortgage payments will increase. See
LaCour-Little, supra note 31, at 484; FTC Comment, supra note 66, at 9.
97 See Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 7; see also Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note I
(manuscript at 7 tbl.1) (showing that in 2006, 71 percent of first-lien subprime loans in-
cluded a prepayment penalty). Prepayment penalties are most common in hybrid loans:
70 percent of hybrids have prepayment penalties, as compared to FRMs, only 40 percent of
which have prepayment penalties. See Pennington-Cross & Ho, supra note 68, at 11-12.
98 See MICHAEL D. LARSON, Mortgage Lenders Want a Commitment-and They're Willing to
Pay You for It, BANKRATE.COM, Aug. 26, 1999, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mtg/
19990826.asp (describing one contractual design that specifies a penalty of 3 percent of
the outstanding balance for prepayment in the first year, a 2 percent penalty for prepay-
ment in the second year, and a 1 percent penalty for prepayment in the third year).
99 Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 26,
2007, § 3, at 1; see also ERic STEIN, COAL. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE EcO-
NOMIC COSTS OF PREDATORY LENDING 7-9 (2001), available at http://www.responsiblelend-
ing.org/pdfs/QuantlO-01.pdf (estimating prepayment penalty revenues at $2.3 billion
each year).
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rates, then the escalating-payments feature becomes moot. Prepay-
ment penalties make it more difficult for borrowers to evade the esca-
lating payments. 00  Prepayment penalties surely played this
supporting role in some escalating-payments contracts. But in many
other escalating-payments contracts this prepayment-deterrence role
was more minor. Prepayment penalties are generally limited in
time-that is, the prepaying borrower will only pay a penalty if she
prepays within the specified period.' 0 ' Further, in many contracts the
prepayment-penalty period expired before the end of the low-rate in-
troductory period. 10 2 Of course, prepayment-penalty periods stretch-
ing beyond the end of the introductory period are not necessary to
sustain an escalating-payments contract. There are other reasons why
a borrower may decide to keep making the escalating payments even
if prepayment is not subject to a contractual penalty.
Prepayment penalties are also an independent deferred-cost com-
ponent, regardless of their role supporting the escalating-payments
feature. First, to the extent that it fails to deter prepayment, the pre-
payment penalty is a significant cost that is deferred until the time of
prepayment. Second, this long-term cost is associated with a reduc-
tion in the short-term cost of the loan. Specifically, loans with prepay-
ment penalties have lower interest rates and thus lower monthly
payments. 10 3 Prepayment penalties thus produce the temporal-shift
characteristic of deferred-cost contracts: pay less now, pay more later.
B. Complexity
In addition to a variety of features that defer costs, subprime and
Alt-A mortgages are also characterized by a high level of complexity.
The complexity of these loan contracts is the product of a prolifera-
tion of fees and other price dimensions combined with elaborate rules
100 See Hearing, supra note 1, at 11 (explaining how prepayment penalties "protected
lenders from the potential churning of mortgages with very low initial rates"); Zywicki &
Adamson, supra note 11, at 18 (noting that lenders needed prepayment penalties to
recoup their upfront costs because subprime borrowers often financed closing costs and
had low introductory rates).
101 See Michael LaCour-Little & Cynthia Holmes, Prepayment Penalties in Residential Mort-
gage Contracts: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 19 HOUSING POL'x DEBATE 631, 635 (2008).
102 See Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 12 ("[P]repayment penalties were scheduled to be
in effect after the end of the teaser period for only 7 percent of the subprime short-term
hybrids originated from 2003 to 2007, and over these years the share originated with such a
provision dropped from 10 to 2 percent.").
103 See Gregory Elliehausen, Michael E. Staten & Jevgenijs Steinbuks, The Effect of Pre-
payment Penalties on the Pricing of Sut'prime Mortgages, 60 J. ECON. & Bus. 33, 34 (2008);
LaCour-Little & Holmes, supra note 101, at 642; Chris Mayer, Tomasz Piskorski & Alexei
Tchistyi, The Inefficiency of Refinancing: Why Prepayment Penalties Are Good for Risky
Borrowers 18 (Apr. 28, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://wwwl.gsb.co-
lumbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/3065/Inefficiency%20ofo20Refinancing.
pdf.
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governing the application of these multiple prices.1 04 Beyond mul-
tidimensional pricing, the prepayment option and the (implied) de-
fault option increase the complexity of valuing these mortgage
products. Finally, since complexity should be measured at the market
level-not at the contract level-the existence of numerous complex
products exponentially increases the complexity of the choice prob-
lem that a borrower faces.
1. Interest Rates
The traditional FRM has a single interest rate that implies a con-
stant monthly payment. The typical subprime mortgage, the 2-28 hy-
brid, has an initial rate that applies for the first two years of the loan.
After the two-year introductory period expires, the loan becomes an
ARM with an interest rate calculated as the sum of a specified index
and a preset margin-a calculation that is repeated at the end of each
adjustment period. To make things even more complex, the loan
contract commonly specifies caps that can limit the magnitude of
both the periodic and total rate adjustment.10 5
Other products are even more complex. As detailed above, op-
tion ARMs commonly specify four different options for each monthly
payment.10 6 These payment options are not predetermined sums;
nontrivial calculations are necessary to figure out what the options
are. Moreover, these contracts, while allowing negative amortization,
typically cap the level of permissible negative amortization, recasting
the loan-even before the end of the introductory period-if this cap
is reached.
2. Fees
Beyond the multiple interest rates, the typical subprime and Alt-A
loan boasts a long list of fees. These fees can be divided into two
categories: origination fees and postorigination fees. Origination fees
are paid at closing-that is, at the consummation of the credit transac-
tion. Before closing a loan contract, the lender obtains information
104 See GAO CONSUMER PROTECTION REPORT, supra note 17, at 6, 21 (emphasizing "the
complexity of mortgage transactions" and the "greater variety and complexity of risks" asso-
ciated with subprime loans as compared to prime loans); JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAP-
PALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM'N, IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN
EMPIRiCAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTPE DISCLOSURE FORMS, at ES-11 (2007) (ex-
plaining that subprime borrowers have more difficulty answering questions about their
loans than prime borrowers); Renuart & Thompson, supra note 24, at 196 ("The lender-
created complexity of mortgage loans now exceeds what most consumers, even highly edu-
cated consumers, are capable of comprehending."); Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 11, at
55-56 (explaining that subprime loans are more complex than prime loans, and that it is
more likely that a subprime borrower will misunderstand her loan terms).
105 See Peek, supra note 80, at 53.
106 See supra Part II.A.2.
20091 1103
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
about the risk that it is about to undertake. Specifically, the lender
performs credit checks and obtains appraisals. The lender also com-
missions various inspections, examinations, and certifications, includ-
ing pest inspection, title examination, flood certification, and tax
certification (for information about the borrower's outstanding tax
obligations). 10 7 Lenders charge the borrower separate fees for each
of these information-acquisition services. For example, LandSafe,
Countrywide's closing-services subsidiary, charges a $36 fee for the
credit check, a $26 fee for flood certification, and a $60 fee for the tax
certification. 08 In 2006, Countrywide's appraisal fee revenues totaled
$137 million, and its credit report fee revenues totaled $74 million.10 9
Separate fees are charged for analyzing the acquired information.
These include escrow analysis fees, which cover the cost of determin-
ing the appropriate balance for the escrow account and the bor-
rower's monthly escrow payments, and underwriting analysis fees,
which cover the costs of analyzing a borrower's creditworthiness.' 10
Still more fees are charged for insuring against identified risks, includ-
ing premiums for credit insurance, title insurance, and private mort-
gage insurance (PMI). u"
Also at closing, the lender charges fees for administrative services
associated with the loan-origination process, such as preparing docu-
ments, notarizing documents, and sending e-mails, faxes, and courier
mail.' 12 For example, some Countrywide loans included fees of $45 to
ship documents overnight and $100 to e-mail documents. 113 And
then there are the general fees: for loan origination, loan processing,
signing documents, and closing the loan. 1 4 Some subprime lenders
charge up to fifteen different origination fees, and these fees can add
up to thousands of dollars or up to 20 percent of the loan amount.' 1 5
107 See Elizabeth Renuart, An Overview of the Predatory Mortgage Lending Process, 15 Hous-
iNG POL'y DEBATE 467, 493 (2004).
108 Morgenson, supra note 99. As Morgenson points out, "It's a big business: During
the last 12 months, Countrywide did 3.5 million flood certifications, conducted 10.8 mil-
lion credit checks and 1.3 million appraisals, its filings show." Id.
109 Id.
110 Pamela Reeves, Many Settle for Really Bad Terns to Get a House, ScuPPs HOWARD NEWS
SERVICE, July 19, 2001; Mortgage Ctr., Inside Scoop-Current Tips: Junk Fees-What You
Don't Know Can Hurt You, http://www.mtgctr.com/tips/default.asp?gaid=4 (last visited
Apr. 9, 2009).
1M1 See Renuart, supra note 107, at 493; Willis, supra note 4, at 725. According to one-
now dated-estimate, financed credit insurance costs borrowers $2.1 billion each year. See
STEIN, supra note 99, at 5-7.
112 Renuart, supra note 107, at 493.
113 Morgenson, supra note 99.
114 Renuart, supra note 107, at 493.
115 See Willis, supra note 4, at 786; see also HUD-TREASuRv REPORT, supra note 11, at 21
(noting origination fees of up to 10 percent of the loan amount, "far exceed[ing] what
would be expected or justified based on economic grounds"). According to HUD, borrow-
ers are paying excess fees averaging $700 per mortgage. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of
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These fees are often financed into the loan amount and form the ba-
sis for additional interest charges.116
In addition to the multiple fees charged at closing, the loan con-
tract specifies a series of future, contingent fees, including late fees,
foreclosure fees, prepayment penalties, and dispute-resolution or arbi-
tration fees. 1 7 Again, these fees can be substantial. Prepayment pen-
alties and foreclosure fees can amount to thousands of dollars.1 1 8
Late fees can amount to 5 percent of the monthly payment. 119
3. Prepayment and Default
Mortgage contracts in the United States commonly allow the bor-
rower to prepay the loan before it matures. The exercise price of this
prepayment option can be either zero, when there is no prepayment
penalty, or positive, when a prepayment penalty is included in the
contract. The prepayment option may seem straightforward at first
glance, but it adds a substantial dose of complexity to the mortgage
contract. To accurately value the contract, the borrower must esti-
mate the likelihood and timing of prepayment, which depend on a
host of future market conditions and personal circumstances. Even
with these estimates, calculating the optimal timing for prepayment is
nontrivial. A commonly used rule of thumb would have borrowers
prepay when the expected savings from refinancing to a lower-interest
loan exceeds the transaction costs associated with terminating one
loan and originating another (including the prepayment penalty).
But this rule of thumb turns out to be a very poor approximation of
the optimal prepayment decision. The reason is that the rule ignores
the option value of rejecting the current refinancing offer, even when
Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Proposes Mortgage Reform to Help Consumers Better Under-
stand Their Loan, Shop for Lower Costs (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://www.hud.gov/
news/release.cfm?content=pr08-033.cfm. According to Michael Kratzer, founder of
FeeDisclosure.com, a website intended to help consumers reduce fees on mortgages, of the
estimated $50 billion in transaction fees paid by mortgage borrowers (not only in the sub-
prime and Alt-A markets), $17 billion consist of junk fees, like $100 e-mail charges, $75
document preparation fees, and $25 FedEx charges. See Gretchen Morgenson, Clicking the
Way to Mortgage Savings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, § 3, at 1. Kratzer estimates that 'junk
fees" have risen 50 percent in recent years. See Gretchen Morgenson, Given a Shovel, Dig-
ging Deeper Into Debt, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, at Al.
116 See Willis, supra note 4, at 725. According to one, now dated, estimate, exorbitant
fees-defined as fees exceeding 5 percent of the loan amount and fees reflecting no tangi-
ble benefit to borrowers-cost borrowers $1.8 billion each year. See STEIN, supra note 99, at
7.
117 See Willis, supra note 4, at 725.
118 See supra Part II.A.3.
119 See Freddie Mac, Glossary of Finance and Economic Terms, http://www.fred-
diemac.com/smm/g-m.htm#L (last visited Mar. 13, 2009); see also Morgenson, supra note
99 (noting that, in 2006, Countrywide's revenues from late charges amounted to $285
million).
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expected benefits exceed transaction costs, and waiting for even bet-
ter refinancing opportunities in the future.
Accounting for this option value complicates the optimal prepay-
ment decision. In fact, the optimal prepayment problem is so com-
plex that it can be solved only by high-powered computers
implementing sophisticated numeric algorithms.1 20 In addition to the
explicit prepayment option, every mortgage contract includes an im-
plicit default option. The borrower can always walk away from the
mortgage. Of course, exercising the default option has a price, in-
cluding lost equity, a damaged credit rating, and the risk of losing
other assets (if the loan is not a no-recourse loan). As with the prepay-
ment option, valuing the default option is a complex task.
4. A Complex Array of Complex Products
A typical subprime or Alt-A contract is multidimensional and
complex. Complexity, however, should not be evaluated at the single-
contract level. From a functional perspective, it is more informative to
evaluate the complexity of the decision that a borrower faces. Borrow-
ers must choose among numerous mortgage products. To make an
informed choice, a borrower must read and understand numerous
complex contracts. This process would be challenging even if the
competing contracts shared the same dimensions and varied only with
respect to the values assigned to each dimension. But, in the sub-
prime and Alt-A markets, the borrower must compare different com-
plex contracts, each with its own set of multidimensional prices and its
own rules for determining when the different prices apply. Consider
a borrower facing a 2-28 hybrid and an option ARM: The 2-28 has an
introductory period and an initial rate. The option ARM has a differ-
ent introductory period during which four different payment options
are available. The 2-28 specifies an index and a margin for the postin-
troductory period with certain caps on rate adjustments. The option
ARM specifies a different index, a different margin, and different ad-
justment caps. The complexity of this choice is evident. In reality the
borrower must choose between more than two products.12 1
120 See Sumit Agarwal, John C. Driscoll & David Laibson, Optimal Mortgage Refinancing:
A Closed Form Solution 5-6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13487,
2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13487.
121 See WILLIAM C. APGAR, JR. & CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & UR-
BAN DEV., SUBPRIME LENDING AND ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS: A LITERATURE
REVIEW AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS § 2.2.3 (2006) (describing "the bewildering array of mort-
gage products available").
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C. Summary
In this Part, I described several common contractual design fea-
tures of subprime and Alt-A mortgages. 122 It should be noted that
these design features are not an innovation of the subprime expan-
sion. For example, relatively complex ARMs with a deferred-cost
structure, created by lower initial rates and higher long-term rates,
have been offered in the prime market since the early 1980s.123 While
cost deferral and high levels of complexity are not unique to subprime
loans, these design features have been enhanced in subprime and Alt-
A contracts. Since complex deferred-cost loans have been around for
a while, they cannot be the only-and they are probably not even the
main-cause of the subprime expansion and the ensuing subprime
crisis. But, as I argue below, they did play an important role in the rise
and fall of the subprime market. It should also be noted that sub-
prime and Alt-A contracts are continuing to evolve. Specifically, in
response to the subprime crisis and the enhanced regulatory attention
that followed in its wake, lenders are redesigning their contracts and
eliminating some of the features described in this Part.124
III
RATIONAL-CHOICE THEORIES AND THEIR LIMITS
Why were subprime mortgage contracts designed to defer costs?
Why was the total cost of the loan divided into so many different inter-
est rates and fees? I begin, in this Part, by critically evaluating the
standard rational-choice explanations for these contractual design fea-
122 I do not purport to cover all the design features that appear in the wide variety of
subprime mortgages. For example, I did not discuss low-doc and no-doc loans. Unlike the
traditional mortgage transaction, many subprime mortgages are based on little or no docu-
mentation of income and assets. In 2006, 62.3 percent of first-lien subprime loans were no-
doc or low-doc loans. See Demyanyk and Van Hemert, supra note I (manuscript at 7 tbl. 1);
see also CREDIT SUISSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 4 ("Roughly 50% of all subprime borrowers
in the past two years [i.e., 2005-2006] have provided limited documentation regarding
their incomes."). Further, "[w]hile many believe that buyers choose to provide limited or
no documentation for convenience rather than necessity, a study by the Mortgage Asset
Research Institute sampling 100 stated income (low/no documentation) loans found that
60% of borrowers had 'exaggerated' their income by more than 50%." CREDIT SUISSE RE-
PORT, supra note 29, at 5.
123 See Peek, supra note 80, at 50, 54; see also Zywicki and Adamson, supra note 11, at
5-7 (explaining how legal reform in the early 1980s-specifically the Alternative Mortgage
Transaction Parity Act of 1982-lifted severe restrictions on the design of mortgage con-
tracts). Moreover, deferred-cost loans are common in other countries (interest-only mort-
gages are standard in the United Kingdom) and in other sectors (corporate bonds are
designed as interest-only loans).
124 See CREDIT SUISSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 1 ("Major lenders such as Countrywide,
Option One and Wells Fargo have already announced plans to discontinue certain high
CLTV and stated income loan programs.... ."); Morgenson, supra note 99 (reporting that
on February 23, 2007 Countrywide stopped offering no-doc loans for more than 95 percent
of a home's appraised value, and on March 16, 2007 it eliminated piggyback loans).
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tures. To anticipate my conclusion, the rational-choice theories ex-
plain some of the observed practices in the subprime market, but
there is much that they cannot explain. This explanatory gap will be
filled in Part IV by a behavioral-economics theory.
A. Deferred Costs
1. Affordability
Perhaps the most common justification for deferred-cost con-
tracts is affordability. If a borrower cannot afford to make a substan-
tial down payment, then she will take a mortgage with a high LTV. If
a borrower currently cannot afford to make high monthly payments,
then she will take a mortgage with low initial monthly payments. 125
Deferred-cost contracts create short-term affordability. Indeed, by
most accounts, deferred-cost contracts were designed to secure short-
term affordability. But short-term affordability is not a rational-choice
explanation. If affordability is to offer a rational-choice explanation
for cost deferral, it must be long-term affordability that is considered:
the borrower must be able to service the loan both now and in the
future. While deferred-cost contracts clearly enhance short-term af-
fordability, it is by no means clear that they enhance long-term af-
fordability. Paying less now means paying more later. Smaller down
payments (higher LTVs) and lower initial payments imply higher
monthly payments in the future. Affordability in the long term can
rationally explain deferred-cost contracts only if the borrower's availa-
125 See GAO AMP REPORT, supra note 43, at Abstract ("Federally and state-regulated
banks and independent mortgage lenders and brokers market AMPs [mostly I/O and pay-
ment-option loans], which have been used for years as a financial management tool by
wealthy and financially sophisticated borrowers. In recent years, however, AMPs have been
marketed as an 'affordability' product to allow borrowers to purchase homes they other-
wise might not be able to afford with a conventional fixed-rate mortgage."); Mayer et al.,
supra note 33, at 7 ("[S]ubprime borrowers may have turned to these products in an at-
tempt to obtain more affordable monthly payments."). Affordability concerns were espe-
cially acute in areas where rapidly rising home prices forced borrowers to take larger loans,
which, if they were traditional FRMs, implied larger down payments and higher monthly
payments. See CREDIT SUISSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 29 ("We have long been of the
opinion that the current housing downturn is as much a function of deteriorating af-
fordability as an issue of over supply from fleeing investors and aggressive
homebuilders .... In order to mitigate the record price increases seen throughout the
majority of the country in the first half of this decade, home buyers became increasingly
dependant on exotic mortgage products intended to reduce down payments and monthly
payments."); FRATANTONI ET AL., supra note 37, at 23 ("lOs in particular allowed borrowers
to afford homes in a booming market."); Szu-Yin Kathy Hung & Charles Tu, An Examina-
tion of Housing Price Appreciation in California and the Impact of Alternative Mortgage Instruments,
17 J. HOUSING REs. 33 (2008) (finding that in California increased use of ARMs led to
greater housing affordability and high housing-price appreciation during the housing
boom in the first half of this decade).
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ble income is expected to increase as fast as (or faster than) the esca-
lating mortgage payments. 126
In this spirit, the FRB advises borrowers that "[d] espite the risks
of these loans, an 1-0 mortgage payment or a payment-option ARM
might be right for you if... you have modest current income but are
reasonably certain that your income will go up in the future (for ex-
ample, if you're finishing your degree or training program) ....
But how many borrowers fit this description? Notice that the FRB is
not talking about standard, gradual pay raises. Those would not
match the substantial increase in the monthly mortgage payment at
the end of the introductory period that many subprime and Alt-A con-
tracts stipulate. The FRB is referring to students and trainees. In-
deed, 2-28 hybrids, and even I/O and option mortgages, may be
beneficial for a second-year law student who anticipates a sharp in-
crease in income after graduation. These students and trainees are
good candidates for escalating payment contracts, yet there are too
few of them to explain a significant fraction of the approximately
126 The failure to adopt this long-term affordability perspective has been the subject of
criticism. In particular, lenders have been criticized for qualifying borrowers who can
make the low short-term payments but not the high long-term payments. See Hearing, supra
note 1, at 11 ("Some subprime lenders ... established borrowers' qualification for mort-
gages on the basis of initially low teaser rates."). The FRB addresses this concern in its
recently adopted TILA amendments. See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,539
(July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) ("TILA Section 129(h), 15 U.S.C.
1639(h), and Regulation Z § 226.34 (a) (4) prohibit a pattern or practice of extending
credit subject to § 226.32 (HOEPA loans) based on consumers' collateral without regard to
their repayment ability. The regulation creates a presumption of a violation where a credi-
tor has a pattern or practice of failing to verify and document repayment ability."). The
effect of these regulations, had they come sooner, could have been substantial. In a pres-
entation to investors, Countrywide Financial acknowledged that it would have refused 89
percent of its 2006 borrowers and 83 percent of its 2005 borrowers, representing $138
billion in mortgage loans, had it followed the long-term affordability standards adopted in
the FRB's regulations. See Binyamin Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Banking Regulator
Played Advocate over Enforcer: Agency Let Lenders Grow out of Control, Then Fail, WASH. POST,
Nov. 23, 2008, at Al.
Some have blamed the government for the lowering of underwriting standards. See
Liebowitz, supra note 26 (manuscript at 3-8) (arguing that policymakers, eager to expand
home ownership, especially in lower-income and minority segments, facilitated-even
mandated, through threats of Community Reinvestment Act challenges-lower underwrit-
ing standards).
127 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., INTEREST-ONLY MORTGAGE
PAYMENTS AND PAYMENT-OPTION ARMs-ARE THEY FOR You? 7 (2006), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/mortgage-interestonly/mortgage-in terestonly.pdf [herein-
after FRB, INTEPREST ONLY]; see also FTC Comment, supra note 66, at 8 (noting the advan-
tage of alternative mortgage products for "upwardly mobile" borrowers). Empirical
evidence confirms that younger households with a college education, and thus better fu-
ture-income prospects, were more likely to opt for innovative mortgage products with low
initial interest rates. See Mark S. Doms &John Krainer, Innovations in Mortgage Markets and
Increased Spending on Housing 35 tbl.2, 39 tbl.6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Work-
ing Paper No. 2007-05, 2007), available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/
papers/2007/wp7-05bk.pdf.
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three million hybrid loans originated per year at the height of the
subprime market.128
While borrowers with rising incomes are the natural candidates
for escalating-payments contracts, borrowers with variable incomes
may also find some of these contractual designs beneficial. The FRB
advises that a borrower with volatile income, who can afford to make
only small monthly payments in low-income periods, may rationally
prefer a loan contract that requires lower monthly payments. 29 But
the typical loan does not offer the low-payment option for more than
two years. Accordingly, the income of the target borrower should be
volatile only temporarily and then stabilize. Moreover, a rational bor-
rower with volatile income should have no problem making fixed-
magnitude mortgage payments. All she needs to do is save some of
her earnings from the high-income periods. As with rising-income
borrowers, the number of variable-income borrowers who would ben-
efit from deferred-cost loans seems small relative to the number of
loans with these design features.
The (long-term) affordability explanation covers a small fraction
of deferred-cost originations. This assessment is consistent with the
evidence of especially high foreclosure rates on homes financed by
deferred-cost loans.130 If deferred-cost loans were designed to address
short-term liquidity problems, then defaults and foreclosures should
be rare. But perhaps there is another, more plausible version of the
affordability explanation. Thus far, long-term affordability was as-
sumed to imply an ability to make the high future payments-that is,
from rising income. A less literal interpretation of affordability may
include an expectation to avoid, rather than make, the high future
128 The three million estimate is based on the 2,780,000 first-lien subprime loans
originated in 2006, see supra Part I.B, multiplied by the 75 percent of hybrid ARMs among
subprime loans. See supra Part II.A.2.
129 See FRB, INTEREST ONLY, supra note 127 (advising borrowers that I/O loans and
option ARMs may be suitable for them if they "have irregular income (such as commissions
or seasonal earnings) and want the flexibility of making 1-0 or option-ARM minimum pay-
ments during low-income periods and larger payments during higher-income periods"); see
also FTC Comment, supra note 66, at 8 (noting the advantage of alternative mortgage prod-
ucts for borrowers with variable income).
130 See Paulson, supra note 2. In October 2007, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson
observed,
mortgage defaults and foreclosures are rising. While the delinquency rate
today is near the 2001 rate, there are over seven times more subprime mort-
gages today than there were in 2001. At the end of the second quarter of
this year, more than 900,000 subprime loans were at least 30 days delin-
quent. Foreclosures are also up significantly-increasing about 50 percent
from 2000 to 2006. Foreclosures on subprime loans are up over 200 per-
cent in that same period. Current trends suggest there will be just over I
million foreclosure starts this year-of which 620,000 are subprime.
Id. Recall that for most of the 620,000 subprime foreclosures that Secretary Paulson antici-
pates, the underlying loan contract was a deferred-cost contract. See infra Part V.C.
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payments, specifically by refinancing the loan before the low-rate in-
troductory period ends.13 1
A borrower could expect to obtain a new mortgage with lower
monthly payments if (1) the borrower's credit score improves (by reg-
ularly making the low payments during the introductory period), 3 2
(2) the market interest rate falls, or (3) house prices increase (imply-
ing a lower LTV for the new mortgage). The question then is how
many borrowers rationally expected that such positive realizations
would enable them to refinance their deferred-cost mortgage and
avoid the high long-term costs. From an ex post perspective, it is clear
that the subprime crisis and the ensuing tightening of credit elimi-
nated the refinancing option for many borrowers.1 3 3 The FRB infers
that even from an ex ante perspective, which is the relevant perspective
for judging the affordability explanation, many borrowers could not
have rationally expected to face attractive refinancing options:
[E]vidence from recent events is consistent with a conclusion that a
widespread practice of making subprime loans with built-in pay-
ment shock after a relatively short period on the basis of assuming
consumers will accumulate sufficient equity and improve their
credit scores enough to refinance before the shock sets in can cause
consumers more injury than benefit. 134
131 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1687 (proposed Jan. 9, 2008) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) ("Consumers may also benefit from loans with payments that
could increase after an initial period of reduced payments if they have a realistic chance of
refinancing, before the payment burden increases substantially, into lower-rate loans that
were more affordable on a longer-term basis. This benefit is, however, quite uncertain,
and it is accompanied by substantial risk .... ); FTC Comment, supra note 66, at 8
("[Blorrowers who are confident they will sell or refinance their homes for an equal or
increased value before the introductory period of the loan expires may benefit from alter-
native loan options.").
132 See Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 11 ("Industry participants claim that teaser mort-
gages were never designed as long-term mortgage products. Instead, they argue that the
two- or three-year teaser period was designed for consumers with tarnished credit to im-
prove their credit scores by making regular payments . . ").
133 Prepayment to avoid high post-reset rates was common before the subprime crisis
hit and the credit crunch set in. See Pennington-Cross & Ho, supra note 68, at 10 (finding,
based on LP data, that hybrid mortgages tend to prepay quickly around the first mortgage
reset date); Shane M. Sherlund, The Past, Present, and Future of Subprime Mortgages 10 (Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Paper No. 2008-63,
2008) (finding that "prepayments jump during reset periods").
134 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 1688. The possibility of refinancing and prepay-
ment provides another explanation for deferred-cost contracts. Assuming that low-risk
borrowers will be the first to get attractive refinance offers and prepay, the lender expects
her pool of borrowers to become more and more risky over time. The increasing risk
justifies increasing interest rates. See Mayer et al., supra note 103, at 12. Similar reasoning
explains the prevalence of prepayment penalties: Assume that ex ante all borrowers are
identical, and at some point each borrower experiences a credit shock that places the
borrower in either the low-risk group or the high-risk group. Borrowers can pay for the
prepayment option ex ante, through higher initial rates, before learning which risk group
they will belong to. Or the high-risk borrowers can pay for the prepayment option that the
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The possibility of refinancing and prepayment, together with short-
term affordability concerns, can also explain the prevalence of prepay-
ment penalties-a specific deferred-price dimension. The prepay-
ment option benefits borrowers. And borrowers must pay for this
benefit. One way to pay for the prepayment option is through a
higher (initial) interest rate.13 5 Short-term affordability concerns
render this ex ante payment unattractive. The alternative is to pay for
the prepayment option ex post with a prepayment penalty. Put differ-
ently, the prepayment penalty, which can be viewed as the exercise
price of the prepayment option, reduces the value of the option to the
borrower but also reduces the cost that this option imposes on the
lender. This explains the lower interest rates on loans with prepay-
ment penalties. 136 While this explanation for the prevalence of pre-
payment penalties is persuasive, it is likely incomplete. This
explanation implies that prepayment penalties replace higher interest
rates. There is evidence, however, that the amounts paid in penalties
ex post exceed the foregone interest payments that were not paid ex
ante. 1
37
2. Speculation
An alternative rational-choice explanation portrays the deferred-
cost mortgage as an investment vehicle designed to facilitate specula-
tion on real estate prices. 138 This explanation applies to the substan-
tial portion-10 percent in the subprime market and 25 percent in
the Alt-A market-of loans that were originated on investment
properties.' 39 It may also apply to loans originated on owner-occu-
pied properties. The speculator purchases a house with a deferred-
cost mortgage and begins making the initial, low monthly payments.
If real estate prices go up, the speculator will sell the house and
low-risk borrowers exercise through higher long-term rates. A third alternative would have
the low-risk borrowers who exercise the prepayment option pay for it through prepayment
penalties. This third option provides valuable insurance against a bad realization of the
credit shock. See id. at 12-13.
135 Arguably this is the situation in the prime market, where prepayment penalties are
less common.
136 See supra Part lI.A.3.
137 See LaCour-Little & Holmes, supra note 101, at 662 (comparing 2-28 ARMs with
lower initial rates and prepayment penalties to 2-28 ARMs with higher initial rates and
without prepayment penalties, and finding that the total interest-rate savings is significantly
less than the amount of the expected prepayment penalty). Other studies find that adding
a prepayment penalty leads to no reduction in ex ante interest rates and is, in fact, associ-
ated with higher ex ante interest rates. See Engel and McCoy, supra note 47, at 2060.
138 I focus on the effects of home-price trends and expectations about home-price
trends. A similar argument can be made about market interest rates and expectations
about market interest rates.
139 Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 19 (reporting the shares of loans originated on invest-
ment properties in the subprime and Alt-A markets).
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pocket the difference between the lower buy price and the higher sell
price, or the speculator will refinance the loan using the increased
equity to obtain lower long-term rates. And if real estate prices go
down, the speculator will simply default on the mortgage. The specu-
lator enjoys the upside benefit, while the lender bears the downside
cost. This attractive prospect is purchased at the bargain price of the
low, initial payments on a deferred-cost mortgage; the high, long-term
costs are avoided. 140
Speculation, with the help of deferred-cost loans, is not really a
risk-free prospect. The speculator does not simply default on the mort-
gage. Default is costly. First, in jurisdictions where the lender has re-
course to the borrower's assets, default places these assets at risk. It is
important to note, however, that a large number of states, including
subprime hot spots like California, Colorado, Nevada, and Arizona,
have no-recourse laws. 4 1 Even in states without no-recourse laws, fil-
ing an action for deficiency is often not cost effective for the lender,
and thus the loan becomes a de facto no-recourse loan. 142 A second
cost of default is foregone equity, although this cost too is often small
due to high initial LTVs and even higher LTVs at the time of default
(recall that default is triggered by falling house prices). A third cost
of default is the damage to the borrower's credit rating and the in-
creased future cost of credit that a damaged credit rating implies. Fi-
nally, default implies foreclosure and relocation-both costly
prospects. While there is no consensus estimate for the cost of default
140 Professor Todd Sinai articulated this strategy nicely:
There's a whole lot of people who would've been stuck as renters without
these exotic loan products. Now it's like they can do their renting from the
bank, and if house values go up, they become the owner. If they go down,
you have the choice to give the house back to the bank. You aren't any
worse off than renting, and you got a chance to do extremely well. If it's
heads I win, tails the bank loses, it's worth the gamble.
John Leland, Facing Default, Some Abandon Homes to Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, at Al
(reporting the statement by Professor Sinai). Professor Sinai focuses on purchase loans.
See id. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the speculation explanation applies to refi-
nance loans as well. Adopting the "heads-borrower wins, tails-lender loses" strategy is
rational for borrowers but not for lenders. The speculation explanation is incomplete ab-
sent an account of lenders' incentives. Why did lenders play along? Agency problems-
within lending institutions and among the different parties in the securitization process-
provide one set of answers. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Another set of an-
swers recognizes that lenders enjoyed a substantial portion of the upside benefit. In many
cases, an increase in housing prices led to refinancing by the same lender. See Gorton,
supra note 14, at 4-5.
141 See 2 MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY R. DWYER, & STEVEN W. BENDER, THE LAW OF REAL
ESTATE FINANCING § 12:69 (rev. ed. 2008). A full list of state laws is available at http://www.
foreclosurelaw.org/. For further discussion, see Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 11, at 29
n. 134 ("It is difficult to estimate exactly how many states have antideficiency laws as foreclo-
sure rules vary a great deal from state to state, but an approximation may be about fifteen
to twenty states, including many larger states.").
142 See Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 11, at 30.
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and foreclosure, for many borrowers this cost will amount to tens of
thousands of dollars.14 3 Despite the cost of default, however, the
downside risk is still dominated by the upside benefit as long as the
probability of a positive realization is sufficiently high. In other words,
if house prices are expected to rise high enough and fast enough,
then speculation is rational even if the costs incurred in the unlikely
event of default are substantial. 144
The question, therefore, is whether such expectations of continu-
ing, rapid increase in house prices were rational for borrowers to
hold. An initial observation is that during the subprime expansion,
home prices were high relative to underlying fundamentals.1 45 As
noted by Peter Orszag, the CBO director, "for a time, the expectation
of higher prices became a self-fulfilling prophecy that bore little rela-
tion to the underlying determinants of demand, such as demographic
forces, construction costs, and the growth of household income.' 1 46
But expectations that deviate from long-term fundamentals are not
necessarily irrational. A rational borrower may recognize that home
prices must fall eventually but expect that the correction will not oc-
cur before he exits the market. This expectation, while it proved to be
erroneous for many subprime and Alt-A borrowers ex post, may well
have been rational ex ante.
143 See ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOSING GROUND:
FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST TO HOMEOWNERS 16 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/foreclosure-paper-report-2-17.pdf (esti-
mating, based on a dataset including loans originated between 1998 and 2006 on owner-
occupied homes, that 2.2 million will lose their homes to foreclosure, and they will lose a
total of $164 billion, which translates into approximately $75,000 per borrower; this esti-
mate assumes that borrowers hold relatively high equity levels, and is therefore probably
excessive); Bernanke March 2008 Speech, supra note 77 ("A recent estimate [of foreclo-
sure-related costs] based on subprime mortgages foreclosed in the fourth quarter of 2007
indicated that total losses exceeded 50 percent of the principal balance, with legal, sales,
and maintenance expenses alone amounting to more than 10 percent of principal.").
144 The upside benefit is also not as straightforward as implied in the initial descrip-
tion. Sale and refinancing involve transaction costs and, in many cases, also prepayment
penalties. Moreover, even with increasing house prices, a borrower may be left with low or
negative equity, the result of high initial LTVs and slow-zero or even negative-amortiza-
tion, severely reducing sale and refinancing options. But, again, this only means that a
rational speculator must have expected a substantial increase in house prices-an increase
sufficient to outweigh the costs and difficulties of sale and refinancing.
145 RobertJ. Shiller, Understanding Recent Trends in House Prices and Home Ownership 4-5
(Yale Univ. Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No. 28, 2007), available at http://www.econ.yale.
edu/ddp/ddp25/ddpOO28.pdf.
146 Hearing, supra note 1, at 10. One indicator, cited by both the CBO and Shiller, that
housing prices were high relative to underlying fundamentals, particularly in 2005-2006,
was the ratio of housing prices to rents. See CBO OUTLOOK, supra note 2, at 8; Shiller, supra
note 145, at 4-5. On the limits of this indicator, see Jonathan McCarthy & Richard W.
Peach, Are Home Prices the Next 'Bubble', FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REv., Dec. 2004, at
1, 7-8; Housing Price-Rental Ratios, http://cboblog.cbo.gov/?p=52 (Dec. 21, 2007, 05:38
EST).
1114
20091 SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CONTRACTS 1115
There were surely some rational speculators in the subprime and
Alt-A markets who rode the real estate bubble armed with accurate ex
ante estimates (that turned out to be false ex post) about the timing of
the bubble's inevitable end. 147 There were also other borrowers-spec-
ulators with optimistic expectations about future house prices that
were not rationally formed. Specifically, the irrational borrowers ex-
trapolate from past price trends: if home prices increased by 10 per-
cent over the past year, these traders expect that home prices will also
increase by 10 percent over the next year. Indeed, in an influential
study, Karl Case and Robert Shiller found that many home buyers
overestimate the correlation between past trends and future price
movements; put differently, backward-looking tendencies drive expec-
tations of future price growth (beyond what could plausibly be justi-
fied in a rational-expectations model). 148 The subprime and Alt-A
markets experienced both rational and irrational speculation. 149 The
147 Rational speculation is more plausibly attributed to the Wall Street banks that
securitized and sold the MBSs. Additionally, the banks' sophisticated clients who pur-
chased these MBSs may have also been rational speculators. And there is reason to believe
that even these sophisticated parties were making irrational assessments. See Hearing, supra
note 1, at 11 ("[T]he rating agencies appear to have miscalculated the risks of some securi-
ties backed by subprime loans, and they may have unduly emphasized the unusual period
of appreciating prices.").
148 See Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, The Behavior of Home Buyers in Boom and Post-
Boom Markets, NEW. ENG. ECON. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 29; see also Karl E. Case & RobertJ.
Shiller, Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market?, 2003 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. Ac-riviTy,
No. 2, at 299; RobertJ. Shiller, Speculative Prices and Popular Models, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring
1990, at 55, 58-61. Moreover, Case and Shiller found that many home buyers believe that
home prices cannot decline. Id. at 59. Case and Shiller repeated their study for the recent
housing bubble, obtaining similar results. See Karl E. Case & RobertJ. Shiller, Home Buyer
Survey Results 1988-2006 (unpublished paper, Yale University, 2006); see also Shiller, supra
note 145, at 11. These survey results are also supported by evidence of borrower behavior,
In particular, home buyers extend themselves more-via higher LTVs and higher pay-
ment-to-income ratios-when buying a home in markets with high historical appreciation
rates. See Christopher Mayer & Todd Sinai, Housing and Behavioral Finance (Sept. 25,
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/-sinai/pa-
pers/Housing-Behavioral-Boston-Fed-v9.pdf. In addition, Christopher Mayer and Todd Si-
nai found that "the lagged five-year average of house price growth is positively associated
with increases in the price-rent ratio." See id. at 22. On the other hand, contrary to the
Case-Shiller survey results, Mayer and Sinai find that the prior year's house-price growth
does not affect the price-rent ratio. Id. at 23. Mayer and Karen Pence found that "[a] one
standard deviation increase in house price appreciation in [2004] is associated with a 39
percent increase in subprime loans [in 2005]." ChristopherJ. Mayer & Karen Pence, Sub-
prime Mortgages: What, Where, and to Whom? 13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 14083, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1149330. Since it is a lagged
appreciation variable that is correlated with the increase in subprime originations, this
finding is consistent with a behavioral story that demand for subprime loans was driven by
expectations of future house-price appreciation based on extrapolation from past trends.
149 This is consistent with a leading economic theory of bubbles, which posits the exis-
tence of both rational and irrational traders. SeeJ. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader
Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703, 705 (1990); J. Bradford De Long et al.,
Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation, 45 J. FIN. 379, 380
(1990); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, J.
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relative proportion of these two species of speculators remains an
open question.
B. Complexity
1. Interest Rates
Mortgage loans, like any other long-term credit product, are sub-
ject to interest-rate risk-the risk that market interest rates will change
over the life of the loan, departing, often substantially, from the inter-
est rates that prevailed at the time of origination. In a rational-choice
framework, ARMs, with their complex formulas for setting interest
rates, are designed to optimally allocate interest-rate risk between the
lender and the borrower. An FRM allocates all interest-rate risk to the
lender. A pure ARM, with an interest rate that closely tracks a market
index, provides the polar opposite allocation, imposing all the inter-
est-rate risk on the borrower. The more complex-and more com-
mon-ARMs, with caps that limit interest rate adjustments, enable a
range of risk allocations between these two extremes.
ARMs were initially developed in the early 1980s to protect lend-
ers from the interest-rate risk that they bore under the traditional
FRM. 150 In a time when loan originators held mortgages on their own
balance sheets shifting the risk to the borrower was an important
means of shedding the risk. This explanation for ARMs is, however,
less powerful in the era of securitization. Originators no longer bear
interest-rate risk, or they at least bear much less of it. The securitizers
then spread this risk among multiple investors, who are, as a general
matter, better situated to bear this risk than the typical borrower.
2. Fees
As explained in Part II, many different services and many differ-
ent costs are associated with the mortgage transaction. In the past,
most of these costs were folded into the loan's interest rate. Now
lenders (and their affiliates: mortgage settlement/closing companies
and servicers) charge separate fees for each service rendered or cost
incurred. There are two rational-choice, efficiency-based explana-
tions for the proliferation of fees.
First, to the extent that some services are optional, setting sepa-
rate prices for these services allows for more efficient tailoring of the
product to the needs and preferences of different borrowers. This
explanation is plausible for some services and fees but not for others.
Specifically, it is not plausible for the many non-optional services that
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19, 28-29; see also ROBERTJ. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE
60-64 (2000) (developing a market-psychological theory of bubbles).
150 See Peek, supra note 80, at 48.
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all borrowers purchase, such as credit checks, document preparation,
and appraisals. Moreover, evidence of "[w]ild variation" in fees
charged for largely standardized services is inconsistent with a claim
that borrowers pay the cost of optional services that they request.' 51
The second rational-choice explanation describes the prolifera-
tion of fees in subprime mortgage contracts as reflecting a desirable
shift to risk-based pricing. For example, if the costs of delinquency
and foreclosure proceedings are folded into the interest rate, then
nondefaulting borrowers will pay for the delinquency and foreclo-
sures of defaulting borrowers. Separate late fees and foreclosure fees
eliminate this cross-subsidization. Again, this explanation is plausible
for certain fees, but not for others.
3. Prepayment and Default
The (implied) default option is an inevitable component of any
loan product. I thus focus on the prepayment option that, while ubiq-
uitous in mortgage contracts in the United States, is virtually nonexis-
tent in most other countries.' 52 The prepayment option serves two
main goals: First, by allowing borrowers who improve their credit rat-
ings to refinance into lower-rate loans, the prepayment option allows
individuals to consider home ownership earlier. Second, the prepay-
ment option protects borrowers from the risk of paying a mortgage
interest rate that is substantially above the current market rate. These
benefits, however, should be weighed against the difficulty of valuing a
mortgage with a prepayment option.
4. A Complex Array of Complex Products
The decision problem faced by a potential borrower is made diffi-
cult by the complexity of the typical subprime or Alt-A mortgage and
even more difficult by the need to choose among multiple complex
mortgage products. The standard efficiency explanation for the large
variety of products available in many markets is consumer heterogene-
ity. In the mortgage market, different borrowers have different pref-
erences and face different constraints. A mortgage design that is ideal
for one borrower could be terrible for another borrower. With more
products to choose from, each borrower, in theory, is able to choose
the mortgage that is best for her. This explanation, however, assumes
151 See Mark D. Shroder, The Value of the Sunshine Cure: The Efficacy of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act Disclosure Strategy, 9 CITYSCAPE: J. POL'Y DEV. & REs., No. 1, at 73, 84
(2007) (noting, for example, that the cost of obtaining a credit report, "a standard na-
tional, largely automated, service" is typically about $50, yet credit report fees range from
$25 to $100).
152 Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical and Inter-
national Context, J. ECON. PERsP., Fall 2005, at 93, 101.
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that informed choice is possible, despite the high level of complexity
of the choice problem. 151
C. Summary
Efficiency-based rational-choice theories can explain many,
though not all, of the contractual design features observed in the sub-
prime and Alt-A markets. Moreover, even for the design features that
can be explained within a rational-choice framework, the rational-
choice theories have only limited reach. The rational-choice theories
explain the demand structure of rational borrowers and the contrac-
tual-design response to this demand. As shown below, however, not
all borrowers, and especially not all subprime and Alt-A borrowers,
were financially sophisticated, rational borrowers. 154 The rational-
choice theories leave an explanatory gap. I now turn to the task of
filling this gap.155
IV
A BEHAWoRAL-ECONOMIcs THEORY
The subprime mortgage contract is a product of the interaction
between the forces of supply and demand in the subprime mortgage
market. When lenders respond to a demand for financing that is in-
fluenced by borrower psychology, the resulting loan contract will fea-
ture deferred costs and a high level of complexity. 156
153 A more sophisticated rational-choice explanation recognizes that complexity-of a
single product and of the array of offered products-increases the cost of shopping. When
shopping costs more, the rational borrower will shop less. Since shopping creates a posi-
tive externality, there is a risk that the market will produce an inefficiently high level of
complexity.
154 See infra Part IV.C.
155 In theory, the demand generated by rational borrowers, even if they are a minority,
could determine the contractual design of all mortgage contracts, including those offered
to imperfectly rational borrowers. Cf Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Mar-
kets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630,
633-34 (1979) (noting that courts and legislatures often determine and enforce purchase
terms based on their conception of rational consumer preferences). This theory assumes
that lenders cannot, or cannot efficiently, discriminate between the two groups of borrow-
ers and offer different contracts to the different groups. This assumption is unrealistic in
the subprime and Alt-A mortgage markets. Note that, to exercise such discrimination,
lenders need not identify in advance the rational borrowers and the imperfectly rational
borrowers. Instead, lenders only need to offer two sets of contracts-one attractive to ra-
tional borrowers and the other attractive to imperfectly rational borrowers-and let the
borrowers self-select. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 35-36 (describing a market
experiment in which a bank "offered consumers a choice between two credit card con-
tracts: one with an annual fee and a lower interest rate, and one with no annual fee and a
higher interest rate").
156 For a good, early behavioral analysis of mortgage-market imperfections, see Es-
kridge, supra note 24, at 1112-18 (arguing that the high stress involved in the home-buying
and mortgage-borrowing process leads many buyers-borrowers to acquire insufficient infor-
mation and to make suboptimal choices). Eskridge also discusses the influence of agents-
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A. Deferred Costs
The behavioral-economics explanation for deferred-cost con-
tracts is based on evidence that future costs are often underestimated.
When future costs are underestimated, contracts with deferred-cost
features become more attractive to borrowers and thus to lenders.' 57
Consider a simplified loan contract with two price dimensions: a
short-term price, PsT, and a long-term price, PLT. Assume that the opti-
mal mortgage contract sets PST = 5 and PLT = 5, as these prices provide
optimal incentives and minimize total costs. If borrowers are rational,
lenders will offer this optimal contract. Now assume that borrowers
underestimate future costs. For concreteness, assume that borrowers
perceive the long-term payments to be one-half of the actual long-
term payments: PLT = 1/2 " PLT. As a result of such misperception, lend-
ers will no longer offer the optimal contract. To see this, compare the
optimal contract, the (5,5) contract, with an inefficient, deferred-cost
contract setting PST = 3 and PLT = 8, the (3,8) contract. Assume that
under both contracts, the lender just covers the total cost of making
the loan. (The total cost is higher under the inefficient, deferred-cost
contract: 8 + 3 > 5 + 5.) Total payments under the optimal contract, as
perceived by the imperfectly rational borrowers, would be P(5,5) = 5 +
1/2 • 5 = 7.5. 158 Perceived total payments under the inefficient, de-
ferred-cost contract would be P(3,8) = 3 + 1/2 • 8 = 7. Borrowers would
prefer, and thus lenders will offer, the inefficient, deferred-cost
contract.159
brokers whose interests are not aligned with those of the buyers, arguing that these agents-
brokers take advantage of buyers' imperfect information and imperfect rationality. See id.
at 1118-23.
157 The CBO has recently suggested that "[t]he rise in defaults ofsubprime mortgages
may also reflect the fact that some borrowers lacked a complete understanding of the com-
plex terms of their mortgages and assumed mortgages that they would have trouble repay-
ing." Hearing, supra note 1, at 13. Further, "[c]ertain ARMs may have been among the
more difficult mortgages for first-time borrowers to understand. Many of those mortgages
made in recent years included teaser rates, which may have confused some borrowers
about the eventual size of their mortgage payments when their mortgage rates were reset."
Id. at 21 n.3.
158 Time discounting is ignored for simplicity.
159 Cf DAVID MILES, THE U.K. MORTGAGE MARKET: TAKING A LONGER-TERM VIEW, IN-
TERIM REPORT: INFORMATION, INCENTIVES AND PRICING 3 (2003), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/consultmiles index.htm (noting that borrowers tend to focus dispropor-
tionately on the initial, rather than the long-term, cost of a loan); Monica Paiella & Alberto
Franco Pozzolo, Choosing Between Fixed and Adjustable Rate Mortgages I (Mar. 26, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976346 (finding, based
the Bank of Italy's Survey of Household Income and Wealth, that "ARM holders do not
fully take into account the risk of a rise of the reference interest rates. On the other hand,
lenders price quite expensively this risk and borrowers end up paying a high price for the
benefit of low initial pay'ments.").
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There are several reasons to expect systematic underestimation of
future costs. Myopia is one such reason. 160 High LTV contracts are
attractive to myopic borrowers, who place excessive weight on the
short-term benefits of a low down payment (or a large cash-out in a
refinance loan) and insufficient weight on the long-term conse-
quences of a high LTV, such as higher interest payments and greater
difficulty to refinance. Escalating-payments contracts are similarly at-
tractive to myopic borrowers, who place excessive weight on the initial
low payments and insufficient weight on the future high payments.161
Myopia will also lead borrowers to discount the costs associated with a
prepayment penalty-the penalty itself or the cost of delayed
prepayment.
Another bias that is responsible for the underestimation of future
costs is optimism. Borrowers might be optimistic about their future
income. They might also optimistically underestimate the probability
that an adverse contingency, such as job loss, accident, or illness, will
bring about financial hardship. 62 As a result, borrowers might over-
estimate their ability to service a loan with high, deferred costs. In
addition, borrowers might overestimate their ability to refinance the
160 An especially troubling manifestation of myopia is the problem of insufficient sav-
ing for retirement. See Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia
in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1150 (2001) (docu-
menting the problem of insufficient saving for retirement); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic
Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1275
(1991) ("Left to their own devices, many people will not save enough for their old age.").
161 See Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy: As
Housing Boomed, Industry Pushed Loans to a Broader Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at Al
("During the housing boom, the lower introductory rate on adjustable-rate mortgages
made them feel closer in cost to regular loans to many subprime borrowers, but those rates
can jump after two or three years. Brokers had extra incentives to sell those loans, which
have terms that often are confusing to borrowers."). The term "payment shock," used to
describe the experience of a borrower who has seen his interest rate reset and his monthly
payment increase, implies a less than perfect understanding of this contractual design fea-
ture. The term "payment shock" is used, for example, by the FRB and the FTC. See FED.
RESERVE BD., CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES 20 (2006), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/arms/armsenglish.htm; FRB, INTEREST ONLY, supra
note 127; FTC Comment, supra note 66, at 9.
162 See Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47
ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 143 (1981) (describing a study revealing that the majority of peo-
ple "regard themselves as more skillful and less risky than the average driver"); Neil D.
Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
806, 806 (1980) (describing two studies revealing that people tend to be unrealistically
optimistic about future life events); see also In re Eashai, 87 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996)
("[W]e recognize the fragility of human nature. '[H]uman experience tells us debtors can
be unreasonably optimistic despite their financial circumstances."' (quoting In re Cox, 182
B.R. 626, 635 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995))); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 114 (2000) ("The
recently unemployed, hopeful that they will be back at work in a matter of days or weeks,
may not be prepared to tell the children there will be no new soccer shoes this season or
no back-to-school clothes.").
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loan at an attractive rate and to avoid the high, long-term costs associ-
ated with a deferred-cost loan by doing so. Such overestimation may
result from optimism about future home prices, about future interest
rates, and about the borrower's future credit score.
Some borrowers were myopic and optimistic. Moreover, some
lenders and brokers reinforced borrowers' myopia and optimism.' 63
These biases provide an alternative, behavioral explanation for the
prevalence of cost deferral. Myopia and optimism explain why short-
term affordability, rather than rational, long-term affordability, took
center stage in the subprime and Alt-A markets. 164 These biases, and
especially optimism about future house prices, also add an important
dose of reality to the speculation explanation. 165
B. Complexity
The typical subprime and Alt-A mortgage contract is complex. It
specifies numerous interest rates, fees, and penalties, the magnitude
and applicability of which may be contingent on unknown future
events. A rational borrower will navigate this complexity with ease.
She will accurately assess the probability of triggering each rate, fee,
and penalty, and she will accurately calculate the expected magnitude
of each rate, fee, and penalty. Accordingly, each price dimension will
be afforded the appropriate weight in the overall evaluation of the
mortgage product.
The imperfectly rational borrower, however, is incapable of such
an accurate assessment. He is unable to calculate prices that are not
directly specified. Even if he could perform this calculation, he would
163 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,542 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt, 226) ("In addition, originators may sometimes encourage borrowers to be
excessively optimistic about their ability to refinance should they be unable to sustain re-
payment. For example, they sometimes offer reassurances that interest rates will remain
low and house prices will increase; borrowers may be swayed by such reassurances because
they believe the sources are experts."); see also Complaint, People v. Countrywide Fin. Corp.
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 24, 2008) (claiming that Countrywide encouraged borrowers to take
complex hybrid and option ARMs by emphasizing low teaser rates and misrepresenting
long-term costs) (the complaint, the California settlement, signed by the California Attor-
ney General on October 6, 2008, and the Multistate Settlement Term Sheet, signed by the
Attorneys General of Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada,
North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas, can be found at http://www.consumerlaw.org/unre-
ported); Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide Subpoenaed by Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007,
at CI (stating that the Illinois Attorney General sued a Chicago mortgage broker and is
investigating Countrywide Financial, the broker's primary lender, for abusive lending prac-
tices, specifically pushing borrowers into payment-option ARMs by emphasizing the low
short-term payments and deemphasizing the high long-term costs).
164 See supra Part III.A. 1.
165 See supra Part III.A.2. Cf Robin Greenwood & Stefan Nagel, Inexperienced Investors
and Bubbles (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14111, 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4111 (arguing that less experienced investment managers
were more likely to exhibit irrational trend-chasing behavior).
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be unable to simultaneously consider ten or fifteen (or even more)
price dimensions. And even if he could recall all the price dimen-
sions, he would be unable to calculate the impact of these prices on
the total cost of the loan. While the rational borrower is unfazed by
complexity, the imperfectly rational borrower might be misled by
complexity.
The imperfectly rational borrower deals with complexity by ignor-
ing it. He simplifies his decision problem by ignoring nonsalient
price dimensions. 166 And he approximates, rather than calculates, the
impact of the salient dimensions that cannot be ignored. In particu-
lar, limited attention and limited memory might result in the exclu-
sion of certain price dimensions from consideration.' 67  Limited
processing ability might prevent borrowers from accurately aggregat-
ing the different price components into a single, total expected price
that would serve as the basis for choosing the optimal loan.168
Increased complexity may be attractive to lenders, as it allows
them to hide the true cost of the loan in a multidimensional pricing
maze. A lender who understands the imperfectly rational response to
complexity can use complexity to her advantage-to create an appear-
ance of a lower total price without actually lowering the price. For
example, if the tax certification fee and the late payment fee are not
salient to borrowers, lenders will raise the magnitude of these price
dimensions. Increasing these prices will not hurt demand. On the
contrary, it will enable the lender to attract borrowers by reducing
more salient price dimensions. 169 This strategy depends on the exis-
tence of nonsalient price dimensions. When the number of price
dimensions goes up, the number of nonsalient price dimensions can
also be expected to go up. Lenders thus have a strong incentive to
increase complexity and multidimensionality.
166 SeeRichard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12J. BEI-Hv. DECISION MAKING 183,
194 (1999) (finding that small disaggregated fees are ignored).
167 Cf Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,525-26.
168 See GAO AMP REPORT, supra note 43, at Abstract ("Regulators and others are con-
cerned that borrowers may not be well-informed about the risks of AMPs, due to their
complexity and because promotional materials by some lenders and brokers do not pro-
vide balanced information on AMPs benefits and risks."); FTC Comment, supra note 66, at
14 ("[F]or loans with more complexity-such as nontraditional mortgages-consumers
face further challenges in understanding all significant terms and costs."). For over five
years, HUD has been working on reforming the home buying process, specifically through
increased transparency regarding closing costs. See Mary McGarity, Closing Nirvana, MORT-
GAGE BANKING, Aug. 2005, at 32 (quoting HUD Secretary AlphonsoJackson as saying, "Buy-
ing a home today is too complicated, confusing and costly.... Each year Americans spend
approximately $55 billion on closing costs they don't fully understand.").
169 See Bar-Gill, Consumer Contracts, supra note 18, at 771-78; see also Willis, supra note 4,
at 725-26 (describing how "a lender can creatively manipulate each component of the
price of a loan to effect a desired predicted return").
1122 [Vol. 94:1073
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CONTRACTS
Lenders also have a strong incentive to increase the complexity of
salient price dimensions, like the options in an option ARM and the
adjusting interest rate in a 2-28 hybrid with adjustment caps. The bor-
rower who is unable to calculate these prices will try to approximate
them. Complexity is attractive to lenders as long as the borrower's
approximation is an underestimation. 170
Finally, complexity can be expected to increase as borrowers
learn to effectively incorporate more price dimensions into their deci-
sion. If lenders significantly increase the magnitude of a nonsalient
price dimension, borrowers will eventually learn to focus on this price
dimension and it will become salient. Lenders will have to find an-
other nonsalient price dimension. When they run out of nonsalient
prices in the existing contractual design, they can create new ones by
adding more interest rates, fees, or penalties. Similarly, borrowers will
eventually learn to accurately estimate even prices that, while salient,
are indirectly defined using complex formulae and whose impact de-
pends on a host of unknown future realizations. When this happens,
lenders will have an incentive to increase even further the complexity
of these or other prices. 171
C. Heterogeneity in Cognitive Ability
The limits of the rational-choice theories, explored in Part III,
opened the door to the consideration of an alternative, behavioral-
economics theory. I have argued that such a theory, by integrating
psychology and economics, can explain the contractual design fea-
tures observed in the subprime and Alt-A mortgage markets. But the
two theoretical approaches-the neoclassical, rational-choice ap-
proach and the behavioral approach-are not mutually exclusive.
The rational-choice theories explain the behavior of the more sophis-
ticated borrowers and the market's response-specifically the contrac-
tual design response-to the demand generated by these borrowers.
Meanwhile, the behavioral-economics theory explains the demand
170 See Brian Bucks & Karen Pence, Do Homeowners Know Their House Values and Mort-
gage Terms? 1 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series
Paper No. 2006-3, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2006/
200603/200603pap.pdf (noting that ARM borrowers "appear to underestimate or not
know how much their interest rates could change").
171 A series of recent papers in industrial organization argue that firms introduce
spurious complexity into tariff structures and by doing so inhibit competition and reduce
welfare. See, e.g., Glenn Ellison, A Model of Add-On Pricing, 120 QJ. ECON. 585 (2005); Xav-
ier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppres-
sion in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. EcoN. 505 (2006); Ran Spiegler, Competition over Agents
with Boundedly Rational Expectations, 1 THEORETICAL ECON. 207 (2006); Glenn Ellison & Sara
Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10570, 2004), available at http://wwiv.nber.org/papers/
w10570.pdf.
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generated by less sophisticated borrowers and how lenders designed
their contracts in response to this demand.
In a companion piece, co-authored with Sumit Agarwal, Gene
Amromin, Zahi Ben-David, and Sewin Chen, I investigate empirically
the relative importance of the rational-choice theory and the behav-
ioral-economics theory in explaining the contractual design of sub-
prime and Alt-A mortgage contracts. Pending the results of this
ongoing study, the relative domain of the two competing theoretical
approaches can be indirectly assessed using evidence on the cognitive
abilities of borrowers. Available evidence suggests that imperfect ra-
tionality is pervasive in the residential mortgage market and especially
in the subprime market. 172 A recent study, by Sumit Agarwal, Gene
Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala Chomsisengphet, and Douglas
D. Evanoff, found that mandated financial counseling is correlated
with less risky ARM contracts, specifically with higher short-term
teaser rates and lower long-term rates. 173 These counseling sessions
likely respond not only to an information deficit among borrowers,
but also to a cognitive deficit.
Survey studies and consumer testing conducted by the FRB and
the FTC found that borrowers do not understand mortgage terms. 174
Also, the FTC, in testing the efficacy of proposed disclosures, identi-
fied substantial framing effects: different disclosure forms containing
the same information led to different choices-a result that would not
be expected if borrowers were perfectly rational. 175
Other studies have documented specific mistakes that borrowers
consistently make. A recent study by Sumit Agarwal, John Driscoll,
Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson identified persistent mistakes in
172 See Howard Lax et al., Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 533, 544-46 (2004) (noting that subprime borrowers tend to be
less educated and less sophisticated about the mortgage market).
173 Sumit Agarwal et al., Can Mandated Financial Counseling Improve Mortgage Decision-
Making? Evidence from a Natural Experiment 27 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No.
2008-03-019, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285603. This study also found
that the mandated financial counseling led to a decline in the demand for credit. Id. at 3;
see also ROBERTJ. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: How TODAY'S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 124 (2008) (noting that most people need to be
financially educated); Annamaria Lusardi, Household Saving Behavior: The Role of Financial
Literacy, Information, and Financial Education Programs 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 13824, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13824 (argu-
ing that households enter into risky financial contracts due to lack of financial education).
174 See LACKO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 104, at ES-6 (demonstrating the limits of mort-
gage disclosures and noting that many borrowers "did not understand important costs and
terms of their own recently obtained mortgages. Many had loans that were significantly
more costly than they believed, or contained significant restrictions, such as prepayment
penalties, of which they were unaware."); Bucks & Pence, supra note 170.
175 SeeJAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EFFECT OF
MORTGAGE BROKER COMPENSATION DISCLOSURES ON CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION: A CON-
TROLLED EXPERIMErr, at ES-7 (2004).
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loan applications that increased borrowers' APRs by an average of 125
basis points.1 76 Another study, by Susan Woodward, identified sys-
temic mistakes leading to excessive broker fees of up to $1,500.177
And numerous studies have documented borrowers' failure to make
optimal refinancing decisions: Many consumers fail to exercise op-
tions to refinance their mortgages and thereby end up with rates that
are substantially higher than the market rate. Other consumers refi-
nance too early, failing to account for the possibility that interest rates
will continue to decline.1 78 According to one estimate, these refinanc-
ing mistakes can cost borrowers tens of thousands of dollars or up to
25 percent of the loan's value.
1 79
Evidence of rapid defaults, within six to twelve months of origina-
tion, 180 provides further support to the behavioral-economics theory.
One explanation for borrowers' inability "to afford the monthly pay-
176 See Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions over the Lifecycle
9-11 (Oct. 21, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=973790.
177 See Susan E. Woodward, Consumer Confusion in the Mortgage Market (July 14,
2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at www.sandhillecon.com/pdf/consumercon-
fusion.pdf; see aLsoJohn Y. Campbell, Household Finance, 61 J. FIN. 1553, 1589 (2006) (citing
Woodward, supra).
178 See Campbell, supra note 177, at 1579, 1581, 1590; LaCour-Little & Holmes, supra
note 101, at 644 (describing the "apparent irrationality on the part of mortgage borrowers,
who fail to default to the extent predicted when house prices fall and fail to prepay to the
extent predicted when interest rates fall"); Agarwal et al., supra note 120, at 3 (surveying
evidence that borrowers fail to make optimal refinancing decisions); see also Robert Van
Order, Simon Firestone & Peter Zorn, The Performance of Low Income and Minority Mortgages
(Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1083, 2007), available at http://ssn.com/ab-
stract=1003444. Similar mistakes have been identified in the U.K. See MILES, supra note
159, at 33; Campbell, supra note 177, at 1588. Others have argued that apparently irra-
tional refinancing patterns can be explained within a rational-choice framework that allows
for heterogeneous transaction costs and accounts for relocation and liquidity motives. See
Michael LaCour-Little, Another Look at the Role of Borrower Characteristics in Predicting Mortgage
Prepayments, 10J. HOUSING RES. 45, 47 (1999) (emphasizing the role of transaction costs
and relocation and liquidity motives); Richard Stanton, Rational Prepayment and the Valua-
tion of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 8 REv. FIN. STUD. 677, 681, 706 (1995) (arguing that heter-
ogeneous transaction costs and exogenous factors such as divorce and sudden
unemployment can explain seemingly irrational refinancing behavior). The problem of
deriving the optimal time for prepayment is a complex one, and it can only be solved
numerically with the help of high-powered computers. Recently, Agarwal and his col-
leagues have shown that the optimal prepayment decision can be approximated using an
implementable formula. See Agarwal et al., supra note 120, at 5-6.
179 SeeAgarwal et al., supra note 120, at 25 ("[M]arket data ... shows that many house-
holds did refinance too close to the NPV break-even rule during the last 15 years ....").
Following the NPV rule, instead of the optimal-refinancing rule, leads to substantial ex-
pected losses: $26,479 on a $100,000 mortgage, $49,066 on a $250,000 mortgage, $86,955
on a $500,000 mortgage, $163,235 on a $1,000,000 mortgage. Id. at 28 tbl.5.
180 See Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 16 (noting that "2 percent of outstanding loans in
the 2007 vintage were in default within six months of origination, and 8 percent were in
default after 12 months").
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ments almost from the moment of origination" 181 is that they did not
fully understand the extent of the obligations that they were undertak-
ing. Evidence that loan prices are affected by factors unrelated to the
risk of nonpayment provides indirect evidence of borrower mistakes:
both data and testimony by loan officers suggest that many borrowers
who would qualify for prime loans ended up with higher-priced sub-
prime mortgages-an indication of systematic mistakes.18 2 Evidence
that borrowers who consider two or more price dimensions when
shopping for a loan end up paying more for the loan than borrowers
who consider only a single price dimension 18 3 provides further sup-
port for the behavioral explanation.
It seems that few people dispute the fact that at least some bor-
rowers did not enter into their subprime mortgage contracts with a
full understanding of the costs and benefits associated with these con-
tracts. The FRB, in justifying its new mortgage regulations, referred to
borrowers who "unwittingly accept[ed] loans" with terms that they did
not fully understand. 184 Likewise, the CBO concluded that "[t] he rise
in defaults of subprime mortgages may also reflect the fact that some
borrowers lacked a complete understanding of the complex terms of
their mortgages and assumed mortgages that they would have trouble
repaying."1 8 5
A clarification is in order. In theory, an incomplete understand-
ing of complex contracts is consistent with rational-choice theory.
Facing a complex mortgage contract, a rational borrower would have
to spend time reading the contract and deciphering its meaning. If
181 See id. Other early defaulters were rational speculators, who stopped paying when
house prices stopped rising. Id.
182 SeeJames H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending: An Overview, in FINANCIAL SER-
VICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 31, 37 (2001) (recording estimates
by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae that between 35 percent and 50 percent of borrowers in
the subprime market could qualify for prime market loans); Lew Sichelman, Community
Group Claims CitiFinancial Still Predatory, ORIGINATION NEWS, Jan. 2002, at 25 (reporting
that, in 2002, researchers at Citibank concluded that at least 40 percent of those who were
sold high interest rate, subprime mortgages would have qualified for prime-rate loans); see
also Willis, supra note 4, at 730; Morgenson, supra note 99, at 9 (recounting that in Decem-
ber 2006, in an agreement with the New York State Attorney General, Countrywide agreed
"to compensate black and Latino borrowers to whom it had improperly given high-cost
loans in 2004").
183 Woodward, supra note 177, at 2.
184 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,525-26 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226) ("Consumers who do not fully understand such terms and features,
however, are less able to appreciate their risks, which can be significant. For example, the
payment may increase sharply and a prepayment penalty may hinder the consumer from
refinancing to avoid the payment increase. Thus, consumers may unwittingly accept loans
that they will have difficulty repaying.").
185 See Hearing, supra note 1, at 13; see also GAO CONSUMER PROTECrION REPORT, supra
note 17, at 14 (describing borrowers "who lack sophistication about financial matters, are
not highly educated, or suffer physical or mental infirmities").
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the cost of attaining perfect information and perfect understanding of
the contract is high, the rational borrower would stop short of this
theoretical ideal. In fact, imperfect rationality can be viewed as yet
another cost of attaining more information and better understanding.
When this cost component is added, the total cost of becoming in-
formed goes up, and thus the borrower will end up with less informa-
tion and a less complete understanding of the contract. The observed
levels of misunderstanding suggest that many borrowers were incur-
ring this added cost of imperfect rationality.18 6
Imperfect rationality, however, is not simply another cost compo-
nent. A rational borrower who decides not to invest in reading and
deciphering certain contractual provisions in the mortgage contract
will not assume that these provisions are favorable to her. In fact, she
will recognize that unread provisions will generally be pro-lender. In
contrast, an imperfectly rational borrower will completely ignore the
unread or forgotten terms or naively assume that they are favorable to
him. Accordingly, a complex, unread term or a hidden fee would
lead an imperfectly rational borrower-but not a rational borrower-
to underestimate the total cost of the loan. As a result, the incentive
to increase complexity and hide fees will be stronger in a market with
imperfectly rational borrowers. The behavioral theory of contract de-
sign is an imperfect-rationality theory, not an imperfect-information
theory. 18 7
D. Market Correction
Individuals are imperfectly informed and imperfectly rational.
Yet most markets work reasonably well despite these imperfections.
Several market-correction mechanisms operate to minimize the ef-
fects of imperfect information and imperfect rationality. These cor-
rection forces are present also in the subprime and Alt-A mortgage
markets. As I discuss below, however, they are weaker in these mar-
kets. For this reason, borrower mistakes persisted in the subprime
and Alt-A markets for a prolonged period of time, and the desirable
changes that we are now seeing in lending practices began only after
the subprime market collapsed.
186 See, e.g., Bucks & Pence, supra note 170, at 19-20 (finding that many borrowers do
not even know that they have an ARM rather than a FRM).
187 Cf Philip Bond, David K. Musto & Bilge Yilmaz, Predatory Mortgage Lending 3 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 08-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1288094 (demonstrating that "a realistic information asymmetry between borrowers
and lenders is enough to generate [predatory mortgage lending] and can explain (at least
qualitatively) when and where it occurs").
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1. On the Demand Side: Learning by Borrowers
Individuals make mistakes. 18 8 But individuals also learn from
their mistakes and learn not to repeat these mistakes. While learning
is not absent from the mortgage market, it is slower. The reason is
that the mortgage contracts that individuals sign over a lifetime are
few and far between. 189 Interpersonal learning can compensate for
limited intrapersonal learning, as borrowers share mortgage-related
experiences. Interpersonal learning, however, is not always common
enough and detailed enough to eliminate mistakes. More generally,
the evidence shows that learning about financial decisions is
incomplete.' 90
In many markets, effective learning occurs when individuals,
aware of their limitations, seek expert advice. This mechanism also
works imperfectly in the mortgage market. Borrowers commonly seek
the advice of mortgage brokers who face an incentive structure that
prevents them from being loyal agents of the borrower.191 Moreover,
188 Not all individuals make mistakes. In theory, even a minority of informed, sophisti-
cated borrowers will induce sellers to offer welfare-maximizing products and contracts. See
Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Exam-
pies of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1983); Schwartz & Wilde, supra
note 155; Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Product Quality and Imperfect Information, 52 Rv.
ECON. STUD. 251, 251-52 (1985). The informed-minority argument has only limited rele-
vance in the subprime mortgage market, where lenders can segment the market, offering
different contracts to sophisticated and less-sophisticated borrowers. See Bar-Gill & War-
ren, supra note 18, at 22-23; Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1141-43.
189 SeeTruth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1676 (proposedJan. 9, 2008) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) ("Disclosures themselves, likely cannot provide this minimum
understanding for transactions that are complex and that consumers engage in infre-
quently."); Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings
Behavior, J. Econ. Persp., Summer 2007, at 81.
190 Experimental evidence suggests that while learning is generally effective in mini-
mizing mistakes, biases in relatively abstract domains like math and finance are more resili-
ent. See HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich
et al. eds., 2002); Keith E. Stanovich, The Fundamental Computational Biases of Human Cogni-
tion: Heuristics that (Sometimes) Impair Decision Making and Problem Solving, in THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF PROBLEM SOLVING 291 (Janet E. Davidson & RobertJ. Steinberg eds., 2003); see also
Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Exponential Growth Bias and Household Finance, J. FIN.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 1-2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081633 (docu-
menting the "exponential growth biases" that lead borrowers to underestimate both bor-
rowing costs and returns to savings); Sumit Agarwal et al., Do Consumers Choose the Right
Credit Contracts? (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2006-11, 2006) (discussing
how systematic and costly consumers' mistakes are in practice); Agarwal et al., supra note
176 (discussing the diminished returns from learning about finances).
191 In the real estate brokerage market, there has been a recent shift, aided by legal
changes, from seller agency to buyer agency. See Ronald Benton Brown, Joseph M.
Grohman & Manuel L. Valcarcel, Real Estate Brokerage: Recent Changes in Relationships and a
Proposed Cure, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 25 (1995) (describing this shift); Christopher Curran
& Joel Schrag, Does It Matter Whom an Agent Serues? Evidenceftom Recent Changes in Real Estate
Agency Law, 43J.L. & ECON. 265, 265-71 (2000) (describing the evolution and effects of a
market for buyers' agents in Atlanta, following a 1994 change in Georgia's real estate law).
This shift could have a positive effect on the mortgage market as well.
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the complexity of the subprime mortgage contract is such that even
so-called experts often get it wrong. For example, a recent study by
Sumit Agarwal, John C. Driscoll, and David Laibson has shown that
available expert advice on refinancing ignores the option value of
postponing the prepayment decision-an omission that can cost bor-
rowers up to 25 percent of the loan value. 192
2. On the Supply Side: Mistake Correction by Sellers and Reputation
Effects
Competing sellers will often have an incentive to correct con-
sumer mistakes through, for example, advertising.' 93 While these in-
centives are not always sufficient in competitive markets, they are even
weaker in imperfectly competitive markets.' 94 As explained above, in-
effective shopping by borrowers inhibits competition in the subprime
mortgage market.195 In many markets, seller reputation provides a
powerful defense against the abuse of consumers. But, again, reputa-
tional forces are weaker in the subprime mortgage market. First,
there is little repeat business, as a single borrower takes few mortgage
loans, and a relatively long time passes between loans. Second, lend-
ers are relatively short-lived. 196 A downside of the securitization inno-
vation was the opening of the market to fly-by-night originators that
had little reputation to lose and insufficient incentives to build a
reputation. 197
192 See Agarwal et al., supra note 120, at 24-25 ("Most of the advice boils down to the
following necessary condition for refinancing-only refinance if you can recoup the clos-
ing costs of refinancing in reduced interest payments.... None of the 15 books and 10
web sites in our sample discuss (or quantitatively analyze) the value of waiting due to the
possibility that interest rates might continue to decline."); cf Michael S. Haigh &John A.
List, Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis, 60 J. FIN.
523 (2005) (documenting biased decisions by financial professionals despite ample oppor-
tunities for learning).
193 See Bar-Gill, Consumer Contracts, supra note 18, at 758-61.
194 Id. at 769-70.
195 See supra Part 1.
196 This phenomenon is evidenced by the number of loan originators that have gone
out of business during the recent crisis. See Worth Civils & Mark Gongloff, Subprime
Shakeout: Lenders that Have Closed Shop, Been Acquired or Stopped Loans, WALL ST. J. ONLINE,
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-subprimeloans0706-sort.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2009) (listing eighty loan originators that closed or filed for bank-
ruptcy between November 2006 and September 2007).
197 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 47, at 2041 ("[S]ecuritization funds small, thinly
capitalized lenders and brokers, thus enabling them to enter the subprime market. These
originators are more prone to commit loan abuses because they are less heavily regulated,
have reduced reputational risk, and operate with low capital, helping to make them judg-
ment-proof."). So, while securitization reduces entry barriers and thus enhances competi-
tion, it is not clear that this enhanced competition is welfare enhancing.
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WELFARE IMPLICATIONS
What are the costs of the identified contractual designs, especially
when understood as a response to borrowers' imperfect rationality?
First, complex, multidimensional contracts hinder competition in the
subprime mortgage market. Second, complex and deferred-cost con-
tracts distort the remaining, weakened forces of competition, leading
to excessively high prices on more salient price dimensions and exces-
sively low prices on less salient price dimensions. Third, these con-
tractual design features increase the likelihood of default and
foreclosure, with all the ensuing costs-to borrowers, lenders, com-
munities, and the economy at large. Fourth, the identified contrac-
tual designs raise distributional concerns, as they impose
disproportionate burdens on weaker-often minority-borrowers. I
address these welfare costs in turn.
A. Hindered Competition
Perhaps the largest cost associated with excessively complex con-
tracts comes from the inhibited competition that they foster. 198 As
described above, complexity prevents the effective comparison shop-
ping that is necessary for vigorous competition. The market power
gained by lenders clearly helps lenders at the expense of borrowers.
But the limited competition also imposes a welfare cost in the form of
allocation inefficiency: borrowers are not matched with the most effi-
cient lender.
The limits of competition in the subprime mortgage market are
reflected in evidence of above-cost pricing. In particular, borrowers
are paying origination fees exceeding the actual costs that these fees
198 See Paulson, supra note 2 ("Homebuyers today have more choices than ever before
in finding a mortgage that best suits their circumstances. Yet, comparing the attractiveness
of one mortgage product to another can be difficult."); see also Susan Block-Lieb & Edward
J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Re-
form" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 T~x. L. REv. 1481, 1530, 1539-40 (2006); Engel & McCoy, supra
note 47, at 2080; Willis, supra note 4, at 726 (describing the increased complexity of mort-
gage products, and arguing that borrowers face a "bewildering array" of home loan prod-
ucts (citingJinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, The Price of Money: Consumers' Understanding
of APRs and Contract Interest Rates, 18J. Pun. POL'Y & MARKETING 66, 67 (1999))); Zywicki &
Adamson, supra note 11, at 70-71 (noting that, while standardization and transparency
provide for easy comparison shopping and foster competition in the prime market, the
same is not true of the subprime market, where lack of standardization and complexity
impede comparison shopping and hinder competition). Since borrowers cannot value the
different loan options, they are susceptible to skewed advertising that selectively empha-
sizes certain dimensions of the loan contract. See FrC Comment, supra note 66, at 3-4
(describing FTC enforcement actions, taken when lenders' and brokers' advertisements
and oral sales pitches were inconsistent with the offered contracts). The success of such
advertising proves the imperfect information, imperfect rationality of borrowers, or both.
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allegedly cover by hundreds-or even thousands-of dollars.'9 9 Bor-
rowers are also paying interest rates that are higher than what the
borrowers' risk profiles justify. 200 The most extreme case is that of
borrowers who would qualify for lower-cost conventional loans but are
nonetheless obtaining high-cost subprime mortgages. 20 It is the
199 See SUSAN E. WOODWARD, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., A STUDY OF CLOSING
COSTS FOR FHA MORTGAGES (2008). The Woodward study finds that complexity and mul-
tidimensionality of origination fees prevent effective shopping, hinder competition, and
lead to inflated prices; it further analyzes more than 7,500 FHA-insured thirty-year fixed-
rate home purchase loans with a 7 percent coupon rate closed in May and June of 2001.
These were not the typical subprime loans but loans than often target similarly high-risk
borrowers. According to HUD, borrowers are paying excess fees averaging around $700
per mortgage, and these excess fees can be eliminated by improved disclosure that would
enhance competition. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 115.
200 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 47, at 2058; Howard Lax et al., Subprime Lending: An
Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 533 (2004) (arguing that sub-
prime interest rates cannot be justified by risk alone); see also STEIN, supra note 99 (valuing
the cost to borrowers of excess interest at $2.9 billion).
201 See FREDDIE MAc, AUTOMATED UNDERWRITING: MAKING MORTGAGE LENDING SIMPLER
AND FAIRER FOR AMERICA'S FAMILIES ch. 5 (1996), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/
corporate/reports/moseley/chap5.htm (reporting that 10 to 35 percent of subprime bor-
rowers would qualify for lower cost conventional loans); Freddie Mac, Half of Subprime
Loans Categorized as 'A' Quality, INSIDE B&C LENDING, June 10, 1996 (describing a poll of
fifty subprime lenders who estimated that half of subprime borrowers could have qualified
for prime loans); Fannie Mae Has Played Critical Role in Expansion of Minority Homeownership
Over Past Decade; Raines Pledges to Lead Market for African American Mortgage Lending, Bus.
WIRE, Mar. 2, 2000, LexisNexis Academic (noting that up to half of subprime borrowers
would qualify for lower-cost conventional loans); see also Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18,
at 38-40; Engel and McCoy, supra note 47, at 2058 n.92; Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform
Now (ACORN), Many Borrowers in Subprime Loans Should Have Qualified for a Lower Cost
Loan, ACORN.ORG, http://www.acorn.org/index.php?id=114. The Wall Street Journal
noted the incentive to steer borrowers toward higher-cost loans:
The analysis also raises pointed questions about the practices of major
mortgage lenders. Many borrowers whose credit scores might have quali-
fied them for more conventional loans say they were pushed into risky sub-
prime loans. They say lenders or brokers aggressively marketed the loans,
offering easier and faster approvals-and playing down or hiding the oner-
ous price paid over the long haul in higher interest rates or stricter repay-
ment terms....
The subprime sales pitch sometimes was fueled with faxes and emails
from lenders to brokers touting easier qualification for borrowers and at-
tractive payouts for mortgage brokers who brought in business. One of the
biggest weapons: a compensation structure that rewarded brokers for per-
suading borrowers to take a loan with an interest rate higher than the bor-
rower might have qualified for.
Brooks & Simon, supra note 161. Gretchen Morgenson, writing for the New York Times,
made a similar observation:
On its way to becoming the nation's largest mortgage lender, the
Countrywide Financial Corporation encouraged its sales force to court cus-
tomers over the telephone with a seductive pitch that seldom varied. "I
want to be sure you are getting the best loan possible," the sales representa-
tives would say.
But providing "the best loan possible" to customers wasn't always the
bank's main goal, say some former employees....
Countrywide's entire operation, from its computer system to its incen-
tive pay structure and financing arrangements, is intended to wring maxi-
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higher profit margin in the subprime market that induced lenders to
steer borrowers into subprime loans.2 02 This problem was explicitly
recognized by the FRB: "[A]n atmosphere of relaxed standards may
increase the incidence of abusive lending practices by attracting less
scrupulous originators into the market, while at the same time bring-
ing more vulnerable borrowers into the market. These abuses can
lead consumers to pay more for their loans than their risk profiles
warrant."203
B. Distorted Competition
Limited competition allows lenders to set above-cost prices and
reap supra-competitive profits. But even if borrowers engaged in vig-
orous shopping, eliminating all supra-competitive profits, there would
still be a welfare cost. The reason is that borrowers' shopping, while
vigorous, would be misguided. Consider again the stylized example of
a mortgage contract with a two-dimensional price: a short-term intro-
ductory rate, PST, and a long-term rate, PLT.2 0 4 The two prices affect
the two decisions a borrower must make: whether to get out of the
loan at the end of the introductory period and whether to take the
loan in the first place. An optimal contract will set the two prices to
induce efficient decisions. If borrowers are rational, competition will
produce the optimal contract. Not so if borrowers are imperfectly ra-
tional. In particular, I have shown that if borrowers underestimate the
costs associated with the long-term rate, PT, competition will focus on
the short-term rate, PST, resulting in an inefficient contract with an
excessively low PST and an excessively high PLT.2 0 5
mum profits out of the mortgage lending boom no matter what it costs
borrowers, according to interviews with former employees and brokers who
worked in different units of the company and internal documents they pro-
vided. One document, for instance, shows that until last September the
computer system in the company's subprime unit excluded borrowers' cash
reserves, which had the effect of steering them away from lower-cost loans
to those that were more expensive to homeowners and more profitable to
Countrywide.
Morgenson, supra note 99.
202 See Morgenson, supra note 99 (explaining that internal Countrywide documents
and testimonies of former employees reveal larger profit margins on subprime loans as
compared to prime loans and especially large margins on loans with high prepayment
penalties and high go-to rates. As a result, the commission structure rewarded brokers and
sales representatives who sold subprime loans, including to borrowers who qualified for
Alt-A loans, loans with higher and longer prepayment penalties, and loans with higher go-
to rates). Evidence refutes the alternative hypothesis that the relative increase in subprime
loans reflects an increase in borrower risk. See LaCour-Little, supra note 31, at 490-93
(showing empirically, through assessment of the two most common risk indicators-the
FICO score and LTV-that borrower risk remained relatively stable).
203 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1675 (proposedJan. 9, 2008) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
204 See supra Part IV.A.
205 See supra Part MA.
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There are two adverse welfare implications. First, the excessively
high PLT will inefficiently lead some borrowers to exit at the end of the
introductory period. Second, and more importantly, the initial deci-
sion to take a loan will be distorted. While the actual total payments,
PST + PLT, will go up to cover the increased cost generated by the ineffi-
cient contractual design, the total payments as perceived by the bor-
rower will go down. 2 06 The result is excessive borrowing (and
excessive home purchases) .2 0 7
This analysis applies to all the examples of cost deferral discussed
above: small down payments, high LTVs, escalating payments, and
prepayment penalties. 20 8 The analysis also applies to the complexity
examples, where one (or more) less salient or indirectly specified
price dimensions is ignored or underestimated. (PLT corresponds to
the less salient, underestimated price dimension, and PsT corresponds
to the more salient price dimension.) In all of these cases, imperfect
rationality results in price distortions; these price distortions increase
total costs and total payments, and skew both long-term and short-
term decisions. Most importantly, these distortions, while increasing
the actual cost, reduce the perceived cost of the loan and thus lead to
an artificially inflated demand for mortgage financing.
C. Delinquency and Foreclosure
There is evidence that the identified contractual design features
increase delinquency and foreclosure rates. 20 9 Deferred-cost con-
tracts are associated with higher rates of delinquency and foreclosure.
Specifically, increased delinquency and foreclosure rates have been
206 See supra Part IVA.
207 Excessive borrowing would result even absent a contractual-design response-that
is, even under the optimal contract. The contractual design response exacerbates the wel-
fare cost.
208 Focusing on prepayment penalties, several studies found empirical evidence of one
of the welfare costs associated with distorted competition. See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra
note 47, at 2060 (reviewing studies that found a positive correlation between prepayment
penalties and higher interest rates); LaCour-Little & Holmes, supra note 101, at 660-61
(finding that, for the common 2-28 ARM, the total interest rate savings is significantly less
than the amount of the expected prepayment penalty).
209 See generally EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA'S LATEST BooM
AND BUST 66-67 (2007) (arguing, based on the study by Schloemer and her colleagues,
supra note 143, that mortgage contract design is linked to borrower distress).
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linked to high LTVs,2 10 escalating payments, 21' and prepayment pen-
alties.212 The FRB, in advocating its new mortgage regulations, ac-
210 See Gerardi et al., supra note 29, at 4. According to Kristopher Gerardi, Adam Sha-
piro, and Paul Willen:
Subprime lenders created a group of borrowers that were much more likely
to default for at least two reasons. First, while they did not invent zero-
equity borrowing, they did allow a much larger fraction of borrowers to
start homeownership with no cushion against negative [House Price Appre-
ciation]. Second, subprime lenders allowed borrowers with a history of
cash flow problems and with monthly payments that exceeded fifty percent
of current income to enter homeownership. Under the best of circum-
stances, subprime borrowers are at least five times as likely to become delin-
quent as prime borrowers.
211 See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note I (manuscript at 19 tbl.3) (finding posi-
tive correlation coefficients, though with limited statistical significance, on ARM (vs. FRM)
and Hybrid (vs. FRM) loans in regressions that try to explain default and foreclosure
rates). All types of mortgages-not only the nonstandard ARMs-originated in 2006 per-
formed badly in terms of delinquency and foreclosure rates. ARMs, however, performed
worse (and many ARMs are nonstandard). Cf id. (manuscript at 11 fig.4) (showing a
much higher delinquency rate for hybrids as compared to FRMs); Bernanke March 2008
Speech, supra note 77 ("The worst payment problems have been among subprime adjusta-
ble-rate mortgages ...."); Bernanke January 2008 Speech, supra note 9 ("Ample evidence
suggests that responsible nonprime lending can be beneficial and safe for the borrower as
well as profitable for the lender. For example, even as delinquencies on subprime ARMs
have soared, loss rates on subprime mortgages with fixed interest rates, though somewhat
higher recently, remain in their historical range."). Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund noted the
data indicating far worse performance for ARMs:
[D]elinquincies have been particularly pronounced for loans that include
an adjustable interest rate component-floating-rate mortgages, short-term
hybrids, and long-term hybrids. For example, looking at subprime mort-
gages, the serious delinquency rates for both adjustable-rate and fixed-rate
loans were about 5.6 percent in mid-2005. But by July 2008, serious delin-
quencies on adjustable-rate mortgages had risen to over 29 percent, while
the similar rate for fixed-rate mortgages rose to 9 percent. Similarly, seri-
ous delinquency rates for both the adjustable-rate and fixed-rate Alt-A mort-
gages were about 0.6 percent in mid-2005. But by July 2008, the
delinquency rate on adjustable-rate Alt-A mortgages had risen past 13 per-
cent, while the delinquency rate on fixed-rate mortgages had risen over 5
percent.
Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 8. The high default rates of ARMs, as compared to FRMs,
may be due to the comparatively poor risk attributes-in terms of average FICO score and
CLTV-of these loans. Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund observed:
The exceptionally high default rates of subprime adjustable-rate mortgages
may be due in part to the relatively poor risk attributes of these loans.
Short-term hybrids, which make up almost all subprime adjustable-rate
mortgages, had an average FICO credit score of only 612 and a mean com-
bined loan-to-value ratio of 89 percent. By contrast, subprime fixed-rate
mortgages have higher credit scores (FICO of 627) and lower combined
loan-to-value ratios (80 percent).
Id. In other words, poor underwriting standards are to blame. Contractual design facili-
tated lower underwriting standards, such as the fact that ARMs enabled lenders to qualify
borrowers based on the low, initial rate.
212 See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note I (manuscript at 19 tbl.3) (finding posi-
tive correlation coefficients on Prepayment Penalty in regressions that try to explain de-
fault and foreclosure rates); Roberto G. Quercia, Michael A. Stegman & Walter R. Davis,
The Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on Subprime Foreclosures: The Special Case of Prepayment Pen-
alties and Balloon Payments, 18 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 311, 337 (2007) (finding, based on
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knowledged that "several riskier loan attributes," including "high loan-
to-value ratio[s]" and "payment shock on adjustable-rate mortgages,"
"increased the risk of serious delinquency and foreclosure for sub-
prime loans originated in 2005 through early 2007."213 A study based
on data from 2004 through 2006 estimates that about 12 percent of
subprime loans will end up in foreclosure as a result of large resets (in
escalating-payments contracts), coupled with insufficient equity to en-
able sale or refinancing (due to high LTVs). 214 The continuing dete-
rioration in the housing and credit markets since December 2006
suggests that the 12 percent figure could well be an underestimate. 21 5
The welfare costs associated with foreclosure are substantial. The
FRB Chairman, Ben Bernanke, estimated that, on average, total losses
from foreclosure "exceeded 50 percent of the principal balance, with
legal, sales, and maintenance expenses alone amounting to more than
10 percent of principal. '21 6 An industry study that assumes foreclo-
LP data, that "lengthy"-that is, 3 years or more-prepayment penalties increase foreclo-
sure risk by about 20 percent and that ARMs have a 50 percent higher foreclosure risk than
FRMs). Others argue that prepayment penalties affect default and foreclosure only indi-
rectly by enabling the lower initial interest rates that qualify riskier borrowers. See Mayer et
al., supra note 33, at 12-13.
213 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1674 (proposed Jan. 9, 2008) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
214 See CAGAN, supra note 25, at 69-70 (focusing on ARMs originated between 2004 and
2006). Cagan's estimates are sensitive to projections about house prices and the index
(LIBOR) that determines the magnitude of the reset. His 12 percent foreclosure estimate
is based on house prices and the index level in December 2006. Id. Specifically, lower
market interest rates mitigate the negative impact of a loan reset, while lower house prices
exacerbate the negative impact of a loan reset.
2t5 While resets on escalating-payments contracts are commonly blamed for triggering
default and foreclosure, the evidence supporting this allegation is not conclusive. But even
studies that fail to identify substantial adverse effects of resets in the current data anticipate
such effects going forward. See Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 28 (noting studies showing
that "borrowers with hybrid mortgages appeared more likely to refinance and prepay their
mortgages around the first reset date but were not necessarily more likely to default
around that time" while suggesting that "[m]ortgage rate resets may yet cause difficulties
going forward"). Shane Sherlund observed:
House price appreciation seems to be the primary determinant of default
and prepayment behavior. Borrowers with subprime mortgages could
more easily prepay when house price appreciation was high (almost regard-
less of the initial credit quality of the loan), but found it more difficult to
prepay once house price appreciation slowed and turned negative. New,
stricter underwriting further limited the ability of many borrowers with sub-
prime mortgages unable to refinance or even sell. Many are then faced
with the decision of default. With this in mind, mortgage rate resets could
have an effect on defaults going forward, even though they have had only
limited effects in the data to date. Prepayment is much more difficult for
many borrowers, so their ability and willingness to face mortgage rate reset
may now be an issue. Short-term interest rates have declined recently, so
these borrowers are not currently facing drastically higher mortgage
payments.
Sherlund, supra note 133, at 11.
216 Bernanke March 2008 Speech, supra note 77.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
sure losses equal to 37.5% of a loan's value estimates total subprime
foreclosure losses on loans originated between 2004 and 2006 at
nearly $29 billion.217 Substituting Bernanke's 50 percent figure for
the 37.5 percent assumption, the estimate of foreclosure losses in-
creases to $38.7 billion. Of this $38.7 billion, the 10 percent (or $7.7
billion) in transaction costs-the "legal, sales, and maintenance ex-
penses" that Bernanke referred to-are clear welfare costs.218 The re-
mainder is partly a welfare cost and partly a welfare-neutral transfer.
The transfer component is the "foreclosure discount," the difference
between the market price and the price received for a foreclosed
property. 219 This price discount, while a loss to the lender and bor-
rower, is a benefit to the buyer of the foreclosed property. The wel-
fare-cost component is the social loss incurred when a property is left
vacant-until the foreclosure sale and often even after the foreclosure
sale. In a declining real estate market, these vacancy periods are quite
long. Another category of welfare costs, not included in the preced-
ing estimates, is composed of the negative externalities that foreclo-
sures impose on neighborhoods and cities. 220 The FRB noted that
"[w]hen foreclosures are clustered, they can injure entire communi-
ties by reducing property values in surrounding areas."2 21 Finally, to
the extent that foreclosures contributed to the real estate slump and
217 CAGAN, supra note 25, at 69-71.
218 See Paul S. Calem & Michael LaCour-Little, Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Mort-
gage Loans 12 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series
Paper No. 2001-60, 2001) (assuming it costs 10 percent of the unpaid balance to dispose of
the foreclosed property and that foreclosure transaction costs amount to 5 percent of un-
paid balance).
219 See CAGAN, supra note 25, at 70 (arguing that foreclosed properties sell at a discount
of up to 30 percent).
220 See Vicki Been, Dir., Furman Ctr. for Real Estate & Urban Policy, Testimony Before
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on Domestic Policy: Ex-
ternal Effects of Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures: Evidence from New York City 4-5
(May 21, 2008) (reporting that, in New York, properties adjacent to recent foreclosure
filings sell at a 1.8 percent to 3.7 percent discount); see also WILLIAM C. APGAR & MARK
DUDA, HOMEOWNERSHIP PRES. FOUND., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE MUNICIPAL IMPACT OF To-
DAY'S MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BOOM (2005), available at http://www.995hope.org/con-
tent/pdf/ApgarDuda-Study-Short-Version.pdf; CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
SUBPRIME SPILLOVER: FORECLOSURES COST NEIGHBORS $202 BILLION: 40.6 MILLION HOMES
LOSE $5,000 ON AVERAGE (2008), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/
mortgage/research/subprime-spillover.html; FAMILY Hous. FUND, COST EFFECTIVENESS OF
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 5 (1998) (noting foreclosure
costs of around $7,000 for borrowers, $2,000 for lenders, and additional costs of $15,000 to
$60,000 on third parties); STEIN, supra note 99, at 11-13 (detailing externalities such as
declines in neighboring property values and increased crime rates (citing U.S. DEP'T OF
Hous. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE
LENDING 25 (2000))); Engel & McCoy, supra note 47, at 2042 n.12; Gerardi et al., supra
note 29, at 1 n.1 (citing Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage
Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUSING STUD. 851 (2006)).
221 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,524 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226).
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to the credit crunch, staggering macroeconomic costs should also be
considered.
Focusing on borrowers, delinquency and foreclosure imply sub-
stantial hardship. 222 First, borrowers will face higher rates for other
credit transactions and reduced access to credit.2 23 Second, borrow-
ers will lose some or all of their accumulated home equity if the
lender forecloses. 224 Finally, the borrower will have to bear the trans-
action costs of relocating to another house or apartment.
Delinquency and foreclosure also impose costs on lenders. In
particular, if the net proceeds from the foreclosure sale are smaller
than the outstanding loan balance, the lender will suffer a loss. Lend-
ers partially compensated for this risk by increasing the interest
rate.225 Much of this risk, however, was not priced. The sheer magni-
tude of the ex post losses-as reflected in the hundreds of billions of
dollars in subprime-related write-offs by financial institutions 226-sug-
gests that the risks were not fully accounted for ex ante.
In measuring the social cost of foreclosure, it is important to dis-
tinguish between costs borne by borrowers and lenders on the one
hand and costs borne by third parties-neighbors, neighborhoods,
and cities-on the other hand. Focusing on borrowers and lenders,
to the extent that the transacting parties were rational, the ex post cost
of foreclosure represents a sour realization of a mutually beneficial ex
ante gamble. Accordingly, we need to worry only about the imper-
fectly rational parties who did not secure a positive ex ante value. Now
consider the costs borne by third parties: these costs-negative exter-
222 Id. ("The consequences of default are severe for homeowners, who face the possi-
bility of foreclosure, the loss of accumulated home equity, higher rates for other credit
transactions, and reduced access to credit.").
223 Id.
224 Id. Consider a borrower with 20 percent equity in her home and a loan balance
equal to 80 percent of the market value of the home: If the net proceeds from the foreclo-
sure sale-the discounted sale price minus the transaction costs-are less than 80 percent
of the market value, the borrower will lose all the equity that she has accumulated. Only if
the net proceeds exceed 80 percent of the market value, the borrower retains part, not all,
of the equity that she has accumulated. The Center for Responsible Lending projects a
total equity loss of $164 billion between 1998 and 2006, or approximately $75,000 per
borrower (given the 2.2 million foreclosures that CRL projects). See SCHLOEMER ET AL.,
supra note 143, at 2-3, 11, 16. These projections are conservative on some dimensions, but
liberal on others; specifically, the projections presume that total equity exceeds the cost of
foreclosure, but for many borrowers this may not be the case.
225 See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 1 (manuscript at 28-29) (finding that
high loan-to-value borrowers increasingly became high-risk borrowers over the past five
years, in terms of elevated delinquency and foreclosure rates, and that lenders were aware
of this and adjusted mortgage rates accordingly over time).
226 See Bethel et al., supra note 12, at 21, 81 tbl.2 (citing one estimate of $150 billion in
writedowns as of February 2008 as well as a forecast that this amount will more than
double, and summarizing the tens of billions of dollars worth of subprime-related write-offs
by banks); Press Release, Standard & Poor's, supra note 16.
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nalities imposed by the loan contract-translate into a social cost,
even when both contracting parties are fully rational.
D. Distributional Concerns
Contractual design can also have distributional effects. While
wealthy borrowers were not generally part of the subprime and Alt-A
markets, there was still substantial heterogeneity in the wealth of sub-
prime and Alt-A borrowers. Given the complexity of these contracts,
wealthier borrowers who could afford to seek out expert advice were
likely to do better than borrowers who could not afford such advice. 227
Moreover, the inverse correlation between borrower wealth and con-
tractual complexity-wealthier borrowers generally got simpler prime
loans and poorer borrowers generally got more complicated subprime
or Alt-A loans-raises another distributional concern.
Evidence that "subprime mortgages [were] concentrated in loca-
tions with high proportions of black and Hispanic residents, even con-
trolling for the income and credit scores of these Zip codes"228 also
raises distributional concerns. Disparities in financial sophistication
and in the ability to effectively comparison shop-if only because mi-
nority borrowers had fewer options to compare-led to substantial
price variations. 229 A recent study found that black borrowers paid an
additional $415 in fees and Latino borrowers paid an additional $365
in fees.230 Nonprice terms likewise reflected variations. Specifically,
"black homeowners are significantly more likely to have prepayment
penalties or balloon payments attached to their mortgages than non-
black homeowners, even after controlling for age, income, gender,
and creditworthiness. '" 23 1
Gender disparities have also been identified. Women as a group
have a relatively poor understanding of credit terms and are less likely
227 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 64 ("Richer consumers are also less likely to
make mistakes, if only because they can hire experts who will prevent them from making
mistakes.").
228 Mayer & Pence, supra note 148, at 2.
229 See Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally Informed Home
Mortgage Credit Regulation, in UNDERSTANDING CONSUMER CREDIT (Eric S. Belsky & Nicolas P.
Retsinas eds.) (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 11, on file with author) ("[L]ow-income
and minority buyers are the least likely to shop for alternate financing arrange-
ments . . . ."); Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, Consumer Information Search for Home
Mortgages: Who, What, How Much, and What Else?, 9 FIN. SERVICES REv. 277, 283 (2000).
More generally, subprime borrowers are less likely to search for the best loan terms. See
Courchane et al., supra note 54 (reporting findings from a survey study); see also Zywicki &
Adamson, supra note 1], at 55-56.
230 WOODWARD, supra note 199, at ix.
231 Michael S. Barr, Jane K. Dokko & Benjamin J. Keys, Who Gets Lost in the Subprime
Mortgage Fallout? Homeowners in Low- and Moderate-Income Neighborhoods 2-3 (Apr.
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121215.
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to shop for credit.2 32 These findings imply that women will get infer-
ior mortgage products. Socioeconomic status also plays a role. Bor-
rowers with less income and education are less likely to know their
mortgage terms, implying greater underestimation of deferred or hid-
den costs and a diminished ability to effectively shop for better
terms. 23 3 Indeed, there is evidence that better-educated borrowers re-
ceived better terms on their loans.234
VI
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
I argued that borrowers' imperfect rationality explains several
contractual design features in the subprime mortgage market. I have
also argued that the imperfect rationality of borrowers, especially
when coupled with contracts designed in response to such imperfect
rationality, produces substantial welfare costs. Since market forces
have proven to be too slow to respond to these problems, legal inter-
232 See John Leland, Baltimore Finds Subprime Crisis Snags Women, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2008, at Al; see also ALLENJ. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED. OF AM., WOMEN
ARE PRIME TARGETS FOR SUBPRIME LENDING: WOMEN ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTED
IN HIGH-COST MORTGAGE MARKET 1 (2006), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/
pdfs/WomenPrimeTargetsStudyl206O6.pdf (finding that women are more likely to receive
subprime mortgages than men and that disparity between men and women increases as
income rises); NAT'L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., HOMEOWNERSHIP AND WEALTH BUILDING
IMPEDED: CONTINUING LENDING DISPARITIES FOR MINORITIES AND EMERGING OBSTACLES FOR
MIDDLE-INCOME AND FEMALE BORROWERS OF ALL RACES 12-14 (2006), available at http://
www.ncrc.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=344&Itemid=76 (finding
that women received 37 percent of high-cost home loans in 2005, compared with just 28
percent of prime loans); PRUDENTIAL INS. Co. OF AM., FINANCIAL EXPERIENCE & BEHAVIORS
AMONG WOMEN 7 (2006), available at http://www.prudential.com/media/managed/
2006WomenBrochureFINAL.pdf (finding that "a majority of financial and investment
products are unfamiliar to almost half of all women"); Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S.
Mitchell, Planning and Financial Literacy: How Do Women Fare? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 13750, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087003
(finding that older women display much lower levels of financial literacy than the older
population as a whole); Women in the Subprime Market, CONSUMERS UNION, Oct. 2002, http:/
/www.consumersunion.org/finance/women-rptl002.htm (attributing some of the dispar-
ity both to the instability in women's credit status that results from divorce or family medi-
cal emergency and to the fact that women have less wealth than men).
233 Bucks & Pence, supra note 170, at 3, 20-21, 26.
234 See WOODWARD, supra note 199 (finding that offers made by brokers to borrowers
without a college education are $1,100 higher on average); Thomas P. Boehm & Alan
Schlottmann, Mortgage Pricing Differentials Across Hispanic, African-American, and White House-
holds: Evidence from the American Housing Survey, 9 CITYScAPE: J. POL'y DEV. & RES., No. 2, at
93, 105 (2007) (finding a negative correlation between education and interest rates); An-
namaria Lusardi, Financial Literacy: An Essential Tool for Informed Consumer Choice? 10 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14084, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1149331 (citing a 2003 study by Danna Moore showing that low-literacy borrowers
are more likely to purchase high-cost mortgages). Individuals with little education, wo-
men, African-Americans, and Hispanics display particularly low levels of literacy. Id. at 1.
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vention should be considered. 23 5 I focus on disclosure regulation. I
do so not because better disclosure can cure all the ills of the mort-
gage market but because disclosure regulation is the right place to
start. First, optimally designed disclosure, while not a perfect fix, can
make a significant difference. 23 6 Second, disclosure can help less-so-
phisticated borrowers without significantly restricting the choices
available to more-sophisticated borrowers.237 Third, as a practical
matter, disclosure has proven to be the most politically feasible form
of regulation in consumer credit markets. 238
A. The Great Promise of the APR Disclosure
Perhaps the most important reason to focus on disclosure regula-
tion is that an existing disclosure mandate seems to provide, at least in
theory, an effective response to the behavioral market failure in the
subprime and Alt-A mortgage markets. I am referring to the APR dis-
closure, which lenders must provide under the Truth in Lending
Act.2 39 The APR is a normalized measure of the total cost of credit. A
lender is required to sum all the different prices and fees that the
235 The FRB, when proposing its recently adopted TILA amendments, endorsed a sim-
ilar approach, stating:
The market has responded to the current problems with increasing atten-
tion to loan quality. Structural factors, or market imperfections, however,
make it necessary to consider regulations to help prevent a recurrence of
these problems. New regulation can also provide the market clear 'rules of
the road' at a time of uncertainty, so that responsible higher-priced lend-
ing, which serves a critical need, may continue.
Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1675 (proposed Jan. 9, 2008) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226)
236 See generally LACKO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 104 (showing that better-designed
disclosure can make a significant difference).
237 See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case
for "Asymmetric Paternalism", 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H.
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
238 See generally Bar-Gill, Seduction, supra note 18. Since the abolition of usury laws,
disclosure requirements have been the centerpiece of the regulatory scheme governing the
mortgage market. See Eskridge, supra note 24 (describing the history of mortgage-contract
regulation in the U.S. and specifically the shift from usury laws to disclosure regulation).
The legislative and regulatory reaction to the recent crisis has focused on disclosure. See,
e.g., Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,524-25 (july 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226); see also, e.g., Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
289, §§ 2501-2503, 122 Stat. 2654, 2855-57. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act, as
well as other legal responses to the crisis, includes important loss-mitigation components
that are unrelated to disclosure. But these are not rules that will govern the mortgage
market going forward. Among forward-looking legal interventions, disclosure is dominant.
The FRB regulations go beyond disclosure on several important dimensions, such as re-
quiring creditors to evaluate borrowers' ability to repay; limiting the scope of permissible
prepayment penalties; and requiring creditors to establish escrow accounts for the pay-
ment of property taxes and premiums for specified insurance products. See Truth in Lend-
ing, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522.
239 SeeTruth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 107, 82 Stat. 146, 149 (1968) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (2006)) (defining the APR); Truth in Lending Act
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borrower is required to pay under the loan contract into a single ag-
gregate amount, the "finance charge," and disclose this dollar
amount. Then, to facilitate comparison shopping between different
credit products, the lender is required to translate the finance charge,
which is a dollar amount, into an annual percentage rate and disclose
this figure as well. 240
The APR should serve as a powerful antidote to the effects of im-
perfect rationality. First, the APR would seem to offer an effective re-
sponse to the complexity and multidimensionality of the subprime
mortgage contract. Lenders are required to calculate the total costs
associated with their loan product and disclose that total to the bor-
rower. With this common metric at hand, borrowers should be able
to compare the total cost of two different complex loan contracts. By
collecting all the rates and fees and folding them into a single aggre-
gate price, the APR should render the limits on borrowers' cognitive
abilities-limited attention, limited memory, and limited processing
ability-irrelevant. 241 Second, the APR should provide an effective
remedy to the myopia and optimism that give rise to deferred-cost
contracts. Since the APR is a composite of short-term and long-term
interest rates,242 capturing both long-term costs and short-term bene-
fits, it should reveal the false allure of deferred-cost contracts.
By overcoming, or bypassing, the imperfect rationality of borrow-
ers, the APR disclosure should also discourage many of the contrac-
tual design features studied above. Consider complexity and
specifically proliferation of 'junk" fees. Adding nonsalient fees was
beneficial to the lender because imperfectly rational borrowers ig-
nored them. But if these fees are included in the APR and borrowers
shop for low APRs, then the incentive to pile up more fees disap-
pears.243 Similarly, cost deferral was an attractive strategy for lenders
because myopic and optimistic borrowers placed insufficient weight
on the long-term costs. If borrowers look to the APR for guidance
and the APR calculation affords appropriate weight to both short-term
§§ 121-31, 82 Stat. at 152-57 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-49 (2006)) (re-
quiring disclosure of the APR).
240 See Renuart & Thompson, supra note 24, at 217 ("Congress designed the APR to be
the single number that consumers should focus upon when shopping for credit.").
241 See id. at 214 (arguing that a comprehensive, fee-inclusive APR will help imperfectly
rational consumers who cannot aggregate the multiple fees on their own).
242 12 C.F.R. § 226.17 (2008); Official Staff Commentary § 226.17(c) (1)-(10) (2008).
243 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SvS. & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN
DEV., JOINT REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING REFORM TO THE TRUTH AND LENDING
AcT AND THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES Acr 9 (1998), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/general/1998/19980717/default.htrm ("[T] he APR
concept deters hidden or junk' fees to the extent that the fees must be included in the
APR calculation.").
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and long-term costs, then lenders will have no incentive to defer
costS.
2 4 4
There is evidence that the APR disclosure can work. Many bor-
rowers know to look for the APR and comparison shop based on the
APR disclosure. 245 This has led to enhanced competition and re-
duced rates.246 There is even evidence that the APR succeeded in
fighting imperfect rationality. Specifically, Victor Stango and
Jonathan Zinman show that the most biased consumers-that is, con-
sumers who substantially underestimate the APR corresponding to a
given payment stream-do not overpay for credit when borrowing in
markets where TILA disclosures are made reliably; yet, such consum-
ers pay 300-400 basis points more in interest compared to less-biased
consumers in markets where TILA disclosures are not made
reliably. 247
244 To clarify, it is not that lenders will be indifferent to the choice between deferring
cost or not deferring cost or between adding nonsalient fees and not adding such fees;
lenders will have an affirmative reason not to defer costs and not to add 'junk" fees. The
reason is that any such deviation from the optimal contract design will increase the total
cost of the loan and thus the disclosed APR.
245 See Lee & Hogarth, supra note 229, at 286 (finding that 78 percent of homeowners
who refinanced their homes report comparison shopping on the basis of the APR); Lee &
Hogarth, supra note 198, at 74 (reporting that more than 70 percent of the population
reports using the APR to shop for closed-end credit); Renuart & Thompson, supra note 24,
at 189 ("TILA disclosures have been remarkably effective in educating consumers to pay
attention to the APR as a key measure of the cost of credit."). The "finance charge" from
which the APR is derived can be viewed as an example of a life-cycle cost measure. Empiri-
cal evidence suggests that life-cycle cost disclosures affect consumer behavior. See Matthias
Deutsch, The Effect of Life-Cycle Cost Disclosure on Consumer Behavior (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Univ. of Md., 2007), available at http://hdl.handle.net/1903/6794 (finding that
shoppers who received "life-cycle cost" information chose cooling appliances and washing
machines that used less energy); see also Matthias Deutsch, Life-Cycle Cost Disclosure, Con-
sumer Behavior, and Business Implications: Evidence from an Online Field Experiment, in SUSTAINA-
BLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION: FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 391, 406 (Theo Geer Ken et
al. eds., 2008) ("Disclosing estimated life-cycle costs to shoppers makes them opt for wash-
ing machines with, on average, 0.83% less specific energy consumption and 0.74% less
specific water consumption.").
246 See S. REP. No. 96-368, at 16 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 252 (credit-
ing TILA with increasing consumer awareness of annual percentage rates and with a sub-
stantial reduction of the market share of creditors charging the highest rates); Randall S.
Kroszner, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the George Wash-
ington University School of Business Financial Services Research Program Policy Forum:
Creating More Effective Consumer Disclosures (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Kroszner2007O523a.htm (stating that TILA disclo-
sure requirements and specifically the APR disclosure "are generally believed to have im-
proved competition and helped individual consumers" (citing BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RESERVE Sys., ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE DEMONSTRATION PROJECT (1987))).
247 Victor Stango &Jonathan Zinman, Fuzzy Math, Disclosure Regulation and Credit Mar-
ket Outcomes 5 (Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2008-42, 2007), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1081635.
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B. The Failure of the APR Disclosure
Despite the aforementioned achievements of the APR disclosure,
there is broad consensus that the APR has not lived up to its great
potential and that the current disclosure regime has failed, especially
in the subprime and Alt-A markets. 248 Why has the APR failed? Why
did it not protect borrowers and ensure an efficient market? The an-
swer lies in several defects that prevented the APR from living up to its
great promise. First, the APR was often disclosed too late. Lenders
were not required to disclose a binding APR-that is, an APR that
they cannot change after the disclosure-until consummation of the
loan transaction (closing).249 In purchase loans, lenders were re-
quired to disclose a good-faith estimate of the APR three days after
receiving a loan application. But lenders were not bound by this esti-
mate, and thus borrowers could not rely on it when shopping for
loans.2 50 Moreover, in some cases, the estimated APR was provided
only after a substantial application fee was paid, and so borrowers who
were reluctant to pay numerous application fees could not use the
estimated APR for comparison shopping. The situation was even
worse with refinance loans, where lenders were not required to pro-
vide any disclosure before closing. 25 1 Disclosing a binding APR only
at closing discourages APR-based comparison shopping. Few borrow-
ers would reach the closing stage and then, after finally learning the
APR, refuse to sign the loan documents and start shopping again.
(Note that to compare the APR on one loan with the APR on a com-
248 The evidence showing the success of the APR is limited to the prime market. See
supra notes 245-47; see also Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based
Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 126, 138-39 (2007) (noting robust competition in the
prime market and that TILA disclosures effectively facilitate this competition). On the
general failure of the TILA disclosure regime in the nonprime segments, see, for example,
GAO AMP REPORT, supra note 43, at 21 (noting that current disclosure requirements "are
not designed to address more complex products such as [Alternative Mortgage Prod-
ucts] "); Paulson, supra note 2; Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the
Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 CEO. L.J. 233, 236 (1991) (noting that shopping for credit is lim-
ited to "upscale consumers who would manage perfectly well without [the] benefit of [the
TILA disclosures]"). Secretary Paulson highlighted the need for more and better
information:
We need simple, clear, and understandable mortgage disclosure. We must
identify what information is most critical for borrowers to have so that they
can make informed decisions. At closing, homebuyers get writer's cramp
from initialing pages and pages of unintelligible and mostly unread boiler-
plate that appears to be designed to insulate the originator or lender from
liability rather than to provide useful information to the borrower. We can
and must do better.
Paulson, supra note 2.
249 See McCoy, supra note 248, at 141.
250 See id.
251 See id. at 137-43; Willis, supra note 4, at 749-50; FrC Comment, supra note 66, at
11-12. The exception is HOEPA loans, where binding early disclosures are required. See
McCoy, supra note 248, at 141.
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peting loan, the borrower would have to reach the closing stage with
the second loan as well.)2 52
Second, while purporting to provide a total-cost-of-credit mea-
sure, the APR excludes numerous price dimensions, such as title in-
surance fees, title examination fees, property survey fees, appraisal
fees, credit report fees, document preparation fees, notary fees, flood
and pest inspection fees, seller's points, prepayment penalties, and
late fees.2 53 By excluding these price dimensions, the APR underesti-
mates the total cost of the loan. Moreover, this exclusion invites stra-
tegic pricing by lenders. When certain price dimensions are excluded
from the APR, lenders will benefit from shifting costs to these ex-
cluded dimensions. 254 These problems undermine the effectiveness
of the APR: since the APR does not measure the total cost of credit,
borrowers are less likely to focus on the APR; borrowers who neverthe-
less use the APR for comparing loans may well end up with a product
that, while boasting a lower APR, costs more overall.
Third, the APR disclosure fails to account for the prepayment op-
tion 255-an option that has critically affected the values of subprime
and Alt-A loans in the recent mortgage-lending expansion. The pre-
payment option can have a substantial effect on a loan's value, even
252 See McCoy, supra note 248; Willis, supra note 4, at 749-50.
253 See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, TRUTH IN LENDING: COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK
98 (2006), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/til.pdf (showing APR does not
include late fees, title insurance fees, title examination fees, property survey fees, appraisal
fees, credit report fees, document preparation fees, notary fees, flood and pest inspection
fees, and seller's points); Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1165-66; Willis, supra note 4, at 744,
747, 750 (noting APR includes origination fees and points, but not interest rate escalations,
prepayment penalties, late fees, title insurance, and application, appraisal, and document
preparation fees).
254 Elizabeth Renuart and Diane Thompson, both former members of the Consumer
Advocacy Council to the Federal Reserve Board, made note of this possibility:
The Board's "fee-by-fee" approach encourages all lenders to "game" the sys-
tem by unbundling the cost of loan originations into an increasing number
of fees that are excluded from the disclosed finance charges .... Absent
mandatory, comprehensive, and simple pricing disclosures, lenders have
perverse incentives to create complicated pricing structures, including dif-
ferent rates on different balances, multitudinous fees, variable rates, and
payment options. These products, by their design, obscure the true price
of credit. Unsurprisingly, lenders have responded to the current regulatory
environment by evolving ever more complex and profitable products.
Renuart & Thompson, supra note 24, at 185, 221. Regulation has focused on "the most
obvious, transparent and important terms," Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 11, at 71, such
as interest rates, points, and closing costs, causing substitution to less transparent terms,
such as prepayment penalties and LTV ratios. Such a focus "makes it more difficult to for
borrowers to easily shop and compare terms." Id.
255 See HUD-TREcASURV REPORT, supra note 11, at 66 (noting that "the APR does not
account for an early payoff").
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for traditional, prime loans.256 The effect on deferred costs of sub-
prime and Alt-A loans that were taken with intent to prepay before the
end of the low-rate introductory period can be much greater. Con-
sider a 2-28 hybrid for $150,000 with a monthly payment of $1,000 for
the first two years and a monthly payment of $1,500 for the remaining
twenty-eight years. The APR on this loan, ignoring the prepayment
option, is 10.74 percent. Assuming that before the 2-28 mortgage
resets, the borrower can refinance into a thirty-year FRM with a $1,000
monthly payment, the effective APR is 7.19 percent.257 The effect of
an attractive prepayment option is substantial.
Moreover, since the prepayment option affects different contrac-
tual designs differently, an APR that ignores the prepayment option
can skew the comparison among different loan products. The prepay-
ment option might render the APR disclosure misleading even with
simple loan contracts. Comparing two loans, Loan A and Loan B, the
APR on Loan A can be lower, reflecting a lower total cost of credit
absent prepayment. But with prepayment, the total cost of Loan B
may well be lower.258 This problem is exacerbated when complex
contracts include a set of varying terms that interact differently with
the prepayment option. 259
The term that most obviously affects the value of the prepayment
option is the prepayment penalty. Many have expressed concerns
about prepayment penalties, and the FRB's new mortgage regulations
256 See Agarwal et al., supra note 120, at 28 (calculating a 26.8 percent impact on a
$100,000 mortgage for using the wrong rule to make prepayment decisions; the impact of
ignoring the prepayment option altogether may well be larger).
257 The actual (no prepayment) and effective (with prepayment) APRs were calculated
using APRWIN (Ver. 6.1.0).
258 The following example is illustrative:
To see how the APR can be misleading, suppose I give you the choice of
borrowing the $100,000 at either an 8% rate and the $1,000 fee with the
360 payments of $733.76, or a 8.125% rate and a fee of $100 and 360 pay-
ments of $742.50. The APR for the 8% rate and $1,000 fee is 8.11%, and
the APR for the 8.125% rate and $100 fee is 8.14%. Most consumers would
think that the 8% rate is a better deal because the APR is lower. However,
this is only true provided you do not pay off the loan early. For example, if
you were able to refinance and payoff the loan after 3 years, with the 8%
rate you would have paid a total of $27,415.36 (36 payments of $733.76 plus
the $1,000 fee). With the 8.125% rate you would have paid $26,830 (36
payments of $742.50 plus $100), so the 8% rate was actually $585.36 more
expensive, even though it had a lower APR.
Reed Mortgage Corp., Annual Percentage Rate (APR), http://www.reedmc.com/APR.htm
(last visited Mar. 13, 2009). More generally, by ignoring the prepayment option, the APR
underestimates the importance of origination fees (those that are included in the APR
calculation) that accrue at closing; no such underestimation afflicts interest charges that
accrue gradually over the life of the loan. See Renuart & Thompson, supra note 24, at 231.
This may provide another explanation for the proliferation of origination fees.
259 Compare the value of the prepayment option on an FRM without a prepayment
penalty to the value of the prepayment option on a negative amortization option ARM with
a CLTV of 100 percent and a substantial prepayment penalty.
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restrict their use in higher-priced loans.260 The fear is that, since pre-
payment penalties are not incorporated into the APR, borrowers will
underestimate their effect on the total cost of the loan.26 1 These con-
cerns, while valid, address only one aspect of the problem. Those crit-
ical of prepayment penalties focus on the penalties that borrowers
actually pay and on borrowers' underestimation of these payments.
They ignore the effects of prepayment penalties on the value of the
prepayment option. Moreover, prepayment penalties reduce the ex
ante value of the prepayment option even when they are not paid ex
post.
An APR that ignores the prepayment option will play a reduced
role in the shopping decisions of perfectly rational borrowers. Fur-
ther, it will play an even more minor role in the shopping decisions of
imperfectly rational borrowers who overestimate the value of the pre-
payment option. Moreover, this flaw in the APR calculation enabled
even honest brokers and loan officers to deflect borrowers' attention
from the APR disclosure. For example, the APR on a deferred-cost
loan could be much higher than the initial teaser rate. Loan origina-
tors wanted borrowers to focus on the low teaser rate and not on the
high APR. These brokers and loan officers could truthfully tell bor-
rowers that they are likely to prepay and exit long before the nominal
thirty-year loan period ends and that they should therefore pay little
attention to an APR that assumes thirty years of loan payments.
The APR disclosure failed. Because the APR was often disclosed
too late, borrowers could not use the APR to choose between different
loan products. Moreover, the APR, by excluding numerous price
dimensions and by ignoring the prepayment option, failed to live up
to its declared purpose of providing an accurate total-cost-of-credit
measure. As a result, borrowers abandoned the APR, and it ceased to
be the focal point of comparison shopping in the subprime mortgage
260 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,551 Uuly 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226).
261 See id. at 44,525 ("Subprime loans are also far more likely to have prepayment pen-
alties. Because the annual percentage rate (APR) does not reflect the price of the penalty,
the consumer must both calculate the size of the penalty from a formula and assess the
likelihood of moving or refinancing during the penalty period. In these and other ways,
subprime products tend to be complex for consumers."); see also Truth in Lending, 73 Fed.
Reg. 1672, 1694 (proposedJan. 9, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) ("The injuries
prepayment penalties may cause consumers are particularly concerning because of serious
questions as to whether borrowers knowingly accept the risk of such injuries. Current dis-
closures of prepayment penalties, including the disclosure of penalties in Regulation Z
§ 226.18(k), do not appear adequate to ensure transparency. . . . It is questionable
whether consumers can accurately factor a contingent cost such as a prepayment penalty
into the price of a loan.. . ."). Moreover, an FTC report concluded, based on consumer
testing, that even an improved disclosure of the prepayment penalty left a substantial por-
tion of the prime and subprime consumers interviewed without a basic understanding of
the penalty. LACKO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 104, at 110.
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market. The resulting cost to borrowers and to society more generally
was substantial. As explained above, the APR has the potential to ame-
liorate the effects of imperfect rationality, but it can effectively re-
spond to the imperfect rationality of borrowers only if imperfectly
rational borrowers rely on the APR; many borrowers, however, did
not.262
C. Fixing the APR Disclosure
Given the potential of the APR disclosure to compensate for the
imperfect rationality of borrowers, it should be a priority for policy-
makers to fix the APR's problems. In fact, the timing problem has
already been addressed-and partially solved-by recent legal re-
forms. In particular, the new FRB regulations require lenders to dis-
close an APR within three days after the loan application has been
submitted and before any fees are charged for both purchase and refi-
nance loans.263 Further, the recently enacted Housing and Economic
Recovery Act requires lenders to disclosure an updated APR three
days before consummation of the loan transaction, in case the previ-
ously disclosed APR "is no longer accurate. '264
These recent statutory and regulatory responses reduce the tim-
ing-of-disclosure problem, but they do not solve it. Two issues remain:
First, lenders can still disclose a low APR after receiving an application
and a higher APR later on.2 65 Borrowers will be wary of using the
application-stage APR for comparison shopping, since this APR can
change. And three days before closing, the time when an updated
APR is provided, may already be too late for effective comparison
262 See 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,525-26. As noted by the Federal Reserve Board in its recent
revision of its Truth in Lending regulations:
A consumer may focus on loan attributes that have the most obvious and
immediate consequence such as loan amount, down payment, initial
monthly payment, initial interest rate, and up-front fees (though up-front
fees may be more obscure when added to the loan amount, and 'discount
points' in particular may be difficult for consumers to understand). These
consumers, therefore, may not focus on terms that may seem less immedi-
ately important to them such as future increases in payment amounts or
interest rates, prepayment penalties, and negative amortization. . . . Con-
sumers who do not fully understand such terms and features, however, are
less able to appreciate their risks, which can be significant. For example,
the payment may increase sharply and a prepayment penalty may hinder
the consumer from refinancing to avoid the payment increase. Thus, con-
sumers may unwittingly accept loans that they will have difficulty repaying.
Id.
263 See id. at 44,590-92; see also Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-289, § 2502(a), 122 Stat. 2654, 2855-57 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b) (2)).
264 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 § 2502(a).
265 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1255, 1269 (2002) (noting that lenders face
no liability for errors in the Good Faith Estimate (GFE), including the GFE of the APR).
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shopping.266 Second, the enforcement of these improved timing-of-
disclosure rules is imperfect. Specifically, several appellate courts
have interpreted TILA's civil liability section 267 as precluding statutory
damages for timing-of-disclosure violations.268 The borrower would
thus have to claim actual damages and prove detrimental reliance-a
substantial barrier to recovery. While Congress and the FRB should
be commended for reducing the timing-of-disclosure problem, still
more can and should be done: disclosure of a binding APR should be
required at an earlier time, 269 and the civil liability provisions of TILA
should be strengthened.
The second problem, underinclusiveness, has not been ad-
dressed. The purpose of the APR was to provide a uniform total-cost-
of-credit measure. The current APR excludes numerous price dimen-
sions and thus fails to present the total cost of credit. The analysis in
this Article lends further support to proposals, most recently by Eliza-
beth Renuart and Diane Thompson, to create a more inclusive
APR.270 Several price dimensions that are currently excluded from
the APR definition can be easily added. Others can only be added at a
cost. Specifically, adding the price of truly optional services to the
APR would generate several APRs for a single mortgage, potentially
confusing rather than assisting borrowers. Adding contingent prices,
such as late fees and prepayment penalties, imposes a different cost.
These prices can only be incorporated into the APR by estimating the
average probability that the fee-triggering contingency will material-
ize. An APR based on this estimated average would be inaccurate for
many borrowers. Of course, the current APR, which in effect assumes
a zero probability of triggering these contingent fees, is similarly inac-
266 Moreover, it is not clear from the language of the statute that lenders cannot
change the APR again between the time of the updated disclosure (three days before clos-
ing) and consummation.
267 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2006).
268 See, e.g., Dykstra v. Wayland Ford, Inc., 134 F. App'x 911 (6th Cir. 2005); Baker v.
Sunny Chevrolet, Inc., 349 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2003); Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc.,
202 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2000); In re Ferrell, 358 B.R. 777 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006). Other
courts have adopted a more expansive interpretation of TILA's civil liability provisions.
See, e.g., Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., 374 F.3d 1060 (lth Cir. 2004).
269 See HUD-TRE.AsuRY REPORT, supra note 11, at 67 (proposing that originators be re-
quired to provide an accurate, within a prescribed tolerance, Good Faith Estimate of,
among other things, the APR). It should be recognized, however, that locking in an APR
at an earlier time would place greater interest rate risk on the lender and that this added
risk would be, at least partially, passed on to borrowers. Borrowers who need the APR as a
focal point for comparison shopping should be willing to accept these consequences. Cf
McCoy, supra note 248, at 138 (arguing that similar rate lock-ins are common in the prime
market even though lenders are not required to disclose a binding APR).
270 Renuart & Thompson, supra note 24; see also HUD-TREASuRY REPORT, supra note 11,
at 69 (proposing that the law be amended "to require that the full cost of credit be in-
cluded in the APR"); Eskridge, supra note 24 (proposing a more inclusive APR more than
twenty years ago).
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curate for many borrowers. While a more inclusive APR is warranted,
for some price dimensions the inclusion decision requires a careful
cost-benefit analysis.
The third problem-the ignored prepayment option-also has
not been addressed by policymakers. This problem has even escaped
the attention of commentators. When borrowers expect, rationally or
irrationally, to avoid high long-term costs by refinancing their mort-
gage, they will ignore an APR that does not include the prepayment
option. It is, therefore, useful to consider the possibility of incorpo-
rating the prepayment option into the APR calculation. To be sure,
accounting for the possibility of prepayment is a nontrivial exercise.
The likelihood and timing of prepayment would have to be estimated
and so would the expected terms of the refinance loan. These esti-
mates would need to be based on projections of future house prices
(for each Metropolitan Statistical Area) and interest rates. These fu-
ture market conditions would then need to be combined with esti-
mated borrower and loan characteristics, such as future FICO score,
future income, and future LTV, to estimate the refinancing options
that would be available to the specific borrower.271
These estimates and projections would necessarily be based on a
series of assumptions. While the use of assumptions is not new to dis-
closure regulation, 272 it should be recognized that some degree of ar-
bitrariness in the choice of assumptions is inevitable and that the
chosen assumptions will not perfectly reflect the situation of all bor-
rowers. 273 However, the difficulties of generating accurate projections
should not be exaggerated. The mortgage industry already employs
sophisticated valuation algorithms to arrive at projections tailored to
specific home and loan characteristics. 274 An APR disclosure that uses
these projections to account for the prepayment option will thus re-
271 Estimating the future LTV is particularly complicated. This estimate would be
based on the current LTV, the contractually specified payment stream, the prepayment
penalty-which would need to be financed by the new loan-and the projected future
house value.
272 Note, for example, the assumptions needed for calculating the total payment pe-
riod for credit card debt under BAPCPA.
273 Sophisticated valuation algorithms can be used to more closely tailor predictions to
specific homes and specific loans. See CAGAN, supra note 25, at 5 (describing the valuation
algorithms).
274 Projections and forecasts are commonly used in the industry. See, e.g., CAGAN,,, supra
note 25; Sherlund, supra note 133, at 11 ("I draw house price, interest rate, and unemploy-
ment rate forecasts from Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's June 2008 monthly economic
outlooks .... "); cf. W. Miles, Boom-Bust Cycles and the Forecasting Performance of Linear and
Non-Linear Models of House Prices, 36J. REAL EsT. FIN. & EcoN. 249 (2008) (comparing the
power of competing models to predict house prices). Futures markets can be used to help
predict price trajectories.
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duce the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. 275
More importantly, this disclosure could restore borrower confidence
in the APR and thus harness the potential of the APR to counteract
the effects of imperfect rationality.27 6
It is worth reminding ourselves that even an optimally designed
APR will not be perfect. It is impossible to fully capture the mul-
tidimensionality of a mortgage loan in a one-dimensional metric. 277
This inevitable limitation, however, does not detract from the social
value of the APR disclosure. Sophisticated borrowers who can deal
with the complexity and multidimensionality will not rely solely on the
APR. Those who rely solely, or mainly, on the APR will be the less
sophisticated borrowers who, absent the APR disclosure, would rely on
an even less accurate proxy.278
CONCLUSION
Subprime and Alt-A mortgage contracts are complex, mul-
tidimensional contracts that often defer costs into the future. This
contractual design can be explained as a market response to the im-
perfect rationality of borrowers. The welfare costs of this market fail-
ure are substantial: Competition is both hindered and distorted,
resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources. Default and foreclo-
sure rates increase, imposing costs on borrowers, lenders, neighbor-
hoods, cities, and the economy at large. And distributional concerns
are raised.
275 Did lenders really have superior information during the subprime expansion? The
multibillion-dollar losses that lenders have been incurring since the collapse of the sub-
prime market suggest that their algorithms may well have been off the mark. Still, it is
hard to imagine that lenders, including the Wall Street firms that financed them, had the
same information as the average subprime borrower. Moreover, at least some of these
lenders made a knowing bet that turned out sour. How many borrowers made a knowing
bet?
276 The proposed disclosure would also assist rational borrowers. Currently, these bor-
rowers must calculate the value of the prepayment option (or the probability of facing an
attractive prepayment option) on their own. This is a costly exercise. And some borrowers
may decide to forgo the exercise. The proposed disclosure would save the calculation costs
or, for those borrowers who would forgo the exercise, reduce uncertainty about the pre-
payment option.
277 See Barr et al., supra note 229 (manuscript at 9) ("The need for simplicity conflicts,
however, with the goal of producing comprehensive disclosures that permit consumers to
comparison shop based on the real price of multi-attribute loans.").
278 The limits of the APR, even when optimally designed, warrant consideration of
supplementary approaches. For example, the FRB could sponsor a web-based mortgage
search tool. This tool would ask the borrower for information relevant to loan underwrit-
ing and then provide a list of best options (from the best lenders), where the best options,
or at least some of them, would not necessarily be picked solely by the APR. Cf JOHN
LYNCH, CONSUMER INFORMATION PROCESSING AND MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES (2008), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/mortgage/presentations/LynchJohn.pdf (propos-
ing a "personalized screening agent website for best alternatives in region").
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In this Article, I argued that the outcome in the subprime and
Alt-A markets can be improved by revitalizing the APR disclosure.
The APR, by providing a common total-cost-of-credit measure, can
serve as an effective antidote to imperfect rationality. The APR can
serve this important role, however, only if borrowers focus on the APR
when choosing among different mortgage products. In the subprime
and Alt-A markets, borrowers have largely abandoned the APR. This
can change. Borrowers will again rely on the APR if it is disclosed
early enough-that is, earlier than what recent reforms require-and
if it is redesigned to provide a comprehensive total-cost-of-credit mea-
sure. To this end, Congress and the FRB should minimize the num-
ber of price dimensions that are excluded from the APR definition
and consider incorporating the prepayment option into the APR cal-
culation. These proposals, if successful in restoring borrower confi-
dence in the APR, will allow the subprime and Alt-A markets to
benefit from the APR's unique ability to combat imperfect rationality.
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